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PREFACE
The criticism which has collected around Ben Jonson 
has been suspicious of him both as a critic and as an 
original creator, unjustly so since he is one of the first 
English authors to be both an acute critic and a serious 
playwright, and since definitions of originality may differ 
according to the predilections of a particular age or the 
general orientation of a civilization. Efforts to defend 
him have concentrated on his peculiarly Elizabethan, as 
opposed to his classical, propensities. These critical 
opinions are indicative of a trend most apparent since the 
nineteenth century, which demands the factually prosaic 
y or practical in matters of everyday actuality and approves 
avowals of spontaneity and originality in literature and 
art. A split has developed between fact and truth. That 
Jonson was able to incorporate the factual world in a vision 
of truth may be one cause for his unpopularity. His plays 
display a hyper-sensitivity to the external world and they 
are aggressively opposed to the reliance of the self solely 
on itself--a tendency begun by the Romantic Movement and 
still in vogue today.
Viewed in the critical context of his age, Jonson 
appears as one who illustrates one particular tradition of 
the mind--legitimate, coherent, and demanding--a tradition 
inherited from the Greeks, represented primarily by Aris­
totle , and subsequently a part of Renaissance culture: the
rational, analytical tradition, which stands in opposition 
to the Christianized Platonic tradition of the poet as 
first of all a creator of ideal truths. This opposition 
is illuminated by an examination of the critical struggles 
of the age which involved coping with several key terms or 
ideas: "nature," "imitation," and "unity of action," the
focal one being imitation. Conclusions by Renaissance 
critics hit two extremes: imitation as copying of earlier
authors, and imitation as a function of the poet as a 
divinely inspired creator of ideal truths. In between 
these two extremes, there still hovered, in a mist, Aris­
totle's original statement that art was an imitation (not 
synonymous with copying) of life or nature, not necessarily 
idealized. Even when the critics used his phrase, they 
still ended with the dictum that art should purvey ideal 
truths, which generally meant idealized situations or 
characters. This, of course, could result in the overtly 
moralistic, and the playwrights' violation of this approach 
to morality gave critics of the drama more ammunition. 
Jonson stands firmly, and with "originality," in the middle 
kingdom with "we may improve, but not augment," a
distinction which Sidney, the other chief English critic, 
does not make. His plays show a distinct opposition to 
incorporating in nature models not found in nature or 
truths revealed from extraterrestrial sources. One 
improves by examining the specimens that exist, not by 
creating idealized ones, which might flatter an audience 
into thinking themselves of the same quality.
Jonson's attitudes towards the concepts of nature, 
imitation, and unity of action are revealed both in his 
criticism and in his plays. His artistic approach is 
revealed as one that conceived of form as a function of 
the rational mind and art as an endeavor of method, in 
practice as well as theory; like Aristotle he is analyti­
cal, empirical, worldly, and ethical, and like Aristotle 
he construes action as being a creative principle of the 
order of things. In addition to being concerned with art 
as truth, he is one of the first English writers to be 
explicitly concerned with art as form.
He is primarily concerned with comedy, with the
"baser sort" of nature, or rather men "worse, or of the
same kind," and unity of action is a major element of that
technique by which he bestows artistic form on a world of
unreason where no form is apparently possible: .he creates
\
a rationally comprehensible and coherent world view out of
I
worldly unreason and the resulting chaos.
His plays from The Case is Altered through Every Man
vii
in his Humour and Every Man out of his Humour to Volpone,
The Alchemist and Bartholomew Fair illustrate his increas­
ing mastery of form based on certain principles, the pri­
mary one being the classical principle of unity, arising 
from unity of action and its successful correlation with 
his idea of human nature, represented by the humours theory. 
In Jonson the classical ideal of unity in all things, in? 
eluding both the universe and art, becomes primarily an 
artistic principle used to reveal and explore the earthly 
chaos which violates this unity.
The Case is Altered illustrates how Jonson grapples 
with plot in the somewhat rudimentary sense of "summary of 
the action," a Renaissance critical phrase too often mean­
ing a preliminary statement of events to govern the sub­
sequent composition. Using plots not his own, Jonson 
struggles in this play with the thought and motive that 
will go with the actions. In the two "humours" plays which 
follow, Jonson creates characters more obviously on the 
basis of a guiding principle. In using the humours for 
comic purposes, he turns from the human condition’s ideal 
possibilities to its contorted probabilities. At this 
stage, he may seem to focus on character more than action, 
particularly in Every Man out of his Humour, for in Every 
Man in his Humour he achieves an artistic balance between 
character and action not so evident in Every Man out of 
his Humour where he is exploring the emotional possibilities
. viii
of the humour theory. Nevertheless, in both these plays, 
there is evidence of Jenson's discerning and fulfilling 
the need not only for a principle of unity in character 
creation (humours theory) but also for a principle of con­
struction to connect and relate character and action (imity 
of action) and produce unified, meaningful action in a 
world where fools and rogues cannot produce rational, and 
therefore, according to Aristotelian thought, not unified 
and not meaningful, action.
In Volpone there is an expansiveness of motive and 
a fulsomeness in thematic content that may bring this play 
closer to the contemporary Jacobean practice of play writ­
ing than to classical example and theory. The principles 
of character and action and their creation are more fully 
absorbed in the governing intelligences of the play, Vol­
pone and Mosca, making it suggest the typically Elizabethan 
focus on a dominant and dominating character. Neverthe­
less, having granted Jonson's premise of the humours, both 
Volpone and The Alchemist are examples of "a man is what he 
is because of his actions." But for Jonson the humours are 
not just a premise; his plays provide the evidence and 
justification for something that came from observation and 
thought, not just an imposed theory. In both plays it is 
action rather than theory which creates both the characters 
and their ends : actions both reveal and increase emotional 
appetites which also feed themselves by the action of
ix
language and become in turn the resulting action.
Jonson could shift the weight of control from unity 
of character, as in Volpone, to unity of action, as in The 
Alchemist, to that of place, as in Bartholomew Fair. But 
consistently present in all these is the principle of uni­
fying action as a creator of the natural or the unnatural, 
as a universal principle of rational order or irrational 
disorder. The rational concept of proportioned action in 
ordered space and time is the governing one, however, and 
it rather than the "laws” of unity of time and place, cre­
ates the boundaries of Ben Jonson's dramatic world.
BEN JONSON: PRINCIPLES OF CRITICISM AND CREATION
CHAPTER I
THE CRITICAL CONTEXT: JONSON AND CURRENT
CRITICAL ATTITUDES
Contemporary commentators point to the need for 
more specific assessments of Ben Jonson's achievement in 
literature when they refer to the careful, conscious com­
plexity of his well ordered plays.^ At the same time it 
seems to be taken for granted that some aspects of his 
work, in particular the humours theory, are already well 
clarified. The humours theory is an old chestnut, and 
G. Güregory Smith, for one, in his biography of Jonson,
thinks Jonson too much remembered as "the academic and
2
antiquary of Humours." The way in which the humours 
theory is taken for granted is indicative of the way in 
which Jonson himself is taken for granted: for his biog­
raphers his colorful life and personality may serve as a
^Madeleine Doran, Endeavors of Art : A Study of
Form in Elizabethan Drama (Madison, Wisconsin, 195^), 
pp. 169, 2?W, 294.
2G. Gregory Smith, Ben Jonson (London, 1919), P« 1.
2source of amusement and legend, the blustering bricklayer
3
Elizabethan who barely falls short of being a buffoon; or 
he may be treated with a certain condescension as an indi­
vidual of no unusual qualities except for an inclination
ktowards the fustily academic. That he had a powerful 
mind which helps to account for his artistically con­
structed plays seems to be the least important considera­
tion; in other words, the treatment of Jonson by intellec­
tuals seems not to value the intellectual and its resultant 
qualities in a work of art. Men in general turn to those 
who pull at their heartstrings and thereby perhaps make 
them think better of themselves than they had thought 
before. Jonson, of course, cannot call upon that source 
of understanding and liking, for he did not proceed through 
the "holiness of the heart's affections."^
Jonson, however, amused a good many people in his 
own day, so despite his critical picture of his own time, 
perhaps his own era had a greater capacity for and toler­
ance of both foibles and honesty than later periods. Per­
haps also his audience had a greater appreciation, although 
not necessarily a critically conscious one, of aesthetic
3
Byron Steel, 0 Rare Ben Jonson (New York, 1928).
4
Marchette Chute, Ben Jonson of Westminster (New 
York, 1953).
^From E. M. Forster's essay "What I Believe" (1939).
symmetry than later ages, for whom form has made its popu­
lar and threatening appearance in standardization and 
mechanization: form of any kind has become either effete
or repressive and the intellectually abstract is often 
considered irrelevant; and if it is not either romantically 
idealistic or cynical, it becomes suspect. On stage the 
predominant impression of Jonson's plays is that of a 
symmetry that comes from their creator's holding together 
a large number of elements in an overall design. This 
design is wrought with a dignity that comes from a classi­
cal consciousness of clear design, and curiously enough it 
also encompasses the most outrageous slapstick and buf­
foonery. In general, reacting to the design of his plays 
seems more dependent on an apprehension of mental activity 
than on intense feeling or even on a feeling of the right­
ness of things enacted. It is perhaps a mental activity 
associated more with mathematics or logic or philosophy, 
but literature has generally reserved to itself the right 
of taking all human experience as its province, and that 
for some time has included not just the appetitive and 
emotive propulsions of feeding and sleeping, loving and 
hating, doubting and affirming, living and dying, but also 
self-conscious intellectual and critical reflection on the 
way in which these activities are pursued.
Jonson's personality, as well as his bent of mind 
and the sphere of his interests, may be another reason for
4only a tentative critical approval of his efforts. Boast­
ful and belligerent, vain and pedantic, rude and uncouth, 
a former bricklayer become a "mountain belly" and "rocky 
face," with the general appearance of an ill-clad butcher, 
he presumed to pronounce on moral and aesthetic matters.
What strange creatures nature makes. Is it possible that 
into such a phenomenally gross presence, nature could have 
placed a powerful intelligence capable of fine distinctions 
and an innate affinity for an understanding of fine design? 
How ridiculous of him not to have perceived the absurdity 
of the dichotomy in his own makeup and to have been properly 
humbled ! But when Jonson talked about the evolution and 
definition of comedy, perhaps that idea is what he thought 
he was talking about, and not about pride or pedantry or 
manners. Despite the observation of a seventeenth century 
contemporary, a student at a convivial tavern gathering, 
that Jonson had never read about the boastful man is Aris­
totle's Ethics, perhaps Jonson found in the Ethics defini­
tions of abstract qualities which did not exclude him.^
Such, then, is the proud man; the man who falls 
short of him is unduly humble, and the man who 
goes beyond him is vain. . . . For the unduly 
humble man, being worthy of good things, robs 
himself of what he deserves, and seems to have 
something bad about him from the fact that he 
does not think himself worthy of good things, 
and seems also not to know himself; else he 
would have desired the things he was worthy of, 
since these were good.
(IV.3.1125a)
^Steel, Jonson, p. l46.
The man who is angry at the right things and 
with the right people, and further, as he ought, 
when he ought, and as long as he ought, is praised.
(IV.4.1125b)
For those who are not angry at the things they 
should be angry at are thought to be fools, and
so are those who are not angry in the right
way, at the right time, or with the right per­
sons. . . .7
(IV.4.1126)
Jonson may have found himself in these words; he may have
been right, as right as those who have seen only a vain
and angry braggart no better than themselves or any other. 
Such may always be the problem of the elusive properties 
of abstractions in relation to appearances.
Jonson's plays throughout and his sententiae evince 
a concern with the "means." By some this might be termed 
a concern with the common or the commonplace. Herford and 
Simpson account for his singularity or rarity in the fol­
lowing manner:
Wherein then does his 'rarity' consist?
Obviously it was in part only a relative and 
conditioned rarity. His contemporaries found 
him singular because his unmistakable genius 
was not in fact made on the common Elizabethan 
or Jacobean pattern. Had he been born two 
generations later, and written for that Eng­
land of Dryden to which he seemed the greatest 
of English dramatists, he would have found 
himself in a society at some points more intel­
lectually akin than his own.
They further state, "In some very obvious senses, then,
7
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in Introduction to 
Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York, 194?), pp. 38?,
3ÏÏ9:
6•rare* Ben Jonson is not one of the rarer spirits, but a 
man built of somewhat common materials, and on no very
g
exalted lines.”
Jonson, to emphasize it again, was concerned pri­
marily with comedy, and comedy was concerned primarily with 
"common” personages. In the first place, the "common” is 
certainly an area in need of the touch of poetry, both for 
the sake cf those who have and keep their being there and 
for the sanity of those who can and do reach beyond it. In 
the second, Jonson's treatment of the common should not be 
allowed to disguise the fact that intellectually, if not 
emotively, Jonson reaches beyond the common. His plays are 
constructed with intellectual excellence and their struc­
ture always provides the intellectual perceptiveness and 
quality that their characters lack. In the third place, 
Jonson may have failed in tragedy, in general the vehicle 
of heroically proportioned characters, but Volpone is evi­
dence that he knew and could convincingly draw the linea­
ments, design, and substance of the heroic character as it 
had been conceived and depicted on the Elizabethan and 
Jacobean stage. The trouble was that he did not really 
conceive it to be heroic; his ideal was a different one--
p
C. H. Herford and Percy Simpson, Ben Jonson; The 
Man and his Work (Oxford, 195^), I, 120. All citations of 
Jonson's work will be from this text, hereafter cited as
H. & S., Works.
7the man tutored in the intellectual mean as a philosophical 
and ethical principle, a man like Cicero in Catiline. In 
the fourth place, it seems strange that a man's singularity 
in one age, the Elizabethan and Jacobean, should be dimin­
ished by virtue of his likeness to writers of another age, 
the "Age of Reason;" just as it seems strange that another 
man's reputation, such as that of Wordsworth, should be 
enhanced by contending that he is unlike the eighteenth 
century. For that matter, it begins to appear that the 
eighteenth century itself is a singular age, there not 
having been anything like it before or since in British or 
American literature.
The eighteenth century, of course, was not unani­
mous in its praise of Jonson. Writers such as Pope and 
Dryden, critics and scholars such as William Gifford and 
Octavius Gilchrist, gave him credit and approval, but it 
was during this period that the practice of Jonson-baiting 
began, apparently because of fancied slights of Shakespeare 
by Jonson. This period was the beginning of the process of 
idolizing Shakespeare, and loving the bard on "this side 
idolatry" it seems was not enough. It was not conceived 
or admitted that one writer could criticize another, if he 
happened to be Shakespeare, on the basis of certain 
sincerely-held standards of literary creation; it had to
8
9
be the result of spleen and envy. This insolent epitome
of envy is the picture drawn of Jonson by Rowe in his 1709
edition of Shakespeare:
tho* I don't know whether the other /jonson/ ever 
made him /^hakespeare? an equal return of Gentle­
ness and Sincerity. Ben was naturally Proud and 
Insolent, and in the Days of his Reputation did 
so far take upon him the Supremacy in Wit, that 
he could not but look with an evil Eye upon any 
one that seem'd to stand in Competition with him.
And if at times he has affected to commend him, 
it has always been with some Reserve, insinuating 
his Uncorrectness, a careless manner of Writing, 
and want of judgment. . . .10
Jonson himself is certainly aware of the possible 
excesses of any state of mind, including, for instance, 
that of Asper, intent on purging humours, and that of Maci- 
lente, the learned man deprived of recognition and fallen 
into an "enuious apoplexie." A passage from the Poetaster 
further illustrates, in good Aristotelian fashion, this 
awareness on Jonson's part:
he doth implore,
You would not argue him of arrogance:
How ere that common spawne of ignorance,
Our frie of writers, may beslime his fame.
And glue his action that adulterate name.
Such ful-blowne vanitie he more doth lothe,
Then base detection: There's a meane 'twixt both. 
Which with a constant firmenesse he pursues.
As one that knowes the strength of his owne muse.
And this he hopes all free soules will allow;
9
S. Schoenbaum, "Shakespeare and Jonson: Fact and
Myth," The Elizabethan Theatre II, ed. David Galloway 
(Canada, 1970), pp. 1-19.
^^Shakespeare, Works, ed. Nicholas Rowe (I709), I, 
xiii, cited in Schoenbaum, Elizabethan Theatre, p. 8.
others, that take it with a rugged brow,
Their moods he rather pitties, then enuies:
His mind it is aboue their iniuries.
(3rd Sounding, Prologve, 16-28)
Jonson apparently had an affinity with the classi­
cal, Pride then would seem a virtue not a sin, abstract 
thought beautiful not barren, concepts of order relevant 
guidelines not repressive or suspect regulations.^^
11This attitude is in contrast to the Christian 
tradition wherein pride is the deadliest of the seven deadly 
sins, and humility is one of the principal virtues.
CHAPTER II
THE CRITICAL CONTEXT: THE ENGLISH CRITICS,
GENERAL IDEAS ON THE NATURE AND PURPOSE 
OF POETRY
Looking at Jonson in a critical and classical con­
text may avoid, but hopefully not evade, the "fearful" per­
sonal qualities associated with the satirist and focus more 
clearly on his intellectual achievement. His contemporary 
critical context and later opinions about it and the period 
have a bearing on assessments of Jonson. The critics 
chosen here are not necessarily ones whom Jonson read; 
instead they are intended to illustrate general trends of 
criticism and its conclusions on certain important topics.
These principal topics have to do for the English 
with establishing the nature of poetry and winning approval 
for its purpose. The important topic of imitation is all 
but ignored; though it appears in Puttenham and Sidney, its 
appearance in their writings serves to show the confusion 
in English criticism about its meaning, the way in which 
"making" is juggled with "imitation" and "imitation" with 
copying. " This juggling shows the vacillation between a 
primarily Platonic or neo-Platonic interpretation and a
10
11
primarily Aristotelian interpretation of the act, function, 
and product of poetry. Poetry as a making connotes divine 
inspiration and ideal, frequently the same as moral, truths, 
and Plato is the ultimate and primary source of this inter­
pretation of and attitude towards poetry. Poetry in the 
Aristotelian sense of imitation of nature, idealized or 
unidealized, does not emerge with clarity and definition 
from the works of the English critics discussed here. The 
beginnings of a later controversy of what constitutes an 
original are here apparent.
The question of nature may appear explicitly, as in 
Sidney, or only implicitly, as in Heywood and Whetstone, 
who equate morality with reality, or with art, or life, or 
truth. • Unity of action appears hardly at all, and in 
general these important topics, when they appear, are 
subordinated to the question of poetry's reputation for 
good and ill.
Attention seems to have been divided between a 
meticulous, logical, painstaking gathering and application 
of rules, on the one hand, and a practical, erratic imple­
menting or ignoring of them on the other. Many critics, 
especially among the Italians, did attempt an expanding of 
acceptable forms to include post-classical and contemporary 
works, and Sidney among the English critics admitted a
liking for "Chevy Chase." But English critics in general
'
and Sidney in particular seemed to shake their heads over
12
contemporary abuses of good taste and good form. In addi­
tion there seemed to be some confusion about morality and 
aesthetics, their distinctions and their interrelation­
ships. Most often the critics, at least the vociferous 
ones, were concerned with attacking or defending the de­
batable morality of contemporary literature, in particular 
the drama. On the question of aesthetic form and purpose, 
English critics were happy to confine themselves in general 
to technical considerations of meter and its use in the 
English language and to the honorable history of poetry 
and its possible use to good and wise effect at the current 
time.
In Thomas Lodge’s "Defence of Poetry" (1579) and 
Thomas Heywood's "An Apology for Actors" (l6l2) are 
reflected the problems of incorporating art with the other 
values of a specific culture, and the assumption is that 
art is an instrument of civilization. Relying frequently 
on ancient authority. Lodge allies poetry to philosophy 
and describes it as a path to wisdom.^ Heywood, concerned 
specifically with the drama, says that playing improves 
and refines the "harsh, uneven, and broken" English lan­
guage; it informs the ignorant and in general makes good 
citizens. Comedy corrects "unhandsome behavior" and cures 
melancholy. For a definition of comic form he follows
^6. Gregory Smith, ed., Elizabethan Critical Essays 
(London, 1964), I, 61-86.
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Donatus in giving the oft-quoted "Ciceronian” definition 
of comedy and in referring to its peaceful conclusion and 
its proper sphere as that of domestic activities. As a 
form or phenomenon in itself with legitimate bases in the 
everyday world, poesy is still under attack. Its justifi­
cation must be found in other subjects or studies or in
2its edifying moral effects.
George Whetstone in the dedication to Promos and 
Cassandra (1578) has a different approach to the problem of 
morality in comedy. Relying on Plato, he affirms that 
"naughtiness comes of the corruption of nature and not by 
reading of the lives of the good or lewde." Using this 
premise makes it impossible to argue for the morally 
instructive effects of comedy. It may indicate a greater 
awareness on his part of there being some distinction 
between aesthetics and morality. At any rate, he devotes 
most of his attention to formal matters: the unities of
time and place, decorum in character and speech, the pur­
pose of poetry, and the importance of probability. Too 
many English writers, he says, ground their work on the 
impossible. His preference in this matter of the possible 
indicates one indigenous English tendency, as well as an 
Aristotelian one, which Jonson will develop more fully.
There seems to have been wide agreement about the
2
Alan H. Gilbert, ed., Literary Criticism, Plato to 
Dryden (New York, 1940) , pp. 553-5^ >4.
14
Horatian injunction that the end of poetry was to instruct 
and/or delight, but to or about what end poetry was to 
instruct or delight there was less certainty. Was it to 
be for the humanistic considerations of learning, wisdom, 
and happiness in this world, or was it to be for moving 
the soul towards some almost divine perfection that is not 
here, has never been here, and never shall be here? There 
was a need for clear definitions of specific matters but 
with reference to some larger and more comprehensively 
logical context than most critics offered.^
For Jonson there is this logical context, one suffi­
ciently large to encompass both the aesthetic and the moral. 
The perfection suggested is not necessarily divine in the 
usual religious sense; it is instead primarily a rational­
ist's idea of divinity, an idea that "guides us by the hand 
to action."^
Now the poesy is the habit or the art; nay, rather 
the queen of arts, artium regina, which had her 
original from heaven, received thence from the 
Hebrews, and had in prime estimation with the 
Greeks, transmitted to the Latins and all nations 
that professed civility. The study of it, if we 
will trust Aristotle, offers to mankind a certain 
rule and pattern of living well and happily, dis­
posing us to all civil offices of society.
(11.2381-88)
Jonson here clearly leans toward the humanist ideal of man
^Smith, I, 58-60.
4
Discoveries, in H, & S., Works, VIII.
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living well in man's world. He speaks of poetry as a 
habit in much the same way that Aristotle speaks of good­
ness as the habit of living well and he combines the two 
ideas with an ease that does no logical violence to the 
integrity of either. The passage appears to be a syn­
cretic one drawing on the Ethics, Poetics, and Politics. 
Herford and Simpson find no definite source for showing 
it a translation. It is noteworthy perhaps that he puts 
the revelation of poetry at a time in the past, it being 
now an instrument of man, and the passage concludes on the 
note of the civil context of poetry.
William Webbe in "A Discourse of English Poetrie” 
(1586) links poetry to the heavenly and ideal by reason of 
its divine inspiration and its "vertuous and most devout 
purpose," according to Plato, at the same time that he 
refers to the Horatian and more secular concern with the 
"happy end of mans life." He quotes Horace: "Let things
that are faigned for pleasures sake haue a neere resem­
blance of the truth." He interprets this truth to be that 
which instructs to the moral. Chaucer, he says, duly 
observed this advice, for in what seems to be "nothing but 
the telling of a merry tale" he hides "profitable coun- 
saile." Poetry has a divine source, a devout purpose; if 
it tells the truth, in an unobtrusive way, it will be moral. 
A moral life then is the happy end of man's life to be 
sought while on earth or is it the state of being necessary
16
for bringing about a happy end to man's earthly existence? 
Moral, true, devout, and happy all seem interchangeable 
terms, rather than ones related to each other in an orderly 
and specific way.
The poetic means to this ambiguous end are not so 
important as the end itself, and on the crucial question of 
imitation Webbe gives diverse impressions in an appended 
translation of the concluding section of the sixth book of 
the enlarged edition of Fabricius' De Re Poetica Libri 
Septem (I56O). Matter may be "fayned" by the poet himself 
or it may be borrowed from others. If he borrows, and 
borrowing apparently means using other authors' works, 
then he should follow exactly that author whom he imitates, 
lest he should fall into inconsistencies. Apparently, 
divine inspiration does not always provide the poet with 
insight. Later, however, it is granted that a poet should 
not be too servile in following his mentors; instead, 
guided by learning, he may enter into new paths. Imita­
tion here refers only to borrowing from other literary 
masters, and "fayning" to the possibly dangerous act of 
either borrowing from nature or using one's own inventive­
ness. The first has precedent; the second is close to 
being a lie or counterfeit.^
^Smith, I, 226-302.
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The different points of reference involved in 
poetic perception and invention are muddled, interchange­
able , and subject to continually shifting definitions.
This problem in critical and aesthetic definition is pos­
sibly a reflection of typically Renaissance problems.
Should one listen to the voice within, implanted there by 
a divine creator, and direct one's efforts and attention 
to an otherworldly goal? Or should one look more closely 
at the world directly in front of him (the book of nature) 
to perceive and create from its forms, sights, and sounds? 
How should one orient oneself, consciously, in a physical, 
material world that is slowly assuming shape, flesh, linea­
ments, and value for its own sake? How is one to relate 
solid substance and complexity to a divine theorem? What 
are the points of reference and what the general perspec­
tive? Not that these were consciously conceived questions, 
at least.not on the part of many critics, who were offering 
isolated definitions that dissolved when placed in rela­
tionship to other isolated definitions.
The contention either for divine inspiration or for 
following other authors with consistency and for the sake 
of consistency leaves a great gap in the middle and points 
to the greater need for poetic method and its definition. 
The concept of imitation is one that can provide this 
definition and link substance and theory. It will be for 
Jonson "the doing," the "faining," the "expressing," the
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"habit," not just a theory or product ideal in its truth. 
Jonson found his own method; that he found it partially by 
means of following other authors or their guidelines does 
not make it less his own. His slight tracing of the history 
of poetry, handed down to and from the Hebrews, in the pas­
sage quoted above, his history of the evolution of comedy 
in Every Man out of his Humour, and various passages in the 
Discoveries on the right of current poets to exercise their 
own invention point to his sense of poetry as a changing 
thing subject to temporal laws rather than a reflector and 
purveyor of forever unchanging idealizations of earth life. 
The presence of Grace or grace in a number of his plays, 
such as Every Man out of his Humour, Bartholomew Fair, and 
perhaps the Queen as Cynthia in Cynthia's Revels, suggests 
his awareness, within his plays' world of man, of things 
beyond man's world or beyond his comprehension, but Jonson 
is more concerned with the means by which man arrived, or 
rather failed to arrive, at that sublime end. The desired 
ideal truth to be shown forth in literature in Jonson's 
plays is the end of the means he depicts his characters as 
successfully not pursuing and not attaining. He is perhaps 
rather hardnosed in thinking a man rather far from under­
standing supernal or sublime virtue if he can not under­
stand virtue on an individual, civil, social, or intellectual 
basis.
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George Puttenham in The Arte of English Poesie
(1589) makes a competent struggle with the relationship
between art and nature, between words and meaning:
. . . so as we may conclude that nature her selfe 
suggested the figure in this or that forme, but 
arte aydeth the judgement of his vse and applica­
tion# # » #
(XXIV,17-19)
. . .  or perhaps rather that he /the Courtier/ 
could dissemble his conceits as well as his 
countenance, so as he neuer speake as he thinkes, 
or thinke as he speaks, and that in any matter 
of importance his words and his meaning.very 
seldome meete. . . .
(XXV.1-5)
Puttenham has moved farther away from the position that 
would ally art with lying; like the Courtier, the poet must 
be a skilled craftsman in dissembling so that his art 
appear natural, but the truth he speaks is suggested by 
nature, and the method by which he achieves his end is 
allied to the rational and the judicial. There is a 
clearer orientation of the artist in relation to the world 
about him and in relation to his artistic methods.
Nevertheless, the old problem reasserts itself 
when Puttenham calls the poet a "maker” who "makes and 
contriues out of his owne brains" just as God "without any 
trauell to his diuine imagination made all the world of 
nought, not also by any paterne or mould, as the Platonicks 
with their Idees do phantastically suppose." If the poet 
"makes" in this manner, then he uses neither the matter or 
the forms of nature. Poetry then dould be a holy dream
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from above or a false image fashioned by the Devil. To 
know the difference would demand a divine instinct, not 
the reason judging by referring a creation to external 
nature or to skill in method. Also, of course, it makes 
the poet very susceptible to the charge of being a liar, 
like that master of all liars, Satan. .
Jonson speaks of the "Poeticall Rapture" and the
importance of nature, instinct, and a "goodnes of naturall
wit" (Discoveries, 11.2489,2411). But he cautions that the
poet not think "hee can leape forth suddainely a Poet, by
dreaming hee hath been in Parnassus, or, having washt his
lipps (as they say) in Helicon" (11.2488-91). The poet is
what he is "by nature, by exercise, by imitation, by
Studie. . . . "  He must pass through the disciplines of
"Grammar, Logicke, Rhetoricke, and the Ethicks, adding
somewhat, out of all peculiar to himselfe. . . . "
(11.24o6-8). The natural wit and instinct are to enable
his pouring out "the Treasure of his minde," this treasure
apparently to be acquired through study. This study is
related to imitation, at least in one sense that Jonson
uses the word:
Not, to imitate servilely, as Horace saith, and 
catch at vices, for vertue: but, to draw forth
out of the best, and choisest flowers, with the 
Bee, and turne all into Honey, worke it into one 
relish, and savour: make our Imitation sweet:
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observe, how the best writers have imitated, and 
follow them."
(11.2475-80)
Only the fool takes himself as master; the poet instead 
must choose "the best, and choisest" (1.250?)• Among these 
Jonson lists Horace and Aristotle first.
Jonson then values poetry as having "her original
from heaven" and he values poetic instinct, but he places
the emphasis on careful artistry, study, and learning.
Most of all he is an example of one who constructs on the
basis of principles, principles which relate fact to idea.
As for the poet being a liar, Jonson boldly outcountenances
this superstition by making liars in many instances his
chief characters and by even allowing them to be architects
in the plot. Brainworm in EMIH, Mosca in Volpone, and the
Subtle-Face duet in The Alchemist are good examples of
characters appearing to create the plots of their plays.
And he most emphatically affirms that his constructions
have a relation to the external world:
He rather prayes, you will be pleas'd to see
One such, to day, as other playes should be.
Where neither Chorus wafts you ore the seas;
Nor creaking throne comes downe, the boyes to 
please;
Nor nimble squibbe is seene, to make afear'd 
The gentlewomen; nor roul'd bullet heard
0
This is a long, densely-packed passage. H.& S. 
give parallel or similar passages for some sections from 
a wide variety of sources, but none for many others. Jonson 
has put all together with his own thought in his own way.
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To say, it thunders; nor tempestuous drumme 
Rumbles, to tell you when the storrae doth come; 
But deedes, and language, such as men doe vse: 
And persons, such as Comoedie would chuse,
When she would shew an Image of the times,
(EMIH, Prologve, 13-23)
. IIOther critics spoke of showing an "Image of the Times; 
Jonson meant it.
Aristotle, with his theory of mimesis, and Plato, 
with his idea of methexis, had, like Jonson, given the 
constructions of man a link with the external, physical 
world and, ultimately, also with the divine. Later Milton, 
partially perhaps in recognition of this problem, was to 
describe God as having created ex deo, from "one first 
matter all," instead of ex nihil. In Puttenham the two 
possibilities exist side by side, and he includes the func­
tion of imitating as well as that of making:
And neuerthelesse, without any repugnacie at all, 
a Poet may in some sort be said a follower or 
imitator because he can express the true and 
lively of euery thing is set before him, and 
which he taketh in hand to describe: and so in
that respect is both a maker and a covuiterfaitor: 
and Poesie an art not only of making, but also 
of imitation.
(I.I. 20-25)
He is careful to point out that no "repugnancie" is 
attached to this definition of the poetic function, and he 
also points out a distinction between the copier and the 
imitator. The copier translates out of "foreine copie or 
example," while the imitator catches the true and lifelike 
image of the things in front of him. Imitation then has
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moved closer to having as its sphere phenomena of the 
material world; it does not exclude literary phenomena, 
but it does exclude an author's mere copying of other 
authors. The critic refers here to the sphere in which 
imitation is exercised, to the qualities of its end prod­
uct, and indirectly to one purpose or end of imitation.
He does not explicitly refer to imitation as a method, 
and "imitation" is still the poor second cousin of "mak­
ing."^
J. W. H. Atkins in English Literary Criticism; The 
Renascence says Sir Philip Sidney is the only one of the 
English critics to have understood what Aristotle meant by
g
imitation. But what Sidney says specifically about imita­
tion, or mimesis, does not differ greatly from other cur­
rent definitions:
Poesy therefore is an art of imitation . . .  a 
representing, counterfeiting, or figuring forth . . . 
with this end, to teach and delight. . . .
Elsewhere he speaks of the "meaner sort of painters, who
counterfeit only such faces as are set before them." He
also links imitation to the following of other authors,
including historians; the matter of history the poet can
make his own by beautifying and adorning.
7
George Puttenham, The Arte of English Poesie,
1589, ed. Edward Arber, English Reprints (Westminster,
XBW).
o
Atkins, 2nd ed. (London, 1951), p. 330.
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What seems different in Sidney is his recurring 
and more emphatic assertion that the poet as creator 
improves on nature, by adding to it "in making things 
either better than nature bringeth forth, or, quite anew, 
forms such as never were in nature. . . Aristotle had
said that the poet showed forth things as they should be 
but he had also spoken of the poet's depicting men either 
better or worse than the ordinary; not all of them would 
represent improvements on nature. "Every understanding," 
says Sidney, "knoweth the skill of each artificer standeth 
in that idea or fore-conceit of the work, and not in the 
work itself." This statement is hardly compatible with 
either the letter or the spirit of Aristotle who arrived 
at his definitions by induction, by the observation of the 
works themselves; instead, of course, it reflects Plato's 
pre-existing forms or ideas.
While Aristotl^e acknowledges for each way of 
knowing an appropriate worth and relevance, Plato's exalted 
idea of philosophy tends to displace the autonomous aes­
thetic value of a work in favor of the idea that it shadows 
forth. Sidney had an affinity for the nobly idealistic, 
and, in addition, was somewhat inclined to regard literary 
endeavors as a pastime in which the cultivated and the 
gentlemanly displayed their talents and learning. They 
did not publish the results of these endeavors and call 
them with great seriousness Works, as Jonson did, to the
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amusement of many. Jenson's inclination to method and to
the empirical would disincline him to the Platonic. Also,
of course, his background as a bricklayer and his rather
robust•personality would disqualify him as a gentleman.
At least, so thought some members of the Court when King
9James wanted to knight his favorite poet.
In his discussion of "right poets" Sidney says 
these "be they which most properly do imitate to teach and 
delight, and to imitate borrow nothing of what is, hath 
been, or shall be; but range, only reined with learned 
discretion, into the divine consideration of what may be 
and should be." Here imitation is linked to creating 
divine patterns, which by imitating men may become better 
men, provided they are moved to do so because of experi­
encing delight with these patterns. The importance of 
this concept to Sidney is illustrated by his frequent 
references to man's fallen nature, to "our degenerate 
souls, made worse by their clay lodgings." Further, in 
his definition of "right poets," he says that "these indeed 
do merely make to imitate. . . . "  The two terms "make'^  
and "imitate" seem rather abruptly yoked together by juxta­
position rather than by logic or definition. Considering 
the main emphasis of his defense that the poet is a maker 
(from poiein) or creator and that herein resides his
9
Steel, Jonson, p. 132.
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superiority, it is strange that he should refer to the 
poet's "merely” making. Since he also refers to the 
superior forms or patterns which the poet creates, it 
would appear that he has transposed the logical sequence 
of his terms.
No one can read Sidney's Defense without being 
aware of his superior sensitivity to and understanding of 
poetry. But the ultimate classical source of that under­
standing, in addition to Sidney's own intelligence, would 
appear to be Plato and not Aristotle. His idea of the 
poet's creation of models or patterns or forms is pri­
marily Platonic, and his awareness of the "brazen” world 
of nature would preclude her imitation as the method of 
the poet's art. Aristotle had said the poet's business 
was to relate "such things as might or could happen in 
accordance with probability or necessity." This approach 
would involve some theory about the way men are, the way 
of human nature, the way of the world, "deedes, and lan­
guage, such as men doe vse,” not just the way men ought to
be.lO
Jonson, despite his awareness of man's "clay 
lodgings” and "fallen nature,” is not averse to taking his 
forms from unidealized nature. He links imitation to 
action, rather than to divine forms, and he thinks of an
^^Sir Philip Sidney, Defense of Poesie, in Literary 
Criticism, ed. A. H. Gilbert, pp. 4o6-4bl.
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"Image of the times" and its forms as legitimate, as 
legitimate as things "better than nature bringeth forth, 
or, quite anew." It is Art, rather than divine inspira­
tion or poetic rapture, which leads the poet to perfection. 
Jonson thinks of the poet as improving but not by aug­
menting, and the revealing of falsehood is a way of dis­
covering truth.
Let us beware, while wee strive to adde, wee doe 
not diminish or deface; wee may improve, but not 




THE CRITICAL CONTEXT: THE GRAMMARIANS AND EARLY
COMMENTARIES: TOWARDS A METHOD
A Greek and Latin edition of Aristotle’s Poetics 
had been published by Paccius in 1536, and in 1548 and 
1550 appeared the commentaries on Aristotle’s dramatic 
criticism by Robortellus and Madius. As the century drew 
to a close there was a more general and pervasive awareness 
of Aristotelian thought and method. Old habits persisted, 
however, and Madeleine Doran in Endeavors of Art charac­
terizes sixteenth century criticism as one "long exegetical
exercise" on the Poetics that was more Horatian in its
,;1
legislative spirit than Aristotelian and Aesthetic.
All interpretations, including those of Aristotle, 
Horace, Cicero, and others, were influenced and qualified 
by the inheritance from the fourth century of dramatic 
views by the grammarians Donatus and Evanthius. These 
grammarians are the ones who first provide the careful, 
formal criticism about the pattern and function of the 




essays, combined in the sixteenth century under the title 
of De Comoedia et Tragoedia. One of them is entitled De 
Comoedia and the other De Fabula, which is now ascribed to 
Evanthius.
In the essay De Fabula Evanthius notes the distin­
guishing qualities of comedy: it deals with ordinary
human affairs, contains no fearful dangers, and has a 
cheerful outcome. Comic characters should be tempered and 
restrained in their emotions and never swell to tragic 
heights or descend to farce. Terence, Evanthius says, 
preserves these rules of character, and with regard to plot 
he carefully knits the middle part with the beginning and 
the end. Frequently he enriches his plots with double 
actions. Models for both comedy and tragedy have been 
provided by Homer, the Iliad for tragedy and the Odyssey 
for comedy. The plots (argument a) of tragedy are often 
true, but those of comedy are always feigned.
The second essay De Commoedia contains the Greek
definition of comedy from Diomedes that it is "a treatment
of private and civil station that is without danger to
life.” Donatus also gives the definition attributed to
Cicero: "The imitation of life, the mirror of custom,
2
the image of Truth.” Donatus emphasizes the didactic
2
This is the definition of comedy offered by 
Cordatus in EMIH (III.vi.206-7).
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function of comedy and the difference in social rank 
between comic and tragic characters. For him, according 
to nature means according to custom.
Donatus apparently had no direct knowledge of 
Aristotle's definition of tragedy, but he helped to set 
the tone and pattern for later critics' application to 
comedy of Aristotelian methods in defining tragedy. It 
cannot be determined if he knew Plato, but by the begin­
ning of the sixteenth century, other Terentian commentator^, 
such as Marsus and Barlandus, were to find strong support 
in Plato (Republic, Gorgias, Phaedrus) for Donatus' empha­
sis on the didactic aim of "right rhetoric." He also 
helped to establish the tradition that comic plots are 
"feigned," made up on the basis of everyday life, as an 
imitation of that life; i.«©.• i names and events were ficti­
tious.
These writers purveyed certain ideas about the 
drama in general and comedy in particular that remained 
current and popular throughout the age. They provided 
precedent for anyone who wished to consider comedy as an 
important and worthy subject, comparable and analogous to 
tragedy, but the drama was primarily a teaching vehicle, 
and one should be careful of its construction chiefly for 
didactic reasons. Their writings were dependent, on this 
didactic principle, and derivative, from the plays of 
Terence.
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With the publication of commentaries on the 
Poetics, criticism approached nearer to a more acute aware­
ness of method. The syncretic one, however, was still pur­
sued, and in 1$48, in his commentary on the Poetics and 
essay On Comedy, Robortellus combines traditional accounts 
based on Horace, Donatus, and Servius and incorporates 
them with Aristotle. Aristotle said little about comedy 
but his contributions to the comedic canon were noted as 
being the following; he did say that Homer was the father
3
of both tragedy and comedy, that characters were either
worse (comedy) or better (tragedy) than men of the current
time, that comedy used fictitious names and incidents, and
that the happy ending of the Odyssey with its double plot
4
was more suitable for comedy.
Several problems emerge or become more emphatic as 
a result of an awareness of Aristotle's work. Imitation 
becomes more definitely associated with plot-making, and 
the relation of plot-making to unified action, or unity of 
action, had to be determined.
While the English critics did speak of the formal 
aspects of poetry, and drama, they did so in a cursory way.
3
Unlike Evanthius-Donatus, Aristotle says that the 
Iliad and the Odyssey are models for tragedy; yet he says 
the plot of the Odyssey is more suitable to comedy.
4
For excerpts from Evanthius-Donatus, Donatus, and 
Robortellus, see Marvin T. Herrick, Comic Theory in the 
Sixteenth Century (Urbana, Illinois, 1950)> pp. 5#-6o,
65-70, 79-Wo, 227-239.
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They spoke of the unities of time and place and their 
neglect in the English drama, and about the unity of action 
there was less discussion. Imitation had appeared in vari­
ous contexts: (1) it meant following other authors and
borrowing from them, with or without additions from per­
sonal invention; (2) it meant representing, counterfeiting, 
figuring forth a true and lively image of things, things 
being in the case of comedy the "common errors of our 
life." It was not specifically or emphatically related 
to action and to plot and to method. For them, it was 
closer to being a problem in morality than to a problem in 
aesthetics. How to achieve organic structure, an action 
causally connected from beginning to middle to end, was 
a major practical and aesthetic problem of the Elizabethan 
dramatists, but, generally speaking, the Italian and con­
tinental critics, rather than the English, are the ones 
who struggled most persistently with the definition of 
formal elements, such as unity and the unities, and with 
the definition of critical terms, such as imitation.
CHAPTER IV
THE CRITICAL CONTEXT: THE ITALIANS, ON
NATURE, IMITATION, AND UNITY
Giraldi Cinthio's Discorsi (written 1543, published 
1554) is one of those general critical works appearing by 
mid-century and showing an awareness of Aristotle. In his 
discussion of the source of comic and tragic plots, he 
argues that both may be feigned, as he had done in his 
tragedy Orbecche. The essence of tragedy is not in a 
known plot but in its arousal of tragic feelings, and the 
power to move tragic feelings depends on imitation, on 
"words fitly and poetically joined together," according to 
Aristotle, only one element of imitation. The poet may 
feign his plot, "if that plot is in conformity with natural 
habits and not remote from what can happen and often does 
happen." Here Cinthio has associated imitation with poeti­
cally written words and their power to move, not with plot 
making. In his section on the subject of imitation, he 
says that literary judgment may be acquired by conversa­
tions and discussions with learned men and by reading 
authors "who have attained excellence." By this second
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way he does not refer to making use of another's methods 
but to feeling the spirit that caused the activity of the 
poet imitated. A flame may be awakened which will become 
a fire emd then a fury and then divine enthusiasm. In 
other words, instead of learning a method, one catches a 
spirit.
When Cinthio speaks of the poet as a maker, that 
term which continues to carry connotations of the divine 
creator, he again refers to the poet's feigning (or making), 
but this time he refers it to subjects or fables of the 
marvellous and the impossible, as in myths, but which are 
accepted because of custom and the poet's skill. Earlier 
he had said that the poet imitated in accordance with 
natural habits, but now, in distinguishing between poetry 
and history, he says that the poet "in his fictions imi­
tates illustrious actions, presenting them not as. they are 
but as they ought to be." The poet, therefore, need not 
write of both vices and virtues. This statement is in 
accord with his theory that the end of poetry is to intro­
duce good morals and that tragedy, like comedy, can have 
a double plot or structure, which, of course, would also 
allow for rewarding the good and punishing the evil. For 
authority, he refers to that much-debated Aristotelian 
statement that Homer's Iliad and Odyssey were both examples 
of tragedy, and another one, difficult to reconcile with 
the first, that the double plot of the Odyssey was more
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suitable to comedy. Tragedy then can imitate the action 
like comedy, and the simple action is best suited to 
tragedy that ends unhappily. Simple action rests on a 
single quality of a person, and by double action he means 
an action based on "diverse kinds of persons of the same 
station in life." Several tendencies,' already noted in 
the English critics, persist here too: following other
authors is a source of inspiration, not of method, and the 
ideal is the desirable object of a poet's imitation. A 
new note is added in reference to imitation of action, 
though it is colored by Cinthio's desire to defend the 
double plot of his tragedy. He links action rather mathe­
matically to persons and seems to think its imitation con­
trolled primarily by a happy or unhappy ending.^
In 1$64 Antonio Minturno published the work usually 
called L'arte poetica but to which he refers in the dedica­
tion as Della toscana poesia (Of Tuscan Poetry). Oneness 
is a principal idea stressed by Minturno: one is the idea
in Nature's work, one is the law of Art, one is the matter 
of the imitative arts, one is the subject of all written 
works in the arts and sciences, and "one sole and single 
action" should be treated in every poem.
Hence the variety that comes from different times 
cannot bring about the possibility of treating in 
poetry more than one action that is entire and of 
suitable size, with which all the rest may truly 
and reasonably harmonize and join.
^Gilbert, Criticism, pp. 243-273.
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He apparently equates the Platonic idea of perfect unique­
ness, the one unchanging ideal form that lies behind the 
various faces of earthly flux, with the Aristotelian con­
cept of one action, whole, entire, and complete. But it 
leads to a curious dichotomy when he speaks of "all the 
rest" that harmonize with the one action and of the impos- 
sibility of treating more than one action. It also seems 
a dichotomy in perspective since the first (Platonic) idea 
of oneness is something which was to be perceived in some­
thing external to the poet, the common quality or principle 
in different individual things, and the Aristotelian idea 
suggests an idea of coherence proceeding at least partially 
from the poet.
In his sections explicitly on the subject of imita­
tion, he says that it is "not strong enough to equal the 
thing chosen for imitation and to represent it as it is; 
moreover copying may encounter the difficulty that nature 
herself cannot bring it to pass that copies cannot be dis­
tinguished from the things that are represented and imita­
ted." It is apparently necessary then to represent as it 
is the thing chosen for imitation at the same time that 
the "copying" ought to produce something distinguishable 
from the original; that is, it should not be a counterfeit. 
It matters, therefore, "what sort of poet you set before 
yourself for imitation." Curiously enough, Minturno 
advises that in order to make it seem that a plant has
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sprung from his own garden, the poet should follow his 
model rather closely, not with regard to facts and words, 
but with regard to the method of obtaining and arranging 
matter and to the form of speech. The poet may change his 
speech but only according to "what the one imitated thought 
was permitted." This seems a curiously confused and con­
tradictory idea of imitation, though he does hesitate
2
towards imitation as a method.
Giangiorgio Trissino published the first four divi­
sions of his Poetica in 1529 and the last two divisions in 
1563; in the first volume Trissino shows only a slight 
acquaintance with the Poetics, but the last volume is an 
extended paraphrase of Aristotle. He adds sections on 
comedy, extending Aristotle's comments on tragedy to comedy 
as well.
Comedy then, imitates worse actions with speech, 
rhythm, and harmony, as does tragedy, and it imi­
tates an action single, complete, and large, which 
has a beginning, a middle, and an end. . . .  It 
suffices to know that comedy is an imitation of 
the wicked and the vicious. . . .
Comedy, he concludes, has the "same substantial parts as
tragedy." By this time a complete awareness has been
achieved of the distinctions between drama and narrative.
Trissino stresses that the end of poetry is to 
teach humans to live well. Perhaps as a result of this 
goal for poetry, he also stresses the "discourse or
^Gilbert, pp. 275-303.
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expression of thought in the play" and that it be taken 
from the art of persuasion, rhetoric. In composing the 
plot the first important step is laying out the speeches 
and then inserting the episodes; "to lay out the speeches 
.generally is nothing other than to note the whole action 
that he wishes to imitate." He appears, to contradict this 
advice when he writes that he who wishes "to compose a 
comedy well should first arrange the fable, that is, find 
the action and write a summary of it, and put it before 
his eyes, and consider well the moral traits, and see what 
is fitting and what is contrary or repugnant, and then put 
in the names, and insert the episodes, and treat it with 
excellent sententious sayings, and with words familiar, 
ornate, and suitable, as we have said about tragedy."
Though this statement may sound somewhat artificial, as if 
governed too much by an attention to the moral suitability 
of the subject, it does show an attempt at describing
method or process, no matter how busily it attempts to be
comprehensive. He refers to action as a principle of
coherence, without enlarging on the idea. Instead he almost
equates the "laying out of speeches" with the "whole 
action."^
In 1571 Lodovico Castelvetro published his anno­
tated translation of Aristotle's Poetics. He was very
^Gilbert, pp. 213-232.
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influential among critics of the sixteenth century, and in 
the next century Milton thought of him as one of the prin­
cipal expositors of the Poetics. Though he is more strict 
than other critics of the day in maintaining the distinc­
tions between comic and tragic, he takes the unpopular 
stand that pleasure is the end of poetry. He takes issue 
with J. C. Scaliger on the subject of poetry's teaching 
morals. Scaliger agrees with Aristotle that "beatitude is 
nothing else than perfect action," but action is "a mode 
of teaching" and "the moral habit will be its end." 
Castelvetro disagrees because, he says, Aristotle states 
that moral habits of character were chosen by poets to 
second the action and not action to second the character­
istics. Castelvetro alone, among the critics thus far 
mentioned, recognizes Aristotle's point about the relation 
of character to action and the importance of action. These 
conclusions, on Castelvetro's part, however, are associated 
with his statement that poetry is for the common people, 
for their delight and recreation. Comedy, which raises 
laughter, does so because of "our nature, corrupted through 
the sin of our first parents, which rejoices at the coming 
of evil upon someone else at some benefit to ourselves. . . 
His strictures about the length of plays arise partially 
from "regard to the ease of the people . . . and human 
necessities for eating, drinking, sleeping, and other 
things."
4o
This consideration for the "ease of the people" 
may lead indirectly to his formulation of the unities of 
time and place and from these in turn to the unity of 
action. In referring to Aristotle's statements on action 
and plot, he observes that Aristotle offers no reason or 
proof and he then attempts to rectify this omission. The 
plot in comedy and tragedy contains "one action or two 
which because of their interdependence can be reputed
not because the plot is not fitted to contain more 
actions but because the space of time of twelve 
hours at most in which the action is presented 
and the limitation of the space in which it is 
acted do not permit a multitude of actions or even 
the actions of one family, nor indeed the complete 
presentation of one action, if it is somewhat 
long.
Action, however, is one he says because it relates to one 
person only or to two, whose actions are interdependent, 
even though he has recognized earlier that character is 
subordinate to action. Whereas the internal or "intellec­
tual" limit of the epic is not dependent upon the "sen­
sible," the limit of tragedy is; hence the unities of time' •
I
and place and internal coherence are further subordinated 
to external through relevant considerations. The actuali­
ties of stage presentation and the everyday world of time 
become the bases for the imaginative temporal and spatial 
orientation of a play's world.
In all, Castelvetro seems concerned with preserving 
the boundaries of the actual world on the basis of the
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reasonable. He also takes issue with the attribution of 
divine furor to the poet. By claiming divine inspiration 
for themselves, the poets have been pleased to play upon 
the credulity of the people. Although the "matter of 
poetry is found and imagined by the ability of the poet, 
and its words are not such as are used in reasoning," 
poetry is accomplished by the man of knowledge, reflec­
tion, and careful reasoning. The matter of poetry "should 
be like the matter of history and resemble it, but it 
ought not to be the same." If the poet fails to discover 
"things like the truth" and produce "a resemblance of them" 
then he may not merit his reputation of being more divine 
than human. It is difficult to determine exactly what 
Castelvetro means by "things like the truth," for he also 
states that discovering "something that was and will be 
perpetually in the nature of things" is performing the 
"function of a good philosopher and of a good scientist but 
not that of a good poet."
According to Castelvetro, then, the poet is a man 
of reason but he must maintain his reputation as someone 
more divine than human. He must produce things like the 
truth but they are necessarily "in the nature of things."
He must strictly heed the ordinary and actual in concepts 
of time and space, but he must produce that which is both 
delightful and marvellous. Castelvetro is attempting to 
balance the poet somewhere in the current and often
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conflicting critical concepts of poetry. It is a rational 
man's attempt at reconciliation; it is not necessarily a 
coherent one wherein the concepts are interrelated rather 
than simply balanced.
That he himself recognizes the difficulties is 
suggested by his section on imitation. "The imitation 
that is natural to men is one thing and that which is 
demanded of the poet is another." The first is a follow­
ing of the examples of others.
But the imitation the poet is expected to use not 
merely does not follow the examples laid down by 
another, or do the same thing that has already 
been done without knowing the cause for doing it, 
but does something completely separate from what 
has been done and sets before itself, so to 
speak, another example to f o l l o w . 4
What this other example is he does not say, but the knowl­
edge of causes and careful reasoning on the part of the 
poet should not be called imitation; instead, the process 
of creation should be called "the strife of the poet . . .  
in finding an incident of human conduct delightful to 
listen to and marvelous." He recognizes and struggles 
with the problematical meaning of the word "imitation" and 
finally discards it as inapplicable to the business of 
poetry.
These critics attempt to count actions, characters, 
hours, and space. An action is one, some think, because it
4
P. 312 in Gilbert, Criticism, pp. 305-357»
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relates to one person, not a mistake that Jonson makes,
either in the Discoveries or in his plays:
So many there be of old that have thought the 
Action of one man to be one. As of Hercules,
Theseus, Achilles, Ulysses, and other Heroes ; 
which is both foolish and false; since by one 
and the same person many things may be severally 
done, which cannot fitly be referred, or joyned 
to the same end: which not only the excellent
Tragick poets, but the best Masters of the Epick, 
Homer and Virgil, saw.
(11. 2764-70)
For some the action is one because everything in studies 
and in the universe is one. Jonson, like Aristotle, might 
have one end in mind, but a multiplicity of things might 
construe to that end and thus unity of effect would be 
achieved. Castelvetro, despite a certain infamy for formu­
lating the unities of time and place, comes closest to a 
coherently rational and composite view. Some are simply 
"great Renaissance clutterholes," as Marvin T. Herrick 
describes Minturno, who attempted, he says, "to include 
everything and follow everybody."^
^Herrick, Comic Theory, p. 271.
CHAPTER V 
THE CRITICAL CONTEXT; ARISTOTLE
In the critical commentaries thus far reviewed 
there occurred a flattening out of ideas until they became 
aphorisms which it was possible to place in a numbered 
order, unrelated to concepts of universal order, then to 
take apart and reassemble in a differently numbered order. 
Literary criticism, like other fields of study, apparently 
has always had the tendency to isolate its particular 
subject from its surrounding contingencies, perhaps an 
unavoidable tendency in an always, and now increasingly, 
complex world.
One characteristic of the Renaissance has been per­
sistently identified as the discovery and realization of 
form, a realization that how something is said is insepa­
rable from what is said, a realization attributed to the 
impact of classical culture. Ultimately this realization 
of the importance of how in aesthetic matters was to enhance 
an awareness of scientific method in the development of 
empiricism; a sense of dynamism was to be incorporated in 
a method which eventually would challenge the static,
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unchanging forms of the medieval heritage. In other words, 
the "laws" of classicism were to contribute to an innova­
tion.
A neglected aspect in Renaissance literary criti­
cism, then and now, is the intellectual milieu of the 
authorities upon whom they drew for guidance. The critics 
struggled with the words, their translation and applica­
tion, in terms of their own historical context and suc­
ceeded in incorporating them in their own times, a diffi­
cult task with which later ages were to be impatient. One 
thing accomplished, as stated earlier, was a sense of the 
importance of form. It was a tedious, hard-fought struggle 
and should not be lightly forgotten or cast aside, for 
under the guise of this struggle for form was man struggling 
for a sense of his own form.
The issues of this struggle become more apparent if 
the formative milieu of one chief Renaissance authority is 
examined, that of Aristotle, with whom Ben Jonson, more 
than any other English critic, including Sidney, had much 
in common. Platonic ideas pervaded and tended to dominate 
English criticism, and it was only slowly and confusedly 
that a gradually deepening, precise awareness of Aristotle 
became dominant in the best known Italian critics. When 
Aristotelian ideas appear in Jonson's critical comments, 
there they are generally clear, coherent, and unconfused, 
with some exceptions. That Jonson knew and understood
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Aristotle, no matter from what source, seems apparent from 
an examination of his plays, to appear later in this study, 
as well as from a close reading of his criticism. The 
closeness of this understanding affinity between Jonson and 
Aristotle should become clearer by isolating an essential 
and fundamental distinction between the two major Greek 
thinkers, whose intellectual achievements were the culmina­
tion of a long series of developments. An examination of 
these developments should help illuminate their relevance 
to Renaissance thought in general and Jonson in particular, 
and the importance of that fundamental distinction.
Greek philosophy inherited from its pre-Olympian 
religion a pervading dynamic force called Physis--nature or 
growth. Ionian philosophers were preoccupied with finding 
in this eternal flux a fundamental unity. This search 
involved isolating by thought the pervasive unifying force 
held on faith from the time of man's earliest religious 
awareness. Sometimes this force was given a religious name 
or interpretation, sometimes a purely physical or rudimen­
tary scientific one, and sometimes both these areas of 
speculation, now called religion and science, were involved 
in the definition. Philosophy struggled in a realm inter­
mediate between these two. The problem was to find the 
generating and unifying cause of the phenomenal world, to 
relate the supernatural to the natural, the abstract to 
the concrete.
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Thales of Miletus called this unifying force 
"water," a "scientific" term, which he further described 
as "one original soul-substance." Anaximander, Thales' 
successor, further differentiated and separated the one 
principle, "nature," by not including it as an element 
among the elements that it generates. His statement of 
cosmic orientation was also a statement of moral signifi­
cance.
Things perish into those things out of which they 
have their birth, as is ordained; for they give 
reparation to one another, and pay the penalty 
for their injustice, according to the disposi­
tion of time.
Aristotle echoes this idea later; "If any of the opposites
1were infinite, the rest would have ceased to be." The 
Greek fear of hubris viewed in this context becomes a fear 
of violating natural law, and natural law is synonymous 
with moral law. Hubris is then a concept based on the 
inherent order of the universe, and on man's understanding 
of it, and not, as in the Christian context, on man's 
defiance of God, resulting in his fallen nature and in a 
particular ordering of earthly space and time.
Anaximenes called an element, Air, the first cause, 
but he also called it Soul. For Anaximander's eternal and 
conscious movement causing innumerable worlds he substi­
tuted a quantitative and purely mechanical change of
^Aristotle, Physics, V$,204b, quoted in G. R. Levy, 
The Gate of Horn (London, 1948), p. 303.
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position. For Anaximenes, Thales, Anaximander, and for 
primitive religious man. Nature, as the underlying force, 
existed in time and space. But it was to be progressively 
withdrawn or abstracted from that sphere into the realm of 
speculative thought until it culminated in Plato's perfect 
Ideas or Forms, for the static nature of which Plato was 
criticized by Aristotle.
The Orphic religious doctrine of cyclic experience, 
involving successive transformations or becomings, involved 
the natural world, with its animal kinships, and reached 
upwards to the divine, which must be experienced in this 
world before ultimate escape into a God-like existence 
could be achieved. These successive transformations 
involved a struggle with death in some form or image, both 
divine and human, and the creative energy liberated by the 
struggle formed the new image of man emerging from this 
conflict. Aristotle's later formulation of the theory of 
catharsis with its liberation and purification of certain 
emotions may be rooted in this early religious idea of 
individual transformation but placed in a more sophisti­
cated rational and social context.
Pythagoras helped to transform the nature of the 
Orphic cyclic experience of becoming into an intellectual 
endeavor; that is, redemption was through the way of recre­
ating thought by experience. It was thought of as a 
process, an activity, an action and this action through
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its various stages of definition by different thinkers 
retained its sense, or echoes of it, of a participation in 
both subhuman and superhuman life. It therefore retained 
its mystical sense, but with Pythagoras and his followers, 
the endeavor proceeded more by intellectual argument and 
contemplation than by prophecy. For the Pythagoreans the 
theory of the One and the Many was also related to mathe­
matics, music, astronomy, to the mysterious relationship 
between numbers and the universe.
Plato's formulation of the One and the Many was 
indicative of a widening gap between worlds earlier inter­
related, but the process was begun before him by Xenophanes
and Parmenides. Aristotle calls Xenophanes "the first
2
Partisan of the One." Xenophanes transferred life to the 
One of which the Many he said are but passing forms. 
Parmenides called the way of the Many illusory and main­
tained that the One cannot evolve the Many. Completed 
form and the process by which that form is completed 
become thereby separate and distinct, and a static concep­
tion is placed in intellectual supremacy. Parmenides,
Aristotle says, has denied Physis or nature, because he
3
has done away with motion.
Plato does relate the Many to the One (created
^Aristotle, Met., A,5,9868, in Levy, p. 304. 
^Aristotle, ap. Sext. Math., X46, in Levy, p. 310.
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things to their heavenly patterns) by methexis, or par­
ticipation, but he leans towards the static Parmenidean 
conception of inflexible abstractions. Aristotle objected 
to these distinctions which tended toward inflexibility.
For Plato the abstract forms, because they were unchanging, 
made perfection, or perfect conceptualizing, possible. 
Whether or not any one ever discovered them was not of 
necessary relevance to their existence. For Aristotle, 
though his Prime Mover is himself unmoved, the process of 
discovering, arriving, becoming, remained important; one 
might or might not arrive, and prior to that arrival there 
were many things of importance in the phenomenal world.
For him the One is a kind of Fourth Dimension which per­
meates all the rest and is the basis of participation, 
which Plato called methexis and Aristotle called mimesis, 
or imitatio.
The terms "nature," "imitation," and "unity of 
action" which became so important in Renaissance literary 
criticism are terms which in their implications reach 
beyond the bounds of strictly literary studies and efforts 
to define them in rhetorical terms. A person faced with 
the stage as a metaphor of life and with creating a world 
in miniature and also aware of the current critical con­
census might realize the important relationship between 
word and world more readily than one confronting the 
problems of textual analysis and explication.
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It is unfair to hold the Renaissance critics 
responsible for something restored to the world only at a 
much later date, but it does seem that they should have 
had more regard for context, some sense of a whole struc­
ture dependent upon its interrelated parts, as the parts 
were dependent upon the whole, even had they known nothing 
of primitive religious experience and the pre-Socratic 
philosophers. The Renaissance world did know about Plato 
and about a large number of Aristotle's works, so it seems 
they should have proceeded with more regard for both the 
distinctions and relationships between categories and kinds,
They decided that the poet's aim in characteriza­
tion was an idealization of nature. The Aristotelian 
basis for this decision is the following passage:
Since tragedy is the imitation of characters better 
than those we know in life, we should imitate good 
portrait painters. They too render the character­
istic appearance of their subject in a good like­
ness which is yet more beautiful than the original.
So when the poet is imitating men who are given to 
anger, indolence, and other faults of character, 
he should represent them as they are, and yet make 
them worthy. As such as example of violent temper 
we have the Achilles of Agathon and Homer.^
(XV.l454b)
This passage gained force and was given emphasis because it 
could be reconciled with other statements, such as Horace's 
well-known ut pictura poesis. The critics avoided the 
neglect of any one authority; multiplicity and variety are
4
Aristotle, On Poetry and Style, ed. G. M. A. Grube 
(New York, 1958), p. 31.
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indicative of the general trend in criticism as well as in 
drama; but in reconciling the diverse authorities they 
might violate the integrity of one.
In the above-quoted passage Aristotle is talking 
specifically about tragedy. Comedy, he says, is an "imi­
tation of men who are inferior but not altogether vicious." 
In a more generic passage he has the following to say:
Since those who make imitations represent men in 
action, these men must be superior or inferior, 
either better than those we know in life, or 
worse, or of the same kind. . . .  We can see 
this in painting: Polygnotus represented men as
better than life, Pauson represented them as 
worse, and Dionysius made them like life. Obvi­
ously, these differences also occur in each of 
the kinds of imitation we have mentioned; they 
are different because they imitate different 
models in this w a y . 5
(Il.l448a)
The critics had decided as a general precept that art imi­
tated nature but idealized it; this is not the same as 
presenting something "better than those we know in life" 
or "better than the ordinary." It more nearly implies that 
the ideal is not to be found in nature, but only in an 
otherworldly storehouse of perfection to which the inspired 
poet has access. Idealizing nature is really the Platonic 
ideal, generally speaking more compatible and earlier 
incorporated with Christianity than Aristotle. Aristotle 
is more susceptible to several different possibilities.
^Grube, p. 5*
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Since the poet, like the painter and other makers 
of images, is an imitator, the object of his imi­
tation must always be presented in one of three 
ways: as it was or is, as it is said or thought
to be, or as it ought to be.°
(XXV.14606)
His work really offered poets and critics a middle plane 
where they did not have to defend poetry to the uninitiated 
against the charge of lying and immorality.
Closely linked, of course, with the concept of 
nature is that of imitation. Both Plato and Aristotle 
spoke of all art as imitation, but the Medieval and Renais­
sance idea of art as imitation came chiefly by way of 
Horatian commentators and is also to be found in the 
^Ciceronian" "Imitatio vitae, speculum conseutudinis, imago 
veritatis." Acquaintance with Aristotle's works brought 
further speculation and helped to modify and change the 
idea of imitation as copying or mimicking, since Aristotle 
spends some time defining and discussing imitation as a 
natural activity of man and often uses it as a comprehen­
sive term applying to the whole process of art. Nor did 
imitation in Aristotle have the slightly pejorative conno­
tations that it had in Plato. In the Physics he says 
specifically that art imitates nature, and by 1555 the
7
Horatian commentators seemed fully aware of this work.
^Grube, pp. 54-55»
7
Marvin T. Herrick, The Fusion of Horation and 
Aristotelian Literary Criticism (Urbana, Illinois, 19%),
p. 33.
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But Plato, or perhaps Cicero, still seems importantly 
present in their minds when they speak of imitation in 
accordance with an idea or a figure in the imagination.
And art again emerges as an idealized fiction.
To say that Aristotle thought art an imitation of 
nature in accordance with a true idea seems a misrepresen-
g
tation of his whole philosophical point of view. For 
essential to that philosophy was his conception of nature 
as a continually generative process, a process, a becoming, 
not a perfect idea. He criticized other thinkers, includ­
ing Plato, for omitting from their definitions of nature 
the idea of motion, and here would seem to be one reason 
for his placing so much emphasis on action in general. The 
drama he says is not an imitation of men or their ideas but 
of their actions. The poet, unlike others except the 
philosopher, is able to perceive the universal in the par­
ticular, but it is of the essence in Aristotle's approach 
that the universal grow out of the particular, according 
to the probable, not according to a true idea. This does 
not exclude coherent thought holding the drama together; it 
does avoid using a word or term that had specific philo­
sophical connotations with which Aristotle disagreed. This 
is not to deny that Aristotle had a concept of reality but
g
Samuel Henry Butcher, Aristotle's Theory of Poetry 
and Fine Arts (London, 1895)> P- 155, cited in Herrick, 
Fusion, pi 5?.
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it is simply to emphasize that he emphasized arriving at 
these concepts by means of observation and induction, that 
he emphasized method or process.
The parallel to method or process in philosophy or 
art is motion in nature and action in human life. Actions 
then and unity of action are the focal point of organic 
unity in the drama. Thought is not divorced from action 
but it grows with the creative process of action. The 
coherence that grows out of this process is for the drama 
the plot, the imitation of an action which is in harmony 
with a rational principle that pervades the universe and 
which has a certain specific disposition in space and time.
Heraclitus' statement that a man's character is his 
destiny might be modified in Aristotle's scheme to a man's 
actions are his destiny; man's movements are in space and 
time; his rhythms make certain inevitable reverberations in 
this context. So an action which is one and whole must not 
have any part which can be deleted. It exists in the uni­
verse and must obey its laws and like the universe it has a 
certain size and order. Like other created things, the 
work of art, because it has form, and it has form because 
it has followed the path of creative laws, also has autonomy. 
When a completed work of art has autonomy, it is then pos­
sible in turn, to approach it from the reverse side, from 
the critic's side, from the standpoint of aesthetics rather 
than from that of morality alone. Not that its morality
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is an excludable issue; it is in this instance subsumed 
under another category. The logos of the fabula is not 
then a mere plot summary, as it emerges in many of the 
major Renaissance critics, and this idea Ben Jonson, as 
both critic and dramatist, correctly perceived.
CHAPTER VI 
THE CRITICAL CONTEXT: BEN JONSON
Though relevant passages from the plays are cited, 
this section is devoted primarily to the Discoveries and 
its importance in establishing Jonson as a discerning 
classical critic, as "original" as, or perhaps even more 
"original" than, any of his contemporaries or immediate 
predecessors, a critic who knew and understood Aristotle 
well and who as a playwright was influenced by Aristotle 
fairly early in his dramatic career, with particular 
reference to the classical principle of unity and unity 
of action and to Aristotle's idea of imitation.
The pendulum of critical opinion of the Discbveries 
as a critical document has swung between two extremes. The 
work has been acclaimed on the one hand as an outstanding 
piece of criticism and on the other as a patchwork of 
translations with little relevance to Jonson's dramatic
work. As usual the truth probably lies somewhere in
« .
between. Jonson is burrowing through the works of others, 
but when he can, according to Herford and Simpson, syn­
thesize in the space of six pages ideas from such a 
diversity of people as Joannes Buchler, Aristotle, Cicero,
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Strabo, Sidney, Seneca, Plato, Ovid, Virgil, Horace, and 
Petronius, together with sundry things not attributable 
to others, then he has to have contributed a great deal 
of his own, not the least being a powerful if ponderous
I
mind. In this section an attempt will be made at a care­
ful verbal analysis primarily of those sections relating 
to Aristotle, his work, and his thought.
In the Discoveries Jonson speaks of Aristotle with 
high regard:
Aristotle was the first accurate Criticke, and truest 
Judge; nay, the greatest Philosopher, the world ever 
had: for, hee noted the vices of all knowledges, in
all creatures, and out of many mens perfections in a 
Science, hee formed still one Art,^
(11.2512-15)
Three things seem important in this passage. First is 
Jonson's awareness of Aristotle's pre-eminence as a 
critic. Despite the fact that many other critics and 
writers are noted, translated, and cited in the Discover­
ies , Jonson is less inclined than other Renaissance 
writers to regard criticism as a kind of undifferentiated
potpourri where the pronouncements of one must be made
2
level and reconciled with that of another. When he 
works with Aristotle, he does so with some consistent 
attention, pursuing his statements for a continuous time 
as a coherent thought. Second, Aristotle appears as one
^H. & S., Works, VIII.
2When Jonson did attempt this, he apparently 
intended to include only Horace and Aristotle.
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who in exploring nature found there vices ("of all knowl­
edges") and not just as one who supposedly said art was 
an idealization of nature. It is notable too that the 
vices are given an intellectual slant. Third, the 
passage suggests works in addition to the literary criti­
cism. This particular passage reflects knowledge of the 
Ethics, as do other sections of the Discoveries, which 
betrays the frequent influence of Aristotle, Aristotle as 
a thinker rather than as just a reference on the one hand 
or an absolute authority on the other. On one occasion 
the clause occurs "if we will trust Aristotle," and on 
another there is the statement that Sophocles, and others 
who wrote well, lived before Aristotle. But Aristotle 
emerges in the Discoveries as one who wrestled rather 
better than others with the nature of things.
But, whatsoever Nature at any time dictated to the 
most happie or long exercise to the most laborious; 
that the wisdome, and the learning of Aristotle, hath 
brought into an Art ; because, he understood the 
Causes of things; and what other men did by chance or 
custome, he doth by reason; and not only found out the 
way not to _erre, but the short way we should take, not 
to erre, /italics ihine73
This passage refers to Aristotle's work as art and it sug­
gests the reason as an instrument of originality which 
probes the causes of things, the nature of reality. In 
the parallel passages in his text, Heinsius is concerned
3
Heinsius speaks of the wise and learned man who 
operates by reason. Jonson inserts the name of Aristotle 
as this embodiment of reason. See H. & S., XI, 286-287»
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with the generic "vir sapiens & eruditus" who "ratione 
agajt, " with the necessity for judgment and reason in art. 
There does follow a long passage in praise of Aristotle 
which Jonson, however, translates and reworks elsewhere. 
But here it is Jonson who makes Aristotle the embodiment 
of reason.
Erring and not erring, in this passage, seem to 
have both moral and aesthetic implications. In the first 
passage quoted "vices," "knowledges," "perfections," 
"science," and "art" are all blended. This approach on 
Jonson's part suggests a composite view of Aristotle's 
work, a view clear and coherent, the kind that usually 
comes after a prolonged exposure to and meditation about 
a particular author. It is the kind of composite view 
behind Aristotle's own works. Two passages from two dif­
ferent works, the Ethics and the Poetics, will illustrate 
the interrelatedness of his views.
In defining virtue and vice in the Nicomachean
Ethics, Aristotle associates virtue with an intermediate
between excess and defect. In elaborating on his point,
he has the following to say:
If it is thus, then, that every art does its work 
well— by looking to the intermediate and judging its 
works by this standard.(so that we often say of good 
works of art that it is not possible either to take 
away or to add anything, implying that excess and
kJonson leaps, deletes, and adds in such a way to 
suggest that he is quite comfortable with both the con­
cepts and the words.
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defect destroy the goodness of works of art, while the 
mean preserves it; and good artists, as we say, look 
to this in their work). . . .5
(6.1106h)
This is easily comparable with the passage from the
Poetics. Reading it again can confirm the impression of
interrelatedness in Aristotle's works, the organic nature
of his view, and the recurring principles of that view.
As in other kinds of imitative art each imitation 
must have one object, so with the plot: since it is
the imitation of an action, this must be one action 
and the whole of it; the various incidents must be so 
constructed that, if any part is displaced or deleted, 
the whole plot is disturbed and dislocated. For if 
any part can be inserted or omitted without manifest 
alterations it is no true part of the whole."
(VIII.1450b)
In the parallel passage in the Discoveries, Jonson conveys
in his translation the same sense of an interrelated whole.
For the practicing dramatist this would be a crucial
passage, and Jonson does not neglect it. To its main
point he devotes more discerning attention than almost
any other critic of the age.
The Fable is call'd the Imitation of one intire, and
perfect Action; whose parts are so joyned, and knitt 
together, as nothing in the structure can be chang'd, 
or taken away, without impairing or troubling the 
whole ; of which there is a proportionable magnitude 
in the members. As for example; if a man would build 
a house, he would first appoint a place to build it 
in, which he would define within certain bounds;
(11.2679-87)
The reference here to proportion and magnitude recurs many
^Richard McKeon, Introduction to Aristotle, p. 339» 
^Grube, On Poetry, p. 17»
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times in the concluding sections of the Discoveries ; in 
Aristotle it is an idea which occurs in a section earlier 
than that on unity of plot: "Beauty is a matter of size
and order" and "What is a matter of art is the limit set 
by the very nature of the action. . . . "
Symmetry, magnitude, proportion, appropriateness, 
all are ideas highlighted in this section of the Discov­
eries , "Of the magnitude and compass of any fable," and 
all of them are recurring concepts in Aristotle's work,
A major idea related to all the foregoing is also 
that of an action existing within certain bounds. There 
is concrete illustration and elaboration of the point, 
all of which Jonson follows and to which he adds his own 
example of Tityus the Giant. Examples of this idea from 
Aristotle are "If the opposites were infinite, the rest 
would cease to be" and "evil belongs to the class of the 
unlimited" and "good to that of the limited." In Jonson's 
works, particularly the two humour plays, characters such 
as Kitely (EMIH) and Asper-Macilente (EMOH) are continu­
ally accusing themselves and others of not being able to 
act in "more stricter bounds," and describing the humour 
as "wanting power to contain it selfe."
The last sections of the Discoveries are derived 
primarily from Aristotle, a highly concentrated distilla­
tion, and focused primarily on the idea of wholeness and 
unity and on action as the vehicle of that unity. It is
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evident that Jonson, as evidenced in this critical work 
at least, is quite aware of the unity of action, and of 
the principle of unity, a classical principle, which think­
ers applied in different ways. For Aristotle the One 
was a pervasive, rational, and universal principle which 
accounted for the harmony and coherence of the universe.
Man cannot live in this universe without acting and he may 
be in or out of accord with this rational principle, but 
whatever he does will place him in some total relation­
ship to this principle— totally positive or totally nega­
tive, if considered on a purely abstract, logical plane.
He participates in life, he imitates the motions of life, 
not of death, and the poet makes imitations and in doing 
so represents men in action. Poetry representing men in 
action does not therefore necessarily exclude certain 
kinds of poetry, and it should be remembered that Aristotle 
regarded thinking as an action, the highest kind.
It is well to bear in mind the special relation 
of action to imitation and the interrelatedness of action, 
imitation, and nature in looking at what Jonson said about 
imitation. Like other Renaissance writers Jonson spoke of 
imitation as a following of other authors, not servilely, 
but as one "that feedes with an Appetite, and hath a 
Stomacke to concoct-, divide, and turne all into nourish­
ment" (11.2473-75)* In this context he seems to think of 
imitatio in terms of both substance and method: (1) "to
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bee able to convert the substance, or Riches of another 
Poet to his owne use;” (11.2467-69)• (2) to "observe,
how the best writers have imitated, and follow them” 
(11.2479-80) italics mine/. : .
His second use of imitation is as "faining; express­
ing the life of man in fit measure, numbers, and har­
mony. . . . ” (11.2349-50). A poet is he who "fayneth and 
formeth a fable, and writes things like the Truth. For, 
the Fable and Fiction is (as it were) the forme and Soule 
of any Poeticall worke, or Poeme” (11,2353-55)» He does 
say that all this is according to Aristotle, so it would 
appear that he did not grasp Aristotle's meaning in the 
appropriate context, at the appropriate time.
J. ¥. H. Atkins says that Jonson here, unlike
Aristotle, represents imitation as "mere 'feigning' or
fancy . . . without any correspondence to truths of a
higher kind.” Only Sidney, he says "grasped Aristotle's
7
meaning with regard to 'imitation.'” But Sidney, as 
pointed out earlier, also called imitation a feigning or 
counterfeiting, and his conception of poetry as a pur­
veyor of higher truths seems to come ultimately from Plato 
rather than from Aristotle, and there was a crucial dif­
ference between Plato and Aristotle in the way they 
approached poetry. Atkins further suggests that Jonson 
did not know Aristotle's text, that he knew only that of
7
Atkins, Criticism; The Renascence, p. 325.
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Heinsius, published in 161I, because, he says, Jonson
follows Heinsius' mishandling of Aristotle with regard to
8laughter or the risible not being suitable in comedy.
But Sidney says much the same when he speaks of delight 
being more appropriate to comedy than loud laughter. It 
was perhaps then an idea current in the age and not there­
fore proof that Jonson did not know Aristotle's text.
A. H. Gilbert, in his Literary Criticism, apparently 
thinks Sidney justified in referring to Aristotle as an 
appropriate authority in this matter.
Without making it too important a point, one might 
note that in the same passage where Jonson calls imitation 
a feigning, he speaks of the "fable and fiction" as the 
"forme and Soule of any Poeticall worke, or Poeme." This
apparently is not Aristotle by way of Heinsius, and "forme"
9
and "Soule" are important words in Jonson's vocabulary. 
Herford and Simpson, give no source for this passage of the 
Discoveries. According to them Jonson's borrowings from 
Heinsius occur later in the text. Heinsius does not call 
the plot the "soul"of tragedy but Aristotle apparently 
does (VI.l450b).^^ Also, later, in another passage,
Jonson equates the fable with "the Imitation of one intire, 
and perfect Action; whose parts are so joyned and knitt
8Atkins, p. 330.




together, as nothing in the structure can be chang'd, or 
taken away, without impairing or troubling the whole; of 
which there is a proportionable magnitude in the members" 
(11.2679-84). This passage, again for which Herford and 
Simpson do not give a source, could just as easily have 
come from Aristotle as from Heinsius. The coherence and 
organization of it is closer to Aristotle than it is to 
Heinsius:
As in other kinds of imitative art each imitation must 
have one object, so with the plot: since it is the
imitation of an action, this must be one action and 
the whole of it; the various incidents must be so con­
structed that, if any part is displaced or deleted, 
the whole plot is disturbed and dislocated.
(VIII.1451a)11
Heinsius' passage, which, according to Herford and Simpson 
is parallel to a later passage in the Discoveries, consists.
I »
of a long discourse where he draws an analogy between space 
in building and action in tragedy. He does not here refer 
to the fable being the imitation of an action; he does not 
refer to the "fabula" at all until much later in a differ­
ent context : "Hactenus ergo, quantam esse fabulam
12tragoediae oporteat & actionem." Jonson translates this 
as "An so farre for the measure, the extent of a Fable 
Dramatieke" (11,2749-50).
A little further on in another section: "Poesy,
is his ^the poet's^ skill, or Crafte of making: the very
^^Grube, p. 17.
^^H. & S., XI, 292.
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Fiction it selfe, the reason, or forme of the worke"
(11.2376-78)» This passage is a translation from Joannes
13Buchler of Gladbach. Jonson adds "is his skill, or 
Crafte of making" and he translates ratione as "reason," 
Reason and form are used synonymously, reason being that 
perhaps which brings form and shape, which does shape or 
make, and which is indicative of something having shape. 
This passage would seem to reveal Jonson thinking of 
poetry as something autonomous, a form of its own, a reason 
of its own, something to be considered on aesthetic prin­
ciples, as well as on the basis of its content, or its 
"correspondence to truths of a higher kind." And it does 
convey the sense of imitation as a creating Process, 
guided by the reason.
The point of Atkins' argument is that Jonson, like 
Bacon, regarded poetry as a "mere ^italics mine]/ fic­
tion," and his hot understanding the implications of 
Aristotle's "imitation" Atkins thin,ks is one proof of this 
attitude. Considering the close relationship between 
action and imitation in Aristotle's studies it seems 
possible that even if one did not fully grasp the meaning 
of imitation and if one did understand the importance of 
unity of action, then this understanding of the second 
would bring one close to a comprehension of the first.
& S., XI, 282.
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For one thing, Jonson was primarily a writer of 
comedies and it was primarily with comedy that he was con­
cerned, Everywhere in the relevant passages of the Dis­
coveries he speaks of the plot, the action, of tragedy 
and comedy. He always includes comedy and when he speaks 
of raising the despised head of poetry to her former dig­
nity, it is in his comedies that he speaks of doing so. 
Here it is obvious that he has a high regard for what 
poetry is. Also, he regards comedy as a form of poetry. 
And comedy, as the times attested, and as Aristotle’s 
Poetics helped to reinforce in its thinking, was not the 
same vehicle of high and serious truths as was tragedy.
It was an imitation of the ’’common errors of our life." 
Common errors are not generally the ones that rip open 
the universe and reveal its deep, serious, and mysterious 
truths. Catastrophic errors or events are generally the 
ones that impress people with the seriousness of existence. 
So Jonson had a problem.
In imitating men in action, men "worse, or of the 
same kind" (II.l448a), men whose actions did not have 
highly serious reverberations or consequences, in dealing 
with follies rather than with crimes, how was he to expend 
justifiably on his drama the seriousness that he was 
instinctively inclined to expend and to receive the seri-
l4ous attention he was naturally inclined to expect? In
l4Gbrube, p. 5•
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presenting fools and rogues, how was he to perform the 
duties of poetry in presenting idealized nature, as all 
the critics agreed that poetry should do? Plato had said 
that poetry should do this, i . , idealize nature, but 
Aristotle had only said that it might do this and he had 
not really said that it was idealization; with regard to 
tragedy he had spoken of men "better than ourselves" or 
better than average. And Aristotle's method stressed 
method or process or principles rather than idealized forms. 
In England in the sixteenth and the seventeenth 
centuries someone native to that time was also stressing 
method and that was Bacon. He owed Aristotle a debt 
though he did not always admit it. The Anglo-Saxon world 
has always had a certain reverence for facts and has 
favored building truth out of fact. Bacon is an.example 
of this characteristically English approach to life, but at 
this time Bacon of course was not alone, and the age in
general was becoming aware of and seeking what would now
,
be called in literary terras realism and in scientific terms 
empiricism. In true empirical fashion they had tried the 
medieval combination of Platonic and Aristotelian Catholi­
cism, and now they were ready to try something else.
Various writers attempted to grapple with and translate 
into literature this new spirit. In drama there were the 
domestic tragedies and bourgeois comedies, somewhat uncer­
tain in intent and mixed in effect; there were also the
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incipient forms of the novel, frequently propagandistic 
in tone and effect and in form, swamplike gardens where 
everything was expected to grow. Their creators had not 
mastered a form which could make coherent a multitude of 
factual detail and also elicit from them universally 
interesting truths.
Jonson is one of those who grapple with the new 
realism. Some of his contemporaries make derogatory 
assessments of his method. William Webbe describes 
Jonson's work as that in which "humorous vapors take the 
place of holy inspiration" (II.389) and calls him "a meere 
Empyrick, one that getts what he hath by obseruation. . . ." 
Dekker calls him "a,mere sponge, nothing but humours and 
observation."^^ The Oxford English Dictionary defines 
"Empiric" for the year l621, as one who "relies solely 
upon observation and experience without benefit of reason­
ing, scientific theory or philosophical theory," sometimes 
synonymous with a quack. Burton in the Anatomy (Il.i.iv.i) 
so uses it: "There be many mountebanks, quack-salvers,
Empericks, in every s t r e e t . T h e s e  derogatory comments 
suggest that Jonson’s sometimes aggressive attitude sprang 
from a keen awareness of that against which he fought. He 
is, at this time, operating partially in a theoretically
^^Atkins, Criticism: The Renascence, pp. 402, 255.
^^Robert Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy, eds. 
Floyd Dell and Paul Jordan-Smith (New York, 1955)»
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alien or unpopular critical and intellectual tradition. 
Humours are not heavenly patterns or images of the ideal, 
and observation may challenge and displace inspiration.
Is it safe to admit that an imitation of life may produce 
people who have not glimpsed universal truth and beauty in 
the Mirror of Nature? What of that whole area wherein 
exists the process of arriving at truth, the means to the 
end? What if the process is as important as its end?
What if absolute truth may or may not be attained through 
the concrete specifics of the physical world— a possibility 
which Aristotle deemed important?
Jonson wanted his work to be an image of the teem­
ing physical world in which he lived. But he was also 
interested in the way in which the external world of fact 
coalesced with "higher truths," and he is one of the first 
dramatists to cope with fact and truth and the principles 
which interrelate them. For him the connecting bridge was 
a rational principle and in his work this principle cre­
ated form and form was to be arrived at by a method, a 
process, by "election and a meane," not by inspiration. 
Imitation then in the context of Jonson's work and world 
suggests a method, an approach, not a depiction of ideal­
ized nature.
Thinking of the practice of poetry as a method or 
process is compatible with thinking of it in an evolution­
ary way, an attitude which Jonson expresses on many
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occasions :
I am not of that opinion to conclude a Poets liberty 
within the narrowe limits of lawes which either the 
Grammarians or Philosophers prescribe. For, before 
they found out those lawes, there were many excellent 
Poets, that fulfill'd them. Amongst whome, none more 
perfect than Sophocles, who liv'd a little before 
Aristotle. (11.2555-70)
Poetry must be free to develop in accordance with the new
minds and fresh spirits that apply themselves to it. A
sense of poetry's evolutionary development is more
explicitly expressed in one of Jonson's early plays, EMOH,
by the Grex, or Chorus:
Cord. No, I assure you, Signior. If those lawes 
you speake of, had beene deliuered vs, ab initio, and 
in their present vertue and perfection, there had 
beene some reason of obeying their powers: but 'tis
extant, that that which we call Comoedia, was at first 
nothing but a simple, and continued Song, sung by one 
only person, till SVSARIO inuented a second, after 
him EPICHARMVS a third; PHORMVS, and CHIOMIDES deuised 
to haue foure Actors, with a Prologue and Chorus ; to 
which CRATINVS (long after) added a fift and sixt; 
EVPOLIS more; ARISTOPHANES more then they: euery man
in the dignitie of his spirit and judgement, supplyed 
something. And (though that in him this kinde of 
Poeme appeared absolute, and fully perfected) yet how 
is the face of it chang'd since, in MENANDER, PHILEMON, 
CECILIVS, PLAVTVS, and the rest; who have vtterly 
excluded the Chorus, altered the property of the per­
sons, their names, and natures, and augmented it with 
all liberty, according to the elegancie and disposi­
tion of those times, wherein they wrote? I see not 
then, but we should enioy the same licence, or free 
power, to illustrate and heighten our inuention as 
they did; and not bee tyed to those strict and regular 
formes, which the niceness of a few (who are nothing 
but forme) would thrust vpon vs.17
This lengthy statement is made by Cordatus in answer to a 
X7This passage resembles Aristotle's brief history 
of Comedy; Aristotle mentions Epicharmus, Phormis, and 
Crates (V.l449b). Grube, pp. 10-11.
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question by Mitis, another member of the Chorus: "Does
he obserue all the lawes of Comedie in it?" Jonson is
usually thought of as a classicist because of his taking
note of the "lawes," and passages such as that quoted
above are cited as proof of his not being an "out-and-out 
18classicist." He does, in the prologue to Volpone (11.30-2) 
refer to the "lawes of time, place, persons" and in the 
preface to the I605 Quarto of Se.janus to his own violation 
of the "strict Lawes of Time." It is interesting that he 
is called a classicist because he mentions the "lawes," 
and does sometimes adhere to them, and not-a-classicist 
because he sometimes sets aside these same "lawes," It 
seems more accurate to think of him, or anyone, as a 
classicist because of his desire to regularize the drama 
in terms of reasonable proportion, in giving reason, as 
maker of order, coherence, and symmetry in the classical 
sense, a part in dramatic form, in creating unified action, 
and also in creating character.
That he considered imitation a "mere feigning, a 
fiction," a mere counterfeiting, should be looked on with 
some skepticism. After all, some of his humour characters 
are persistently referred to as counterfeits, as those whose 
.outsides do not agree with their insides. They are people 
who are lies, mere fictions, people who have affected wills 
and an affected reason and cannot act with "election;" what 
1 q *
& S., IX, 422, note 1.235.
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they are is "borrowed;" they do not act with proportion, 
within bounds, and have not got "a habit" of acting well. 
Some of their follies are essential and some may seem only 
borrowed fads, but their follies themselves are in a sense 
lies since these follies make of their possessors rational 
monsters; they are violations of nature., a nature con­
ceived of as operating on a rational principle.
Jonson's "counterfeits" then are embodiments of a 
violated universal truth. They bear an inverse "corres­
pondence to higher truths" and are concrete images of 
exceedingly abstract thought. They are drawn from the 
critically neglected realm of unidealized nature and given 
parts in a form not generally conceded to be a purveyor of 
higher or serious truths.
In the Ethics Aristotle describes the good, or
virtuous, life as that life lived in accordance with a
rational principle. He describes the purpose of a life:
if this is the case,^nd we state the function of man 
to be a certain kind of life, and this to be an activ­
ity or actions of the soul implying a rational princi­
ple, and the function of a good man to be the good and 
noble performance of these, and if any action is well 
performed when it is performed in accordance with the 
appropriate excellence :19
(1.7.1098a)
The good man is one who exercises moral choice, or
election, who consistently does the right thing for the
right reason. A man can by the habit of acting well become
^^McKeon, Aristotle, p. 318.
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good, or a good man better. No man, since he can create 
his own life, should wish to live any life save his own; 
he will not borrow what cannot be a part of his own. He 
lives it with proportion, "concerned with choice, lying in 
a mean, i.e., the mean relative to us, this being deter­
mined by a rational principle . . . "  (11.6.1107a). Such 
a course of action brings about integration, integrity, 
oneness. Concrete action can create abstract quality and 
character, a character whose spirit is in tune with uni­
versal principles of truth and harmony. The resulting 
effect in both character and action is that of unity or 
uniqueness residing in, not isolated from, multiplicity or 
plurality.
This same effect is the general effect of Ben Jon­
son's plays. Madeleine Doran places Jonson artistically 
in the Renaissance tradition of "multiple unity, of the co­
ordination of accents" rather than in the classical one of 
the subordination of accent; yet in her assessment it is 
to another classicist that she refers for a comment on 
Jonson's work:
As I have emphasized before, Jonson's great comedies, 
well-organized as they may be, are truly of the Renais­
sance both in number of lines of action complexly inter­
woven and disentangled and in general richness of 
detail--in character, in language, in observation on 




significantly, for "the copiousness and the well- 
knitting of the intrigues.
Jonson's plays are complex, multiple, and rich in 
detail, but he seems to favor also the principle of sub­
ordination of accent as evidenced by the careful way in 
which he manages the power relationship of the Volpone- 
Mosca and Face-Subtle partnerships. The Discoveries con­
tains a passage on this principle of patterning:
In being able to counsell others, a Man must be 
furnish'd with an universall store in himselfe, to the 
knowledge of all Nature : That is the matter, and seed-
plot; There are the seats of all Argument, and Inven­
tion. But especially, you must be cunning in the 
nature of Man: There is the variety of things, which
are as the Elements, and Letters, which his art and 
wisdome must ranke, and order to the present occasion. 
For wee see not all letters in single words; nor all 
places in particular discourses. That cause seldome 
happens, wherein a man will use all Arguments.
(11.74-83)
Using "rank and order" accords with his emphasis on using 
"election, and a meane."
Jonson's use of the humours in creating his char­
acters is another reason why some critics regard Jonson as 
one more of his own time than of a classical one. The 
humours theory was a pervasive one in Elizabethan and 
Jacobean times, appearing in the current physiological 
texts and used by other literary people besides Jonson. 
George Chapman is one example, but he made a rather inor­
ganic use of the humours, a use that Jonson would not have 
entirely approved. The theory itself was, of course, an
axDoran, Endeavorsp. 278.
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ancient one, promulgated in the fifth century B.C. by
Hippocrates. The body of man was comprised of blood,
phlegm, yellow and black bile, and on these four elements
the body was dependent for its health.
His health is most perfect when these elements are 
evenly proportioned to one another in combination, 
quality, and quantity, and are perfectly mingled.
He has pain when one of these elements is defective 
or excessive or is isolated in the body, uncompounded
with the others.22
Galen in the second century A.D. developed Hippo­
crates ' theory by adding to it the idea of spirit pervad­
ing all parts and mingling with the humours. Presumably 
at this point the theory became psychological as well as 
physiological. Thomas Linacre translated Galen's book Of 
Temperaments into Latin in 1521, and Linacre*s pupil Sir 
Thomas Elyot did much to popularize the idea. Elyot's 
Castel of Helth was published in 1539 and went through 
numerous editions. In Jonson's own immediate time, Robert 
Burton is the only one who analyzed the humours ;
A humour is a liquid or fluent part of the Body, 
comprehended in it, for the preservation of it ; and 
it is either innate or born with us, or adventitious 
and acquisite. (I.i.2.2)
He names and describes the humours and also
expresses the idea of a spirit which acts as "a common tie
or medium betwixt the body and soul," or as, according to
23"Paracelsus, a fourth soul of itself." Burton refers 
22Of the Nature of Man, written by Polybius, son- 
in-law to Hippocrates, quoted in H. & S., IX, 391.
23Burton, Anatomy, p. 393.
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frequently to Jonson's characters in illustrating certain 
kinds of people, the gullish, for instance, or the too 
uxorious. One of Jonson's most explicit definitions 
appears in EMOH;
some one peculiar quality 
Doth so possesse a man, that it doth draw
All his affects, his spirits, and his powers
In their confluctions, all to runne one way;
(2nd sounding, 105-8)
One interesting thing about this theory and 
Jonson's use of it is the idea of oneness, the spirit's 
contortion in accordance with one particular humour so that 
a character is drawn to being of one sort and to acting
in one way. In addition to being reminiscent of Hamlet's
delineation of "that particular fault," that "one defect,/ 
Being nature's livery, or fortune's star" (I.iv.31-36) 
which may cause corruption and of the Greek hamartia, it 
suggests also the Aristotelian concept of integrated one­
ness of character.
Jonson's use of this theory is ultimately rather 
like several pages out of the Ethics. Hippocrates-Polybius' 
"defective or excessive" and Galen and Burton's "spirit" 
also suggest Aristotle. A number of Aristotle's works, 
including the Ethics, Physics, and Rhetoric, which were 
known by the early part of the sixteenth century, and the 
Poetics were exerting an influence by mid-century. At any 
rate, all these branches go eventually back to a common 
soil. Jonson would have had ample opportunity for exposure
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to the humour theory from any number of sources, and one 
need not limit him to the Ethics, for instance, since he 
vas an eclectic and omnivorous explorer of ideas. But in 
addition to and perhaps more important than distinguishing 
between the real or organic humour and the foppish or super- 
fician fad, there is the clear, rational treatment of a 
clearly irrational principle, a treatment bearing more kin­
ship to Aristotle than to other possible influences. If 
Aristotle's virtuous man acts consistently in accordance 
with a rational principle, Jonson's humour characters act 
consistently in accordance with an irrational principle. 
Instead of doing the right thing for the right reason, 
they do the wrong thing for the wrong reason. The wrong 
reason has to do with something that cannot always be 
literally equated with one of the four humours; it does 
have to do with generally their being the wrong way around, 
the reverse image of the integrated man in harmony with his 
best self and the universe. They become, frequently, because 
of their irrationality, images of perverted creativity, 
rational monsters. They act in accordance with some par­
ticular fault or defect. By this action their fault grows, 
they increase in the humorous, and become "by habit" more 
greedy, more envious, more fantastic. Since their ends 
are not ultimate or absolute ones, since they substitute 
secondary goods for ultimate ones, they can become only 
something grown to excess within their own warped bounds.
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A sense of purposeful action that is ultimately senseless 
arises from characters acting in accordance with their 
fault but in the context of a world view which holds 
rational action in accordance with a spiritual, "non- 
corporeal," ultimate as the ideal.
If the characters violate the principle of harmoni­
ous oneness and integrity, they are nevertheless created 
upon the basis of a principle of unity and made to act in 
relationship to that principle. Their very violation of 
this unity is the source of a unified purpose, a unified 
effect, and a unified action. Jonson's perception and 
use of the unifying principle between character and action 
and the unity of action possible in senseless actions is 
suggested by a passage from the Discoveries, a passage from 
the lengthy section on plot and unity of action, based on 
the Dutch scholar David Heinsius' De tragoedioe constitu­
tions , published in Leyden in I6II. In the section on 
"What Jis meanty by one and entire" concerning the madness 
of Sophocles* Ajax, Heinsius' text reads thus:
Exempli gratia, Sophoclis Aiacem videamus: Aiax
armis priuatus, indignatur, & sic erat contumaliae 
impatiens, rabit ac furit. Ergo, quod pro tali est, 
haud pauca sine menta agit, & postramo pro Ulysse 
pecudes insanus mactat.
Jonson translates this passage in the following manner:
For example, in a Tragedy, looke upon Sophocles his 
Ajax: Ajax, depriv'd of Achilles' Armour, which he
hop'd from the suffrage of the Greekes, disdaines; 
and, growing impatient of the Injurie, rageth and 
turnes mad. In that humour he doth many senseless
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things; and at last falls upon the Grecian flocke, 
and kills a great ranune for Ulysses ;
(11.2794-2800)
There are apparently several associations in Jonson's 
mind. .The humour can be a form of madness, at least the 
progenitor of "many senseless things," and it is like the 
tragic flaw or error of tragedy. The passage demonstrates 
the important association that Jonson makes between the 
humours and unity of action. It is the association which 
enables him to create coherent plays with unified actions, 
action proportionate in a rational context and concept of 
space, time and being. These unified actions help to cre­
ate coherent characters; emotional appetites are revealed 
and given increase by the actions and the language of 
action and the increase becomes the resulting action itself.
Atkins is skeptical of using the Discoveries to 
comprehend or analyze Jonson's drama. The work was not 
published until l640-l, by Sir Kenelm Digby, and Atkins 
thinks its contents and the understanding they suggest 
belong to the latter part of Jonson's life, more particu­
larly to 1620-25, though some of the passages suggest an 
earlier date, I605-I5. "At any rate," he says, "it is 
important to note that the dramatic theory expounded at
the end of the work has but little bearing on his earlier
24dramatic creations." In his earlier dramatic creations" 
he was "more romantic in his bold and original efforts to
24Atkins, Literary Criticism: The Renascence, p. 314.
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25devise a new English drama.*’ Although he had "inborn 
classical tendencies," up to 1616 he had "much classical 
learning but little classical technique." Does this imply 
then that he can be said to have used classical technique 
in his later plays because there is extant a work from his 
later years containing many passages on technique, pri­
marily the classical? It is really between The Case is 
Altered and the two humour plays that a dramatic change 
occurs in Jonson’s technique. Jonson thought so himself; 
there must have been a reason.
Presumably Jonson was a student of the classics 
from his early years in Camden’s school. Aristotle was 
well known by the time Jonson was born in 1573* Herford 
and Simpson’s list of books from Jonson’s library include 
the following;
Aristotle. Opera Omnia quae extant, GLraece & Latine.
Authore Guillelmo Du Val. Paris, 2 Vols,, I619.
Aristotle. De Poetica Liber. Latine conversus.
Ed. T. Goulston. London, I623.
There is also a copy of Aristotle’s Rhetoric in Greek and 
no copy traced of Heinsius’ commentary on Aristotle. The 
dates of these known editions are late, but the date on 
his edition of all Plato’s extant works is early, 15?8, 
and Jonson does not refer to Plato any more than he does 
directly to Aristotle in the plays. He was apparently a 
frequenter of libraries, the University and Bodleian 
Libraries at Oxford, for instance.
^^Atkins, p. 261.
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Any critical work of his early period would have 
been destroyed in the fire of 1623, including the preface 
and commentary to his version of the Ars Poetica of Horace. 
The commentary to this work he says was Aristotelian,
Horace illuminated by means of "the Stagarite." As early 
as 1605, in. the I605 Quarto edition of . Se.janus, he announces 
this work. In the Conversations with Drummond it is men­
tioned again. In 1623 it is still unpublished and after 
that it is lost. In this fire he says, in the "Execration 
upon Vulcan," there perished
twice-twelve-years stor'd up humanitie,
With humble Gleanings in Divinitie,
This passage suggests that he had been in the habit of
exploring as he does in the Discoveries for a considerable
length of time.
The liberties he takes with Heinsius' text and the 
rapid, abbreviated syntheses that he makes suggest that 
Jonson is retracing old trails, that it is not material 
encountered for the first time and only in this place. The 
pendulum of critical consensus has swung from acclaiming 
Jonson as an original interpreter and student of Aristotle 
to either an almost complete rejection of the Discoveries' 
importance in this matter or an ambiguous realization 
that there is something peculiarly Jonsonian in these 
passages. Tentative attitudes towards the Discoveries are 
understandable since it is a trail long since covered by 
the leaves of many autumns, but it seems fair to say that
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Jonson is often as "original" in this particular work as he 
is in his plays. In his conception of imitation he saw 
nothing to prevent his making use of other men's works, 
provided he understood them and knew how to turn them to 
his own use, provided that he understood the sense and that 
in his own writing there was no contradiction between words 
and sense, another principle of creation stressed by Jonson.
It is not really necessary to rescue him, and his 
dramatic works, from classicism in order to describe him 
as "bold and original," and therefore "romantic." Jonson 
knew how to be classical and "original;" he understood the 
spirit and principles of classicism, beyond the "laws" 
assigned to it; he knew how to imitate and he knew how to 
steal, as another poet, of the modern era, T. S. Eliot 
has described his own method. If he can be described as 
"stealing" in the Discoveries, thereby decreasing its 
importance in relation to his drama, he certainly knows 
how to give, with the appearance of ease, the stolen 
property the imprint of his own mind, which suggests a 
great and continued familiarity and an understanding that 
was by this time second nature.
There are the same clarity and appearance of ease 
in the implementation of aesthetic principles of his plays, 
which are really different from anything else in the 
period. They are both earthy and sensual and abstract and 
rational. Like some of the poets of the eighteenth century.
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Jonson is simultaneously specifically concrete and largely 
abstract. He is the man who can think both of administer­
ing emetics to turgid poets, such as Marston, and of regard­
ing his plays as "phisickes of the mind." And most of his 
plays are, in a sense, intellectual physicks; they demand 
first, not a gut reaction, but an intellectual recognition. 
Such a trickster, to probe into such irrational and 
"natural" realms of folly with such an intellectual weapon, 
a weapon which made occupants of these realms unnatural.
To catch a thief, hire another thief. Jonson, however, 
always announced himself. Many still missed his coming, 
and his going too.
CHAPTER VII 
THE HUMOURS: AFFECTED OR GENUINE
Critical treatment of the humours in Jonson's work 
has ranged from thêir consideration as the four physio­
logically based temperaments of Renaissance "science" to 
their being simply affected mannerisms. The first would 
be a deeply rooted, inherent, temperament and therefore 
genuine, the second a shifting, facile adoption of surface 
mannerisms and therefore not genuine.
Herford and Simpson give an historical account of
I
the "scientific" theory of the humours and state "Such was 
the theory which Jonson turned to literary account in the 
Comedy of the Humours."^ In an article designed to inter­
pret the humours anew, Henry L. Snuggs draws attention to a
passage in the Induction to Every Man out of his Humour:
But that a rooke, in wearing a pyed feather.
The cable hat-band, or the three-pild ruffe,
A yard of shooetye, or the Switzers knot
On his French Garters, should affect a Humour!
0 'tis more then most ridiculous.
(11.110-114)
^H. & S., Works, IX, 394,
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On the basis of this passage, and the playwright's use of 
miracle to convert Sordido and, in the play's original 
ending, Macilente, he contends that Jonson deliberately 
used the term in two senses; the "genuine and the affected 
or eccentric." Macilente, and perhaps Morose in Epicoene, 
he says are the only genuinely humoural characters in 
Jonson's plays. He concludes that "Though Jonson portrays, 
then, both the genuine and the affected humour, the humour 
of his comedy is almost exclusively affectation or eccen­
tricity."
Snuggs* argument is also based on the eighteenth 
century's treatment of Jonson's work and ideas. Jonson's 
conception of the comic humours, he maintains, is "carried 
over with little change into the Restoration." He points 
to Dryden's statement about the "comic humour of eccen­
tricity," an "extravagant habit," to Shadwell's dramatic use 
of social affectation, and to John Dennis's comment on the
spurious humour, "which is only a Habit or Disposition con-
2
tracted by Use of Custom." One encyclopedia of the
eighteenth century, however, indicates that the humours
had retained something of their original definition in
addition to having acquired a new one.
Humour is also used in dramatic poetry, for a sub­
ordinate or weaker species of what the critics 
call manners.
2
Henry L. Snuggs, "The Comic Humours: A New Inter­
pretation," PMLA, LXII (March 19^7), 114-122.
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It is a mannerism derived from social behavior, but it is
something else as well.
Humour is usually considered by critics, as a 
fainter or weaker habitual passion peculiar to 
comic characters, as being chiefly found in per­
sons of a lower degree than those proper for 
tragedy.3
Even though this second definition suggests the theory's 
original application, it is considerably weaker than, for 
instance. Sir Thomas Elyot's in his Castel of Helth (1539)•
In the body of Man be foure principall humours, 
which contynuinge in the proportion, that nature 
hath lymytted, the body is free from all syckenesse. 
Contrary wise, by the increase or diminution of any 
of them in quantitie or qualytie, ouer or vnder 
their natural assignement, inequall temperature 
commeth in to the body, which syckenesse, foloweth 
more or lasse, accordynge to the lapse or decaye 




Jonson's use of the humours really partakes of some­
thing of all these definitions. That eighteenth century 
critics and playwrights interpreted his humours to mean 
only social affectations or eccentricities does not mean 
that he gave them a clear warrant to do so. That his
huraouf’s did not fit the temperaments as defined in the
"science" of the times need not preclude a personal theory.
3
E. Chambers, Cyclopaedia; Or, An Universal Dic­
tionary of Arts and Sciences; Containing an Explication of 
the Terms, and an Account of the Things Signified Thereby, 
in the Several Arts, both Liberal and Mechanical, 2nd ed. 
(London, 1738), Ï1
^H. & S., IX, 391-392.
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That he depicted humours as revealed in the "manners of 
men" need not mean that he saw them as originating there 
or that he collected them like a "mere Empirick" without 
a creative and controlling synthesis. There is a mass of 
evidence in the plays to indicate that Jonson intimately 
connected the humours with human nature itself. It is 
true, however, that he could not always decide exactly 
what that connection was. Fairly early though, in Every 
Man in his Humour, he decided it was something either "bred 
in the bone" or staining "vnto the liver, in some ;" the 
second of these alternatives allows for the possibility of 
the humour as something learned, and this, of course, does 
allow for one possible source being the "manners of men." 
Jonson was grappling with, not evading, the age-old, and 
still unanswered, question of the source or cause of man's 
flawed, imperfect nature. He does not always refer to the 
humours by that name, but when Busy emerges in zealous 
"Originall Ignorance" and Wasp in irrational "vapours," in 
Bartholomew Fair, they are being just as humourous as 
Macilente. The fact is that the humourous in Jonson's work 
refers to a large inclusive realm, resolved into categories 
only by the characters themselves. That realm is the irra­
tional and the appetitive, where man's chief pursuit is 
self-gratification. It is, therefore, a realm of shifting 
desires and pliant emotions. Like Cavalier Shift in Every 
Man out of his Humour, a character may be "easily yeelding
90
to any good impressions.” Like Busy, he may follow any 
scent, whether it be pig or ”a pyed feather” or the "worlds 
soule.” All his characters have this in common, that they 
yield to impressions, the sensory and the sensual, rather 
than to reason. This yielding, or shifting, is the humour­
ous action. Some may yield to the trivial in a trivial 
manner. Others may have stronger appetites and better 
wits, but they too yield, if not to the trivial, at least 
to the false. Jonson probes with a double-pronged dex­
terity; impelled from either direction, from the "liver" 
or the "cable hat-band," man manages to lose himself. In 
any case, Jonson had warrant, if he so desired it, from a 
contemporary's definition of the humours: Burton stated
that they could be "either innate or born with us, or 
adventitious and acquisite."^
It is impossible to classify Jonsonian characters 
according to the four "scientific" humours of the time.
The phlegmatic is missing, as is the sanguine, and the 
melancholic is rare. The choleric man does make frequent 
appearances, but usually he is not simply choleric. But 
the characters do have humourous dispositions, humourous 
in accordance with Jonsonian definition and usage. Usually 
in his plays there is at least one and often more than one 
strongly humoural character who is a kind of anchor man
^See above, p. 77-
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around which whirl the weaker-spirited characters, more 
superficial, more foolish, or more obsessed with trivia.
In all, the force that moves them is a force beyond the 
reach of reason. Whatever portion of this force a charac­
ter may have, it is frequently a small or perverted portion. 
It may be directed lightly, foolishly, towards the trivia 
of life and in such a circumstance, the comic tone is not 
impaired. But it is a portion of the same force, larger 
and more perverted, which flows in the veins of the shadowy 
creatures, such as Macilente-Asper, that haunt the satiric 
comedies and the greater villains and scoundrels of the 
major plays.
To use Snuggs' terms, Jonson does then portray 
both the "genuine" and the "affected humour." But the sub­
stratum for the "affected," or learned, humour is a physio­
logical-psychological pre-disposition to be humourous and 
the second, or affected, humour is even more ridiculous or 
contemptible because of the reality and awareness of the 
first. Characters may be temporarily cured of a particular 
manifestation of the humourous, but not necessarily of the 
inclination to be humourous. The conclusions of The 
Alchemist and Bartholomew Fair indicate the way in which 
Jonson completely incorporated this second proposition in 
his work. All the humours, both the strong and the weak, 
are perversions of the principle of reason which Jonson 
thought did, or should, underly the nature of things.
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creating coherence and making a man an integrated, unified, 
whole person. Not only do the "absurd, affectations" ones 
fail in "manners," they fail in all that makes man digni­
fied and worthy of the name man. They are apes who imitate 
the surface of life. But anyone who says they are more 
properly cases for a psychiatric ward than representatives 
of humanity must surely not have looked very closely at 
humanity itself. Jonson has simply stripped away dis­
guising features which might confuse the issue and dis­
played the follies in the forefront of the stage.
The main action in Jonson's plays then may be 
described as man doing "many senseless things." Within 
each personal temperament these senseless things exist in 
potentia; in action they are given actuality. Although 
the humour is in itself irrational, and therefore a frag­
ment, characters acting in consistency with their particu­
lar humour produce unified action revealing each character 
for what he is and making an action picture of the pattern 
of humanity as well. The characters are not self-directed 
in the highest sense of being moved by the reason, but they 
are in the sense of being self-impelled towards personal 
gratification. If they are puppet-like, it is because they 
act in accordance with their natural impulses, which are 
not here the source of spontaneous and meaningful action. 
This may be a hard proposition, unpalatable to the heirs of
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the Romantic revolution. It is not necessarily a whole 
truth, but it is certainly a portion of the truth, as most 
propositions are, in art or elsewhere.
CHAPTER VIII
THE CASE IS ALTERED; EARLY HUMOUROUS ACTION
This play, first published in I609 but dated by 
Herford and Simpson at 1597-98, is Jonson's only known 
attempt at adapting something resembling the double plot in 
vogue in the Elizabethan drama of the 90's and at borrowing 
ready-made plots to tailor to his own uses. From two con­
trasting plays of Plautus, the Captives and the Auralaria, 
Jonson takes his two stories--the one a serious romance 
with comic relief, the other a satirical comic treatment 
of avarice with serious moments. Although both lend them­
selves to the Elizabethan love of mingling the grave and 
the gay, neither satisfies that same taste for a plot filled 
with incidents and crowded with persons. Jonson, however, 
satisfies this deficiency for his audience. Not only does 
he have two plots in one play, whereas Plautus had single- 
line action plots, but he also multiplies the original two 
suitors to five, he adds two children, Aurelia and Phoenix- 
ella, and he also adds the clownish Juniper and Onion. 
Charles R. Baskervill remarks on the Elizabethan charac­
teristics of this play:
,4
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The wealth of motive and material found in The 
Case is Altered--romantic love, romantic friend­
ship, mazes of love entanglement, Plautine motives 
of lost and stolen children, clownish fads, and 
folk point of view, satire on word-mongers, and 
especially on unchecked follies--exhibits nearly 
every current that is apparent in the drama around 
1599, when experiments were being made in many 
lines.1
Freda L. Townsend remarks on the search for classical unity 
of action, or rather the single line of action, by various 
critics and points in answer to five main strands of 
interest: (1) Count Ferneze and sons, Paulo and Gasper-
Camillo, and the prisoner Chamont, (2) the love of Paulo 
and Rachel, and the treachery of Angelo, (3) the wooing of 
Christophero, Onion, and Ferneze; (4) Jaques and his money;
O
and (5) the activities of the Count's daughters. The play
would seem indeed an example of the "co-ordination of
accents," rather than the subordination, of which Madeleine 
3
Doran speaks. But need the search for classical unity be
the search for a single line of action? In the Discoveries
Jonson comments on "What /is meant7 by one and entire":
One is considerable two waies; either as it is, 
only separate, and by it selfe, or as being com­
posed of many parts, it beginnes to be one as 
those parts grow or are wrought together. That it 
should be one the first way alone, and by it selfe, 
no man that hath tasted letters ever would say, 
especially having required before a just Magnitude 
and equal Proportion of the parts in themselves.
^English Elements in Jonson's Early Comedy (Austin,
1911), p. 103.
2
Apologie for Bartholmew Fayre (New York, 194?)t
p. 40.
3
See above, p. 75*
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Neither of which can possibly be, if the Action be 
single and separate, not composed of parts, which 
laid together in themselves, with an equal and 
fitting porportion, tend to the same end; which 
thing out of Antiquitie it selfe hath deceiv’d 
many, and many this Day it doth deceive.
(11.2751-63)
The rest of the passage refers to the erroneous thought 
that ’’the action of one man” produces one action and empha­
sizes, repeatedly, that only those actions which can be 
joined ”to one and the same end" can produce unified action.
Jonson himself, in this passage based on Heinsius, 
reveals that he does not conceive of unity of action con­
sisting in a single and separate action. Some of the ampli­
fication in this passage is not to be found so explicitly 
stated in Aristotle, who, in places, is ambiguous on the 
subject, but who, nevertheless, provides the basic justifi­
cation. ”A story," says Aristotle, "does not achieve unity, 
as some people think, merely by being about one person" 
(VTII.l451a). Homer, he says "built his plot around the 
one action which we call the Odyssey; and the same is true 
of the Iliad” (VIII.l451a). On another occasion, however, 
he refers to the double plot like that used in the Odyssey 
as being more appropriate to comedy than to tragedy. But 
he apparently has in mind the divided attention and the 
diverse effect created by the good being rewarded and the 
bad punished at the end (XIII.1453a). In any case, the 
matter of importance is "the limit set by the very nature 
of the action" (VII.l451a). Another of his statements on
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unity seems important: "The unity of a statement can be
understood in two ways: the whole Iliad can be said to be
one because its parts are connected, but the definition of 
man is one because it indicates one thing" (XX,l45?a)*^
Jonson was working with an idea or consciousness 
of space different from that of the Greeks or of the Middle 
Ages. For the Renaissance in general the consciousness was 
of space enlarged, but,it tended to be heavenly space dis­
placed and relocated in a more temporal and human frame.
To occupy this increased space, the playwright might turn 
to and explore past time, relating it confusingly on occa­
sion to the present. Or he might bring a stronger lens to 
focus on contemporary humanity, highlighting and enlarging 
some and increasing the number of objects brought into 
view by the power of the glass. In more space on earth, 
there is room for more people. Elizabethan and Jacobean 
playwrights set about to demonstrate this with alacrity. 
Absolutes were still present or implied, but they did not 
hold space and time in the same vertical relationship to 
eternity as in preceding ages. With the development of the 
baroque sensibility, time re-oriented itself, at least 
momentarily, to the vertical ascent heavenward as well as 
to man's horizontally defined destiny. There was still a 
scene crowded with incidents, characters, and objects. In
^Grube, ed., On Poetry, pp. 16,17,25,44.
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Jonson, of course, there is this crowded scene, sometimes 
seeming very compressed because of the large number of 
characters, because he tightens his control by tightening 
time or place, and because each minute is ticked off more 
emphatically. There is also an awareness of absolutes, 
but these absolutes define man in an earthly, temporal 
context.
The Case is Altered cannot be described as having 
a single line of action or simply a double one with a main 
plot and a subplot. Instead, there are several focal points 
from which actions radiate and then interlace with one 
another.■ Some of these focal points are weightier in 
interest than others, which are subordinate. The limits 
of the movement are marked by these principal centers of 
interest: Count Ferneze and his genteel establishment, on
the one hand, and Jaques and his humble residence, on the 
other. Between these two points move the lesser charac­
ters, attracted by an opportunity to court or to display 
fine and affected manners or by an opportunity to indulge 
an affected love. The immediate and perceptible space of 
the play is also denoted by these two magnetic poles. The 
Venetian locale alluded to but not shown relates primarily 
to past actions which, however, will be resolved in the 
present circumstances: the earlier loss of the Count's son
Camillo, the kidnapping of Rachel, and the restoration of 
both to their proper station. Disposed in these two main
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centers and providing the play in general with holding 
pegs, so to speak, are two genuinely humoural characters, 
the Count and Jaques.
When Count Ferneze enters for the first time, he 
does so in an impatient peremptory manner, illustrating 
his son Paulo’s description of him which precedes his
'I
entry :
You know my father’s wayward and his humour 
Must not receive a check, for then all objects,
Feede both his griefe and his impatience.
And those affections in him are like powder.
Apt to enflame with every little sparke,
And blow up reason, therefore Angelo, peace.
(I.vi.85-90)
■ He fires a short quick speech and sends the servants flying
about in search of his son Paulo, upon which he concludes,
Patience? a Saint would loose his patience to be crost,
As I am with a sort of motley braines
See, see, how like a nest of Rookes they stand.
Gaping on one another.
(I.vii.17-20)
Paulo accounts for his father's behavior partially by his 
grief for loss of his wife, but his grief is easily dis­
placed by the prospect of acquiring Rachel DePrie for him­
self. He needs only the knowledge that his steward, 
Christophero, seeks her for himself to decide that he, the 
Count, is "farre in love,” a "perswasion” wrought in him 
by "fancie.” He immediately proceeds to pursue the object 
of this current fancy. In the midst of his pursuit, word 
comes of Paulo’s capture, and the Count turns aside in 
another direction:
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I set my thoughts on loue, on seruile loue,
Forget my vertuous wife, feele not the dangers.
The bonds and wounds of mine owne flesh and bloud.
And therein am a mad man: therein plagu'd.
With the most iust affliction vnder heauen.
(III.iv.18-22)
He is more susceptible to a guilty conscience than to 
reason, which can be blown up by "every little sparke."
His temper leads him to raise his hand against a prisoner 
under his protection, and unknown to him his own son. Thus, 
though the Count may not be classifiable as one of the four 
"scientific" humours, his humourous disposition makes him 
precipitate in his actions and obtuse in his comprehension 
of others.
The other character delineated as being strongly 
humourous is the Count's opposite in the social scale; pre­
sumably an outcast, a beggar, whose only rare possession 
is a daughter. Jaques De Prie expresses his humour in one 
particular way, his affection for his gold. He does not 
appear until Act II, but when he does, he is presented 
boldly. Immediately, his moving passion is delineated, by 
Jaques himself, and its effects are physical in their mani­
festation. He has spied Paulo and Angelo haunting his 
dwelling and he fears their motive is greed for his gold.
. . .  What a could sweat 
Flow'd on my browes, and over all my bosome!
Had I not reason? to behold my dore 
Beset with unthrifts . . .
That I might live alone once with my gold. 
0 'tis a sweet companion! kind & true!
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A man may trust it when his friend cheats him;
Brother, or friend, or wife! o wondrous pelfe,
That makes all men false, is true it selfe.
(II.i.2-5; 27-31)
His humour is strong enough to lead him to steal, to kid­
nap, to disguise himself and Rachel in "beggery counter­
feits ," even to overcome the stench of dung in his nostrils. 
All motives are referred first of all and most importantly 
to his one preoccupation, his sweet treasure hidden under a 
pile of dung. His other treasure, Rachel, has some 
reflected value from the gold simply because she was stolen 
from the same place at the same time.
Likewise, the majority of the remaining characters 
in the play dance attendance upon appetites which control 
their motions. Some of them do have a sense of the true 
or real as opposed to the false or counterfeit; Paulo and 
Rachel are true to their love; Gasper-Camillo and Chamont 
are true to their friendship, to their word, and to the 
soldier's code of courage. But behind the "romantic love, 
romantic friendship, mazes of love entanglement" which 
Baskervill finds in this play, Jonson is writing his own 
kind of play. As it reveals characters yielding easily to 
any impression, the romantic love motif becomes a vehicle 
for satire.
Paulo and Angelo introduce the major love motif as 
Paulo decides that Angelo is the "true proper obiect" of 
his soul, a constant friend with whom he can entrust the
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care of his beloved Rachel. Soon after, Onion joins the 
love-smitten ranks, desiring Juniper as spokesman to 
Christophero who will in turn be spokesman to Rachel. 
Christophero in his turn decides to press his own suit, but 
first he will consult and seek the support of. the Count, 
who in turn sets about pursuing Rachel for himself. Every 
one of the lovers seeks an emissary or assistant and by 
each he is betrayed and deceived.
The motivation of the inconstant friends as even­
tually inconstant lovers may seem casual, but it does not 
necessarily seem unrealistic. People are susceptible to 
suggestion and they tend to want what others want. Why 
should depth be demanded of fictional characters and not of 
real people? Appetite unallied with either developed emo­
tion or reason easily shifts its affection, as it surfaces 
first in one place and then in another.
Onion derives his affection, on infection, partially 
from the false poet Antonio Balladino who in the first 
scenes helps to set the tone of superficiality, of facile 
"trembling hearts" and "trickling teares." Juniper also 
forms a member of this trio and has the "sprightly humour" 
of calling upon large, incomprehensible words such as 
"Hierogliphick" and "Aequinoctiall." Valentine calls it a 
humour, but Juniper construes it as a "naturall gift." 
Juniper presents Onion to Balladino as one "mightely 
enamored of thee," "one as right of thy humour as may be.
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a plaine simple Rascal, a true dunce." Onion has preten­
sions to noble poetic sentiments, but in his cloddish 
insensitivity he thinks that because Rachel is poor, she 
is not above his station. Both Juniper and Onion are easily 
turned from the scent of love by the scent of gold. As 
they wax amorous at the keyhole of Jaques' house, Onion 
for Rachel and Juniper to help Onion woo Rachel, the owner 
returns with "amorous eyes," to "court" his gold. Juniper 
is thoroughly clouted by Jaques while Onion takes refuge 
in a tree and thereby spies out Jaques' secret treasure.
And thereafter Onion's love is given "a box of the eare." 
When they surface in the play again, they have dressed 
themselves in fine suits and have become convivially drunk. 
One passion, after all, is as good as another, whether it 
be poetry, love, or drink.
As indicated earlier, this group blends easily with
the presumably more cultivated by means of Juniper's
request for assistance from Christophero and Christophero's
suit to the Count. As soon as Christophero announces his
romantic intentions, it is also made apparent that his love
is humourous and shallow;
I spide her lately at her fathers doore.
And if I did not see in her sweet face 
Gentry and noblenesse, nere trust me more:
But this perswasion, fancie wrought in me.
That fancie being created with her lookes.
For where love is he thinkes his basest object 
Gentle and noble; I am farre in love.
(II.Vi.37-42)
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He seems more susceptible than Onion to the gentility in 
Rachel’s face, but he concludes that love has simply 
ennobled a base object. One suspects that not love so much 
as the material value of that love is an important con­
sideration for Christophero. This suspicion is confirmed 
when he seeks to assure the Count that a wife would not 
make him neglectful of his duties as a steward. The Count 
himself privately notes that Rachel's poverty should be a 
deterrent to Christophero. In both men, to some degree, 
financial calculation is at work. This materialistic per­
version of love into a fancy or humour is perhaps sym­
bolized by Jaques' golden hoard. Rachel, the real treasure, 
presumably sought by so many, sits like a "Madona" atop
the treasure in which most of her suitors are really inter­
ested. The action, therefore, which takes so many charac­
ters on the path to Jaques' house also leads to the play's 
major revelations, or examples of altered cases.
Angelo, not so easily described as tainted, even 
indirectly, by the smell of gold, is nevertheless as humour­
ous in his major actions as the Count or Jaques. Like
both, he is willful; at the same time he is also "yeelding
I
to any good impressions." He is willful in that he insists 
on his right to so yield.
He is an asse that will keep promise stricktly
An any thing that checks his private pleasure;
Chiefly in love. S'bloud am not I a man?
Have I not eyes that are as free to look?
And bloud to be enflam'd as well as his?
(III.i.7-13)
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Thematically he is important because he is another key 
figure illustrating the dominant influence of appetite: 
trust and the bonds of a close friendship cannot restrain 
him. He is close to the group of characters in which 
affective impressions have been made and will be retained 
and, of course, is a foil for Paulo's true love. In the 
action he will hasten the binding together of Paulo and 
Rachel and his own displacement by Rachel as the "true 
obiect" of Paulo's soul.
In several of this play's characters, Jonson has 
begun to mold the strongly humourous character, the char­
acter whose passion is of sufficient strength to give momen­
tum to a feasible line of action, whose actions can be 
observed as consistent with what he is. Each character 
acts consistently in accordance with what he is and all the 
characters are in some way consistent with each other.
They share the same wayward flesh, the same irrational 
motivation, and their minds are all delinquent in the exer­
cise of reason.
One critic has described Jonson's construction in 
this play in an impressive manner:
The plot and intrigue both have a thorough-going 
stratification which includes almost all the prin­
cipal characters and, furthermore, furnishes them 
their main motivation. These elements rarely in­
fuse one another; rather they are parallel lines.5
^J. J. Enck, "The Case Is Altered: Initial Comedy
of Humours," SP, L (April 1953), 209.
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Una Ellis-Fermor sees this independence of parts existing 
in as late a play as The Alchemist. She refers to the 
intrigue and interactions as the "outer form," the charac­
ters and their moods as the "inner form," and compares 
both to a modernistic, non-representational painting in'
g
which color-groups and line design are unrelated.
This appearance of independent parts seems to vanish 
if one does not demand the wealth of figurative and sym­
bolic language to be found in many Elizabethan and Jacobean 
plays. Jonson was contemptuous of conceits; his false 
poets are generally stuffed with conceits, and only a char­
acter like Onion demands a "prety Paradox or some Aligory" 
made. Instead, Jonson's language tends toward the abstract 
and analytical; the figurative, the concrete, the symbolic, 
are used, but they are not the vehicles by which the poet 
mounts aloft, nor generally the means of universalizing a 
play's application. Frequently, of course, Jonson the 
critic attempts to make this application directly. A man 
so conscious of the distracting play of the emotions would 
not allow his audience a possible escape through the flowery 
chain of a poetic leit motif. He wanted no pauses by the 
wayside to contemplate one particular moment. His audience 
must go all the way, and to this end he carefully molded 
character and action, both tending towards one end,
^The Jacobean Drama. An Interpretation (London, 
1953), p."?5:
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consistent and unified in overall effect. All characters 
in this early play persist to the end. Jonson does not 
create a unified effect by dropping some in order to focus 
on one. Immediately after Paulo's realization of Angelo's 
treachery, the stage is set for the restoration of the 
Count's lost son, Gasper-Camillo. Count Ferneze and his 
entourage, Maximillian and Francesco, enter, followed by 
servants leading in the prisoner Camillo. Christophero 
enters in frenetic haste, interrupting the denouement of 
this particular problem. Jaques soon follows; "a confusion 
of languages" ensues as each one, the Count, Christophero, 
and Jaques, loses himself in an ecstasy of complaint about 
his own interests; and Maximillian demands "Ifhat rule is 
here?" Chamont, Paulo, Rachel, and Angelo return; the 
restoration of son Paulo is followed by Chamont's revela­
tion of Gasper's past history and Jaques' confession of 
Rachel's kidnapping. Chamont now has a sister and a bride- 
to-be as he is paired with Auielia. Maximillian becomes 
the master of ceremonies as he sorts out information and 
directs all to the nuptial celebrations. Juniper and Onion 
who began the play, return to end it in the last scene. 
Their presence reveals the fate of Jaques' gold, now in the 
possession of "hinds" who think that worth can be had by 
the purchase of a lordship or silk clothes.
CHAPTER IX
EVERY MAN IN HIS HUMOUR; THE HUMOURS CONTAINED
Every Man in his Humour was first acted in 1598, 
but not printed until I6OI. It did not again appear in 
print until the folio edition of I616, at which time, 
before being placed first in the edition of Jonson's works, 
it had undergone some careful revision. This revision 
probably took place about I608-I6IO, but may have been as 
early as 1605.^ In general, the dramatic substance of plot 
and character remain the same; the most important changes 
involve the transfer of the setting from Italy to England 
and the Anglicizing of the characters' names. However, 
since this paper is concerned with the early influence of 
classicism on Jonson's work, this chapter will be concerned 
primarily with the first version of this humours play.
Although Jonson has been writing plays of humourous 
action prior to this one, with the presentation of Every 
Man in his Humour he explicitly draws attention to the 
humours as an important concept. That he places the concept 
in a position of prominence suggests of course its conscious
^H. & S., Works, 11, 545; IX, 344.
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use as an "Image of the times" and as a unifying device in
molding character and action. As an "Image of the times,"
however, it is more than a mirror•image of customs and
behavior, a concern with "affectations and misjudgments
2
rather than threats to the health of society." It is more 
nearly a clearly focused but reversed image of life as a 
rational process; as such the image is of life in perverted 
imitation of reason.
If, in Greek philosophy and in Jonson's plays, 
nature's secret principle is reason, and action is the pri­
mary means by which nature fulfills itself as a rational 
process, there must be some cause for action not being 
rational or not eventually leading to a revelation of rea­
son. That cause is the perversion of reason in the human. 
The humour theory, for Jonson, is a statement of this per­
version. Piso's definition of the humour suggests this 
interpretation: "it is a monster bred in a man by selfe
loue, and affectation, and fed by folly" (III.i.157-58).
It is a monster because it is unnatural, because it con­
fuses and fragments the species man by separating his inner 
truth from his outer image, which in turn confuses all 
observers. One who swears bravely may be taken for a brave 
man. One who says he is a poet and writes a few verses may 
be thought a poet. One who says he is reasonable may think
2
Alan C. Dessen, Jonson's Moral Comedy (Evanston, 
Illinois, 1971), p. 45.
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he is so. One who pretends to be dissolute and irreverent 
may be judged to be so. "Superficiall formes'* and "reall 
substance** (I.i.74-75) do not correspond, as Lorenzo Senior 
tells his nephew Stephano they should. In the language of 
Aristotle, the Formal Cause and the Efficient Cause should 
be working in harmony, but in a humourous world they fail 
to do so.
It is not enough to say a humour is a perversion, 
an unnatural state producing unnatural effects. One must 
define the natural, of which it is. a perversion, as the 
reason and as the rational action chosen by the will guided 
by reason. There are enough references in this play, and 
others, to construe this classical principle of unity as 
Jonson*s standard. In Act II of this play, Lorenzo Senior 
ponders how to restore his son to a regular course of 
action, "to reduce him from affected will/ To reasons 
manage":
My troubled soule beginnes to apprehend 
A farther secret, and to meditate 
Vpon the difference of mans estate:
Where is deciphered to true iudgements eye 
A deepe, conceald, and precious misterie.
Yet can I not but worthily admire 
At natures art: who (when she did inspire
This heat of life) plac*d Reason (as a king)
Here in the head, to haue the marshalling 
Of our affections: and with soueraigntie
To sway the state of our weake emperie.
(ii.6-l6)
As he continues to **reason'* on the subject, he begins to 
encounter certain difficulties in confronting the reality
Ill
of illogical diversities in kingdoms and in men. From these
difficulties he turns aside to reaffirm his faith in reason.
Els, if the power of reason be not such,
Why do we attribute to him so much?
Or why are we obsequious to his law,
If he want spirit our affects to awe?
Oh no, I argue weakly, he is strong.
Albeit my sonne haue done him too much wrong.
(11.31-36)
It is clear that though he begins with reason as something 
mixed by nature's art in the human brain, he ends with its 
being an imposed law at strife with other elements in man, 
a law which must win its battles by intimidation.
The rule of reason advocated by the older genera­
tion, represented in this play by Lorenzo Senior, may seem 
to the young unnatural, imposed, and certainly no insurance 
against error. Although Lorenzo Senior speaks well for 
reason, he does not escape the general error and confusion. 
He is easily fooled by Musco in disguise as the soldier 
Portensio, although he swears to judge "if thy deedes/Will 
cary a proportion to thy words." He expresses surprise 
that one of such good exterior presence should be so degen­
erate in mind. The right formula is his, but he does not 
know how to apply it. All poetry he thinks idle, a useless 
toy to be exposed eventually by reason and experience.
In contrast to Lorenzo Senior is another representa­
tive of the older generation. Justice Clement, who, in addi­
tion, is a legal authority. Like the other characters, he 
has a humour, to be merry, but his humour is to challenge
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the reality of all the others in the play. He does not 
accept the statements of others without examination. He 
can correlate deeds and words. He can distinguish between 
true and "idle" poetry, partially because he knows poetry 
and therefore can recognize a plagiarism, even though 
jumbled. He cautions Lorenzo Senior against his anxious 
spying:
Nay but good Signior: heare me a word, heare
me a word, your cares are nothing; they are like my 
cap, soone put on, and as soone put off. What? 
your sonne is old inough, to gouerne himself; let 
him runne his course, it's the onely way to make 
him a stay'd man: if he were an vnthrift, a ruf­
fian, a drunkard or a licentious liuer, then you 
had reason: you had reason to take care: but
being none of these, Gods passion, and I had twise 
so many cares, as you haue, I'Id droune them all 
in a cup of sack: come, come, I muse vour pareell
of a souldier returnes not all this while.
(III.iii.131-141)
Clement's merry temperament helps him to remember 
the experimental playfulness of youth and to know that 
reason can be more easily and truly discovered than imposed. 
Clement's sense of sanity is the prevailing spirit of this 
play. Men are still likeable and not so dedicated to the 
humours but they can be dissuaded from them with a jest.
By the time of the second, revised version, how­
ever, the signs point more clearly toward a more devastating 
image of man. In the I616 folio version of the play Knowell 
(Lorenzo Senior) attempts to account for the humours. Al­
though he bemoans the time past when "age was authoritie,"
he recounts in great detail the vices of both parents and 
children.
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Nay, would our selues were not the first, euen parents. 
That did destroy the hopes, in our owne children;
Or they not learn'd our vices, in their cradles.
And suck’d in our ill customes, with their milke.
Ere all their teeth be borne, or they can speake,
We make their palats cunning! The first wordes.
We forme their tongues with, are licentious iestsi
But, this is in infancie; the dayes
Of the long coate: when it puts on the breeches,
It will put off all this. I, it is like:
When it is gone into the bone alreadie.
No, no: This die goes deeper then the coate.
Or shirt, or skin. It staines, vnto the liuer,
And heart, in some.
(II.V.14-20; 25-31)
This detailed analysis of the humours more fully supports 
Piso and Biancha's statements, in the first version, that a . 
humour is a disease. It points towards the plays to follow 
where the perverted representations of life become more 
intense. In Every Man in his Humour there is still a pos­
sibility that the surface appearance is false to the inner 
truth, that experience can be clarified by itself and reason 
can emerge triumphant.
Nevertheless, though the general tone is light 
hearted and gay, the whole action is still the result of a 
composite of humourous actions, even, unified, and con­
trolled in effect. Each character is limited as a human 
being because of his humour; his actions are therefore 
limited to those arising from or illustrating his humour. 
Because each character is true to his humour, the action 
emerges as a unified one even though the characters are 
numerous and frequently trade humours and the appropriate 
actions.
Ilk
The patterning of this play is similar to the previ­
ous one in that some characters seem more determined in 
their humours than others, in that these characters provide 
a focus for all the actions. Thorello's house, of course, 
is the principal setting and Thorello's is usually the 
dominant humour in any scene where he appears. By the end 
of Act I, in scene iv, in which Thorello first appears, 
all the major characters, except Clement and Prospero, have 
been introduced. Thorello's scene with Piso and Guiliano 
is the last one and serves as a climax to this first act. 
After much vacillation between confiding and not confiding 
in Guiliano, he delivers a long, detailed analysis of his 
brother Prospero's "giddie humor." Like Musco in his coun­
terfeit form, Prospero, Thorello thinks, is betraying his 
true self in a false form leading to a "diseased riot." 
Thorello's speech is both an analysis of his brother's 
humour and a picture of his actions. In subsequent speeches, 
and he has four long ones in this scene, he analyzes other 
humours and creates more action pictures by following the 
logical paths of their currents; all this is motivated by 
his own jealousy. The scene ends with the appearance of 
Biancha, the cause of all his anxiety, and at this point 
there is explicit reference to the "new disease." Thorello 
immediately presents its anatomy. Although it causes a 
violation of the human form, it is something more than a 
violation of social forms.
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A new disease? I know noti new or old,
But it may well be call'd poore mortals Plague;
For like a pestilence it doth infect 
The houses of the braine: first it begins
Solely to worke vpon the fantasie,
Filling her seat with pestiferous aire,
As soone corrupts the iudgement, and from thence.
Sends like contagion to the memorie.
Still each of other catching the infection.
Which as a searching vapor spreads it selfe 
Confusedly through euery sensiue part,
Till not a thought or motion in the mind 
Be free from the blacke poison of suspect.
Ah, but what error is it to know this,
And want the free election of the soule
In such extreames? Well, I will once more striue,
(Euen in despight of hell) my selfe to be 
And shake this feauer off that thus shakes me.
(I.iv.205-222)
Perhaps the question of whether the humour is real or 
affected is related to a more basic problem which reveals 
itself in many forms: can man control himself and his own
destiny or is he a prey to unknown forces, both external 
and internal; is a tragic flaw the result of a basic indi­
vidual imperfection or of a single misjudgment at a par­
ticular time; can Swift, in the empirical age of the eigh­
teenth century, hold ideas to be the result of indigestion 
and at the same time hold man responsible for being rational; 
can the humour be as organic as a disease and still be shaken 
off by an effort of will following a conscious realization? 
Thus far man has had to balance himself between the horns 
of this dilemma; Jonson in his time does likewise.
At any rate, Thorello is a key figure and he appears 
importantly placed at other moments of the play. In the 
central act of the play. Act III, in the first scene, he
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sets the tone for the rest. Piso responds to another of
his long, humourous speeches:
Whence should this flow of passion(trow) take head?ha? 
Faith ile dreame no longer of this running humor,
For feare I sinke, the violence of the streame 
Alreadie hath transported me so farre,
That I-can feele no ground at all:
(11.132-136)
The humour ultimately sweeps away everything into a mass 
confusion, and each character in turn fastens on the term 
to explain the incomprehensible confusion that he experi­
ences in trying to relate to or understand another. This 
act is rounded off with Thorello's jealousy again mani­
festing itself, its cause, Biancha, now present and visible 
on stage. A scene between Cob and his wife Tib occurs to 
parallel Thorello and Biancha's situation just depicted and 
the last scenes of the play when all gather at the water- 
carrier's house for the further satisfaction of their 
humours. Thorello appears in these last scenes with the 
others and here Cob's beating of Tib is both the low-brow 
reflection of Thorello's suspicions and the direct result 
of troubles in Thorello's house.
Thorello may be thought of as representative of the 
middle-age group to which conventions bring no security or 
stability; Prospero, Lorenzo Junior, and the other gallants 
and fops as the young who make sport of conventions or mis­
understand them; Lorenzo Senior and Judge Clement, as the
elder statesmen who keep watch over the conventions, effec­
tively and ineffectively. The last two balance each other,
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both in the concepts they represent and in their appear­
ances in the play. Lorenzo Senior opens Act I, appears 
briefly again (for the third time) in the center point of 
the play, Act III, scene iii, to receive the sage advice 
of Clement who has just appeared for the first time. 
Clement's role now increases in importance as Lorenzo's 
diminishes. In the last act it is Lorenzo who is the most 
confused onlooker and Clement who is the complete master of 
the situation. It is Lorenzo who has condemned all poetry, 
but it is Clement who can apply the light of learning and 
thereby truly judge false poetry condemned to the flames of 
destruction. It is Lorenzo who is deceived by Musco dressed 
as a soldier, but it is Clement who is not deceived either 
by Musco or by Bobadilla's asserting himself to be a soldier. 
By means of these two, Lorenzo Senior and Judge Clement, the 
beginning, middle, and end of the play are clearly marked.
Scampering about beneath the noses of their elders, 
the gallants and fops and fools, always kept informed by 
Musco, weave their own spell. The few but lengthy appear­
ances of Thorello, Clement, and Lorenzo Senior are balanced 
by the brief but numerous appearances of Lorenzo Junior, 
Musco, Stephano, Matheo, Bobadilla, Prospero, Guiliano, and 
Cob, who carry less of the play's thought than its action.
The women seem exempt from the humours, but they are accused 
by the men of being something worse; eventually, however, 
they are drawn into the general melee: Biancha goes to
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Cob's house to spy on Thorello, Hesperida proceeds to an 
assignation with Lorenzo Junior, and Tib generally joins 
in with Cob's angry words.
By the end of Act I, all the major intrigues are 
under way, each one having been introduced in each of the 
four scenes: (1) Lorenzo Senior's suspicions of his son
and his resolve to follow after and spy on him; (2) Lorenzo 
Junior and Musco's counter-conspiracy; (3) most of the 
circle of gallants and fops, including Matheo, Bobadilla, 
and Cob, and Prospero introduced by name only; (4) Thorello 
and the usual auditors of his fears, Guiliano and Piso.
The second act begins with the appearance of Musco dis­
guised as a soldier. His first important act will be to 
fool Lorenzo Senior. His counterfeit appearance is a 
visible materialization of the conscious intent of the 
play. Musco can knowingly assume as counterfeit what the 
others confuse with the real. He does so when he flippantly 
pleads the "humor of necessitie" to Lorenzo Senior to 
account for a soldier's begging alms. Like attacks of &te, 
or blind passion, among the Greeks, which helped account 
for irrational human passions and acts, the humours become 
an excuse for or explanation of almost anything. Stephano 
seriously pleads himself bewitched because he loses his 
purse; Bobadilla says he does not defend himself from 
Guiliano because he has been struck helpless by a planetary 
influence. But these are the fops, who never fail to
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confuse superficial form and essential substance; their 
whimsical behavior, though superficial, is a manifestation 
of something’s being basically wrong with the situation in 
general.
One faction of the gallants has been introduced by 
Act I, but in Act II they are all brought together, the 
witty played off against the witless, and their humours 
displayed for the admiration of their fellows, for the 
derision of the audience. Bobadilla introduces his habit 
of swearing, a habit which grows throughout and which is 
finally caught by the witty Prospero. Stephano says he is 
melancholy; Matheo swears he is melandholy too and when he 
is melancholy he writes sonnets; so Stephano promptly sits 
down to write sonnets too. Their "essences," so easily 
acquired, are easily assumed by others, and here their 
humours and their actions are deftly interlaced, one with 
the other.
The same interlacing occurs throughout the play.
In Act III, scene ii, for instance, Bobadilla, for the 
benefit of Prospero and Lorenzo Junior, discourses on the 
wonders of tobacco. Piso, who has been in the preceding 
scene, returns in search of a messenger to his master, 
Thorello. He exits and enters again with Cob, the sought- 
after messenger. On both occasions, first one and then 
both, as they pass through, fling out caustic remarks about 
"rogish Tabacco;" in the meantime, Bobadilla pursues his
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ovm interests by demanding that they help him light his 
match. As each intrudes his particular concern on the 
business of another, a general confusion of words and action 
is the result. At any moment the unexpected and the seem­
ingly irrelevant may intrude with explosive results, 
because each one pursues his particular concern, because 
no one understands about the business of another, and 
because each will nevertheless risk quarrelsome comments 
about another's pre-occupation. The same quarrelsome 
pattern of confusion repeats itself in the next scene as 
Clement confounds Cob for speaking against tobacco.
Scene iv comes as a climax to the subdued rumblings of the 
two preceding scenes: it begins with a quarrel between
Guiliano and Biancha about the gallants and ends in taunts, 
challenges, and swordplay, when all become embroiled in 
Guiliano's misunderstanding of one word overheard from the 
end of a conversation.
This confusion of minds, interests, and actions 
reflects a major theme of the play, a theme suggested by 
such lines as "signior Pithagoras, he thats al manner of 
shapes" and "Let all things be preposterously transchanged." 
At the end of the play this distortion of reality and per­
version of reason is summed up by the responses of Lorenzo 
Junior and Judge Clement to Matheo's poetry. Lorenzo 
Junior comments:
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Poetry? nay then call blasphemie, religion;
Call Diuels, Angels; and Sinne, pietie;
(V.iii.305-306)
People "think” and act according to "grosse opinion" and 
"fat iudgements," in other words, irrational, unintellec­
tual, subjective predilections. Clement gives a reason 
for the existence of "this barren and infected age."
I Lorenzo, but election is now gouerned alto­
gether by the influence of humor, which insteed 
of those holy flames that should direct and light 
the soule to eternitie, hurles foorth nothing 
but smooke and congested vapours, that stifle 
her vp, & bereaue her of al sight & motion.
(V.iii.344-348)
Both these speeches indicate the humours to be more serious 
than mere follies or social affectations, but they come at 
the end of the play when there has been a revelation of 
reason and everyone has vowed a better behavior for the 
sake of all.
CHAPTER X
EVERY MAN OUT OF HIS HUMOUR; THE HUMOURS OVERFLOW
As the next episode in the continuing saga of 
man's humourous degeneration begins, it is apparent that 
what often seemed mere theorizing on human nature in 
Every Man in his Humour has become more deeply a part of 
characterization in Every Man out of his Humour. The 
humours have the same source and are of the same kind as 
those in Every Man in his Humour, where they have already 
been described as a disease, staining "unto the liver, and 
heart," in some, something deeper "than the coate, or shirt, 
or skin." But this analysis of the humours in Every Man 
in his Humour was presented with a certain calm, contained 
rationality. And there was much emphasis in this play on 
keeping a due proportion and balance.
Now, however, the tone is sardonic, more openly 
and emphatically satirical. Satire involves emotions 
strong enough to usurp the office of reason and upset the 
balance which reason can create. It involves indignation 
and contempt, which not only rule their possessor but also 
the portrayal of their objects. Exaggeration is involved 
because contemptible traits hidden among or interwoven with
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other less objectionable traits or redemptive ones are 
extracted and highlighted in an anatomy of man. If these 
traits are not presented with a force sufficient to sug­
gest a strong emotional distaste, then the point is lost, 
especially on those who are not susceptible to reason.
So there is a very rational justification for the choice 
of satire as a writer's vehicle. The careful and orderly
structure of Every Man out of his Humour suggests such a
rationale, and the dual character of Asper-Macilente sug­
gests such an awareness on Jonson's part.
Macilente in the first act sets the tone and sug­
gests the rationale behind his own creation.
but, Stoique, where (in the vast world)
Doth that man breathe, that can so much command
His bloud, and his affection? 
' • • « • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
There is no taste in this Philosophie,
Tis like a potion that a man should drinke,
But turnes his stomacke with the sight of it.
I am no such pild Cinique, to beleeue.
That beggery is the onely happinesse;
Or (with a number of these patient fooles)
To sing: My minde to me a kinjgdome is,
When the lanke hungrie belly barkes for foode.
I wish the organs of my sight were crackt;
And that the engine of my griefe could cast 
Mine eye-balls, like globes of wild-fire, forth.
To melt this vnproportion'd frame of nature.
(I.i.2-3; 11-15; 25-28)
On the one hand, he rejects reason and philosophy as inef­
fective in a world where the basic structure has no pro­
portion. On the other, he emphasizes the fact that an 
inequitable fortune has physical effects, that man is a 
creature with a physical nature, and that hardships, such
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as a "hungrie belly," generate strong emotions. Through­
out the play he will respond to the deformities of his 
fellow characters with the passionate intensity generated 
by his condition. But he also makes social and moral 
judgments, judgments which he would not have made, however, 
if his own condition were not impoverished and that of the 
undeserving prosperous. He therefore has a vested interest 
or a selfish motive in seeing the others exposed.
Alvin Kernan in The Cankered Muse states that 
Jonson in Every Man out of his Humour "went to some 
trouble to make clear that the character of the satirist 
is a mask which an author assumes for the purpose of mak­
ing some lasting impression on the world he is attacking." 
He concludes that Jonson developed in "dramatic terms the 
relationship between author and satirist which is axiomatic 
in both Elizabethan formal verse satire and critical dis­
cussions of the g e n r e . O n e  wonders why, if the conven­
tion of the mask was so axiomatic, Jonson had to underline, 
explain, emphasize its use, and therefore, of course, why 
Asper exists. He was, of course, adapting the convention 
to the drama and also he was rather sensitive to the way 
in which he was frequently disallowed the multiple aware­
ness and aesthetic distance of the thinking man and artist. 
Asper, despite the vehemence of his outbursts, still
^Alvin Kernan, The Cankered Muse: Satire of the
English Renaissance (New Haven, Connecticut, 1959)» 
pp. 116-117; 137-138.
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insists on his right to be judged according to "arte, or 
iudgement." His vehemence, however, matches Macilente's, 
as he frequently refers to "publicke vice," "iniquitie," 
"crimes," "sinne," and an "impious world." Later in the 
play the Grex make the well-known distinction between 
hate and envy, with reference to Macilente's motives;
Asper's emotion then is presumably hate or indignation 
rather than envy. Like the man of reason he can hate the 
right thing at the right time for the right reason. Why 
then could not Macilente have been motivated by hatred of 
crime or sin alone rather than envy of others? Probably 
the answer lies as much in Jonson's desire for realism and 
his understanding of the aesthetic distance or objectivity 
of art as in his desire to use a convention established in 
another genre. In an imperfect world of imperfect people 
it is rather difficult to depict anyone who does not in 
some way share in that imperfection. A thinking man may 
more accurately observe the faults of the world from a 
distance, but what happens when he becomes a man of action 
as well? May not his hatred of sin become confused with 
the object which embodies that sin? If, as a result, he 
comes to hate mankind as well as mankind's sins, then he 
may lose his balance, his sanity, and his right to speak 
to humanity. Also, of course, he would be hampered in his 
actions, but a character like Macilente can violate trusts, 
arrange betrayals that bring revelations, and even stoop
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ta poisoning dogs without anyone demanding that a hero 
not act like a villain. Action, of course, is a necessity 
in the drama and it is a necessity in achieving the change 
posited by the play's title. The work of art, the play 
itself, is a form of action, but it has been generalized 
and distanced to apply to all men who are living examples 
of Asper's "publicke vice," and it is the kind of contri­
bution that the artist can make to the reformation of the 
world. Asper then emphasizes the author's ability to 
satirize without self-interest and to remain at a distance 
sufficient to ensure some objectivity; Macilente as a man 
of action, involved in the world and motivated by envy, 
serves the interests of realism as well as underlining the 
distinction between an author and his characters or his 
mask. He also provides the author with an opportunity to 
expose another counterfeit— the false and shallow critic 
who speaks primarily from self-interest.
The play as a form of action helps to serve Asper's 
desire "To melt the world, and mould it new againe." It 
is an expression of the artist's desire and belief that 
art have some efficacy, that it is relevant to reality.
So Asper, in addition to standing for disinterested 
critical appraisal and aesthetic distance also stands for 
the artist's involvement in his world. So the transition 
from the everyday world of the audience to the appearance 
of Macilente in scene one and the play proper is a slow one
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designed to preserve both critical distance and involvement 
as the audience is gradually pulled in on the author's 
terms. In between is the Grex who discuss the play just 
as the audience might, only, of course, in a more informed 
way. Asper appears with them in this context of critical 
analysis. Even before Macilente and scene one, the charac­
ters begin to blend with the chorus as Buffone wanders on 
stage before his time and the "Prologue" abandons his 
formal announcement, insisting that the Grex have already 
made all necessary prologues. The opening may seem slow, 
but the audience is not abruptly plunged into strange 
waters and they may even have forgotten that they are 
watching a play. Just as the critics and the author-figure 
are absorbed into the play, so is the audience.
Macilente*s wrath, which embraces the other charac­
ters in a flood of sardonic, sometimes savage, remarks, 
helps to set the tone and to create a unity of tone, but 
the fact that he too has a humour helps to create unity of 
action as well. The dispersal of humours is not brought 
about by one different in kind from the other characters 
in the play. Like the others he has that which will not 
contain itself, which draws all "his affects, his spirits, 
and his powers" "to runne one way." Macilente's humour is 
more intense than that of any other character and it grows 
in strength as it feeds itself with disgust at the "times 
deformitie." All the humours have "fluxure, and humiditie,"
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so there are no opposing elements which cannot be mixed. 
Fungoso faints from the "fluxe of appareil," Briske says 
that Saviolina's "wit was at the floud." Mitis says that 
Briske*s humour "ebbes apace," but Cordatus says it will 
flow again "till there come a generall drought of humour 
among all our actors." Sordido prays for a drought, so 
that he can make a fortune from his grain, but the one 
that comes is that forecast by Cordatus. In the end 
Macilente's humour will inundate all the others and put
out the "wild-fire" in his own soul.
.
COR. 0, hee's a fellow of a strange nature. Now 
do's hee (in this calme of his humour) plot, and 
store vp a world of malicious thoughts in his 
braine, till hee is so full with 'hem, that you 
shall see the very torrent of his enuie breake forth 
like a land-floud: and, against the course of all 
their affections oppose it selfe so violently, that 
you will almost haue wonder to thinke, how 'tis 
possible the current of their dispositions shall 
receiue so quick, and strong an alteration.
(IV.viii.152-159)
It is like an energy force of sufficient intensity to con­
sume that which is like itself without destroying form. All 
action is generated by it and all is of the same kind.
There is one scene which brings together the two char­
acters most responsible for the play's tone and for the out­
come of the action. It occurs near the end at a moment 
when abundant proof and justification for its point has 
been offered. In addition to all this, it offers further 
proof that Jonson was thinking in terms of "like unto 
like." At the tavern Carlo Buffone and Macilente have been
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discussing the appropriate action for the forthcoming 
debacle of humours when they turn to remarks on the nature 
of man.
CARL. 'Tis an Axiome in naturall philosophie, What 
comes nearest the nature of that it feeds, conuerts 
quicker to nourishment, and doth sooner essentiate.
Now nothing in flesh, and entrailes, assimulates 
or resembles man more, then a hog, or swine--
MACI. True; and hee (to requite their courtesie) 
often-times d'offeth his owne nature, and puts on 
theirs; as when hee becomes as churlish as a hog, 
or as drunke as a sow: but to your conclusion.
CARL. Mary, I say, nothing resembling man more 
then a swine, it followes, nothing can be more 
nourishing: for indeed (but that it abhorres from 
our nice nature) if we fed one vpon another, we 
should shoot vp a great deale faster, and thriue 
much better: I referre mee to your vsurous Can­
nibals , or such like: but since it is so contrary, 
porke, porke, is your only feed.
MACI. I take it, your deuill be of the same diet; 
he would ne're ha' desir'd to beene incorporated 
into swine else. 0, here comes the melancholy 
messe: vpon 'hem Carlo, charge, charge.
(V.v.60-79)
Man can mix with swine, water with water, humour with 
humour, and if man is not careful, he will find himself 
becoming one flesh with the devil. The element in which he 
lives here will be the element in which he lives hereafter, 
trapped by the physical law by which he has lived. If one 
is searching for an example of savagery in tone, he need 
not look further. The scene is even more ironic if one 
remembers Carlo himself will shortly hereafter receive a 
beating from Puntarvolo, aided by Macilente. Of all the 
other characters, it is only Macilente whom Carlo has in
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any way favored,
'Slid, the slaue ^ Macilent^7 were to be 
lou'd next heauen, aboue honour, 
wealth, rich fare, appareil, wenches,
All the delights of the belly, and the 
groine, whateuer.
(V.iv.29-32)
One refrain throughout the play has been Carlo's contempt
for friendship.
Pish, the title of a friend, it's a vaine 
idle thing, only venerable among fooles; 
you shall not haue one that has 
any opinion of wit affect it,
(IV,iii,111-113)
In a sense. Carlo is betrayed by a lapse from his humour,
as Volpone will be in a later play. The gallants who are
partners in playful tricks are developing into the villains, 
partners in crime.
Critics have, in various ways, called this play a 
failure on the basis, primarily, of its lack of unity,
Una Ellis-Fermor thinks that this play is worse in "con­
fusion of plot" than Every Man in his Humour, that it is 
"over-burdened with non-dramatic material, which, while
attempting to explicate character and plot, actually sue-
2ceeds only in deadening them," Herford thinks Jonson's
"classical instinct for order and unity" has been "over­
powered" by a "motley disarray" of "pathological specimens,
3
labelled and classified," Jonas A, Barish calls it "a 
2
Jacobean Drama, p, I06,
& s,, I, 378-379.
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4heroic failure" because it lacks a "minimal suspense."
Alan C, Dessen states that a "tension clearly exists 
between Jonson's literary aims and the basic demands of the 
theater, a tension which results in elaborate and often
5
confused scenes." As an example of this confusion he 
cites the scene in St. Paul’s aisle (lll.i-vi) where many 
characters meet and exchange remarks, a scene which may 
look far less confusing on stage than it does on paper, a 
scene which, even if confusing, does not seem inappropriate 
when the author’s message is confusion.
But the structure of this play does not lack unity, 
and the movements of the characters may be disorderly, but 
they are not disordered. The array of characters in the 
large central scenes suggests the motley crowds pushing 
about on any busy day in London, vdiere people lived closely 
together, crowds which were familiar sights to any London 
playgoer. Like Walt Whitman, Jonson captures the "hurl 
and blab of pave" and he does so with a care that hides his 
art.
Macilente begins the play proper, violently, and 
also ends it, gently. The next two scenes are evenly 
balanced, with Macilente, Buffone, and Sogliardo in scene 
ii and Macilente, Sordido, and Hine in scene iii.
4
Ben Jonson and the Language of Prose Comedy 
(Cambridge, Massachusets, I96O), p. 104.
^Jonson*s Moral Comedy, p. $1.
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Sogliardo and Sordido are brothers; the first is a country 
lout who aspires to be a gentleman at court; the second 
is a country lout who aspires to wealth and to power over 
his fellows; the first apes the superficial or false 
values of authority and the second flouts all authority.
The tone and direction of the play have been established: 
the characters will now move towards the object of their 
ambitions, acceptance and glorification at court. It is 
not the object for all, but it is the general direction of 
movement in the play. At court, of course, they find ano­
ther counterfeit like themselves, and following this they 
will fall into various forms of disrepute more appropri­
ately located in a tavern and in prison.
Macilente’s second-in-command. Carlo Buffone, 
after having been introduced in the Prologue and in scene 
ii with Macilente, will open Act II, where Fastidius Briske 
is introduced and his humour exposed, by Buffone, along 
with Sogliardo who aspires to be a gallant like Briske and 
whose talk is peppered with the word "humour." The 
arrival of a messenger, Cinedo, and their discussion of 
"the knight" prepare for the appearance of Puntarvolo and 
the play-within-a-play to be enacted in scenes ii and iii. 
Puntarvolo's homecoming, programmed by himself to sound 
like a medieval romance, is the principal scene for this 
particular character, but it also blends,. in scene iii, 
with one of the large scenes where all the characters
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heretofore introduced and one new one, Fungoso, have fore­
gathered. The - preceding scene has established Puntarvolo 
and his Lady as the center of interest, but around their 
imitation of "sir Lancelot, and queene Gvevener" there are 
interwoven a number of other interests and actions : the
relationship between Sordido, Sogliardo, and Fungoso is 
established; Fungoso is impressed with Briske's "fine sute 
of clothes" and presses Uncle Sogliardo to help him obtain 
money for such a suit while Sogliardo presses him for news 
of "a new Motion" in London; Briske and Puntarvolo vie 
with each in displaying their knowledge of court affairs 
and the subject of Saviolina, the "court-starre," "that 
planet of wit," is introduced; Puntarvolo discusses the 
business of his travel venture ; Briske discovers that his 
merchant's wife, Fallace, is Sogliardo's niece and Fungoso's 
sister. Carlo moves from group to group, weaving all 
together and making the satirical comment appropriate to 
the humour in progress. Actions already begun are fur­
thered, new ones begun, and preparations made for future 
ones. Old humours are whetted and new ones blossom.
After this "Scene full, and relieu'd with varietie of 
speakers to the end," the groups break apart and the fol­
lowing three scenes bring different individuals to promi­
nence on the basis of relationships established in the 
preceding scene: Deliro acts out his uxoriousness and
Fallace her contempt; Fungoso and his sister talk at cross
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purposes, he of his new clothes, she of her admiration for 
Briske; Briske appears to astound Fungoso with another new 
suit, to delight Fallace with his presence, to promise to 
introduce Macilente to the court. Macilente takes over 
this portion of the play and, as Buffone has done in the 
last major scene, he keeps a current of satiric commentary 
running.
Act III which opens in the aisle of St. Paul's 
gradually builds by a series of accretions to another large 
gathering of characters by scene vi. Clove and Orange's 
attempt to gull the gentlemen helps to establish the atmos­
phere of the place which in turn helps to emphasize the 
fraudulent and commercial nature of the characters ' ambi­
tions. A number of important things happen: Sogliardo
buys a coat of arms and acquires "a pimpe" for a tutor, 
recommended by Carlo, for his preparation as a gentleman—  
one Cavalier Shift, who has a principal scene in which to 
establish his character; Fungoso's attempts to ape Briske 
become more emphatic as he brings his tailor to observe and 
then copy Briske's apparel; some telling remarks are eli­
cited from Carlo which emphasize the lack of values in 
this upside world where scoundrels ply their trade in a 
church, where a lineage is bought at market, and the 
habits of a gentleman are learned from denizens of the 
underworld and brought to perfection in a tavern. Carlo's 
remarks also reveal his own values and prepare for his
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later downfall.
Nay, looke you sir, now you are a gentleman, you 
must carry a more exalted presence, change your 
mood, and habit, to a more austere forme, be 
exceeding proud, stand vpon your gentilitie, and 
scorne euery man. Speake nothing humbly, neuer 
discourse vnder a nobleman, though you ne're saw 
him but riding to the Starr-chambre, it's all 
one. Loue no man. Trust no man. Speake ill of 
no man to his face: nor well of any man behind
his backe. Salute fairely on the front, and wish 
'hem hang'd vpon the turne. Spread your selfe 
vpon his bosome publikely, whose heart you would 
eate in priuate. These be principles, thinke on 
'hem, I 'le come to you againe presently.
(III.iv.101-111)
Near the end of the act, after the fulsome scenes 
at St. Paul's, in scene vii, the focus returns to single 
characters and small groups. It is also the beginning 
of every man's being put out of his humour. Sordido, who 
is ready to hang himself "since flesh and bloud cannot 
beare this crosse," is saved by some rustics whose con­
temptuous remarks also save him from his humour. The next 
scene, with Macilente and Briske at court with Saviolina, 
reveals the shallowness of Sogliardo, Fungoso, and Fal­
lace 's ideal and foreshadows their disillusionment: when
Saviolina appears, Briske falls apart and casts about for 
props to his conversation— a vaulting-horse to do tricks 
on, a pipe to fill up his many pauses. The scene is punctu­
ated by Macilente's contemptuous judgment of court values:
Be a man ne're so vile 
In wit, in judgement, manners, or what else;
If he can purchase but a silken couer.
He shall not only passe, but passe regarded:
Whereas, let him be poore, and meanely clad.
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Though ne’re so richly parted; you shall haue 
A fellow (that knowes nothing but his beefe,
Or how to rince his clammy guts in beere)
Will take him by the shoulders, or the throat,
And kicke him downe the staires,
(III.ix.10-19)
Sordido's redemption has begun a counter movement 
which from this point gradually includes the rest of the 
characters. After this conversion in Act III, Macilente 
becomes busier as he begins the task in earnest of strip­
ping "the ragged follies of the time,/ Naked, as at their 
birth": he tells Deliro of Briske's poor reception at
court, and Deliro resolves, now that the "masking vizor is 
off," to bring an action against Briske for his many loans. 
Fallace is angry with Deliro and Macilente and worries 
about Briske, whereupon Macilente proceeds to anatomize 
Fallace with disrespect. Those characters who do not 
appear in the first scenes of this act are kept in the 
minds of the audience because they are discussed by the 
other characters. Then towards the end of the act in a 
carefully modulated movement, they, in this case Sogliardo, 
Briske, and Fungoso, appear in scenes which highlight and 
emphasize for the last time their individual humours.
Carlo and Macilente's opinions are given fuller prominence 
in this act, and with each word he utters Carlo more fully 
reveals and damns himself. The act ends with Macilente's 
plot to expose Saviolina.
Act V begins with a large foregathering, but as it 
proceeds the participants gradually diminish as one by one
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each character is put out of his humour. All the threads 
have been carefully interwoven. Sogliardo's introduction 
at court will deprive Saviolina of her self-conceit that 
she can judge "that inward poweir that formes his 
2^ogliârdo.';s7 countenance^ y It will expose her and prove  ^
Macilente's criticism of the court valid. It will also 
expose Sogliardo, but he will not lose his humour until 
the next scene when Puntarvolo's dog, and fellow-traveller 
in his projected business venture which has also involved 
Briske, provides the occasion for unmasking Sogliardo's 
"professor," Cavalier Shift. Shift, to prove himself a 
tall man, has sworn to many robberies and now swears, in 
a kneeling posture, just the opposite to clear himself of 
poisoning Puntarvolo*s dog. At the tavern where Carlo 
awaits the company for a celebration dinner. Carlo, at 
the instigation of Macilente, cannot resist doing what he 
usually does anyway. He indulges his propensity to make 
caustic remarks, Puntarvolo beats him, constables appear 
to stop the uproar, and at the end Fungoso, found hiding 
under a table, is held for the reckoning. Because of his 
fine clothing, no one believes that he cannot pay; by the 
time Deliro arrives to rescue him, he is willing to foregoe 
his appetite for fine clothes. Macilente has sent Deliro 
to redeem Fungoso and thereafter sends Fallace to rescue 
Briske, now in prison. Deliro goes because of his fatuous 
desire to please Fallace and Fallace goes because of her
138
obsession with Brisks, Macilente, of course, sees that 
Deliro will discover Fallace and Brisks together, When 
Brisks swears to leave off imitating gallants and fops, 
Macilente is also put out of his humour. He concludes 
the action by humbly and gently appealing to the audience 
for their "kind approbation,"
Freda L, Townsend, who is one critic with a favor­
able opinion of this play, remarks that each character is 
"in reality an action in himself,"^ There is something 
more: each character, or action, is part of one large
action, slowly modulated at the beginning but sweeping 
rapidly at the end to a conclusion where all threads have 
been interwoven and not a stitch dropped,
^Apologie for Bartholmew Fayre: The Art of Jonson's
Comedies (New York, 19^7), p, 46.
CHAPTER XI
VOLPONE:
HUMOUROUS ACTION: "EASILY YEELDING TO ANY
GOOD IMPRESSIONS"
The Dedication preceding the text of Volpone should 
prepare the reader for a greater intensity and seriousness 
of purpose. In it Jonson defines the true poet as "the 
interpreter, and arbiter of nature, a teacher of things 
diuine, no lesse then humane, a master in manners; and can 
alone (or with a few) effect the business of man-kind;" 
whereas, of the "writers of these dayes" he says "not only 
their manners, but their natures are inuerted." This sug-
t ~
gests something beyond his avowed purpose in earlier plays 
of an imitation of life "accommodated to the correction of 
manners" (EMOH III.vi,10-11). He admits here to a general 
concern with the nature behind manners, not really a new 
concern, but newly admitted, at least in his comedies, and 
certainly appropriate to and obvious in Volpone, where 
characterization, action, theme, and imagery consistently 
reflect this inversion of nature.
Heretofore, although Jonson has referred to his
humourous characters as diseased or as monsters, he has
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also maintained they are ridiculous subjects for pleasant 
laughter and all has ended happily. Although the charac­
ters of Volpone are also ridiculous, the laughter they 
provoke may be more nervous than pleasant. In Every Man 
out of his Humour there was a long discourse on swinish 
human nature by Carlo Buffone; now in Volpone the charac­
ters are themselves portrayed as various carcass-snuffling 
scavenger birds. Jonson certainly serves notice in the 
Dedication that this comedy may be thought by some to vio­
late "the strict rigour of comick law," and this play, 
unlike earlier ones, ends with justice rather than with 
unmitigated happiness. Despite this difference in the 
comic conclusion and in the extremities of the aberra­
tions, the psychology of the humours is still present and 
working. Lady Would-bee, despite her ability to reduce 
everything to nonsense, gives an accurate description of 
the psychology of the legacy-hunters:
And, as we find our passions doe rebell,
Encounter 'hem with reason; or diuert 'hem.
By giuing scope vnto some other humour 
Of lesser danger: as, in politique bodies.
There's nothing, more, doth ouer-whelme the 
iudgement,
And clouds the vnderstanding, then too much 
Settling, and fixing, and (as't were) subsiding 
Vpon one obiect. For the incorporating 
Of these same outward things, into that part.
Which we call mentall, leaues some certaine faeces, 
That stop the organs, and as PLATO sayes.
Assassinates our knowledge.
(III.iv.101-112)
Mosca possesses the same knowledge, but he realizes its 
significance and knows how to use it for something more
I4l
than the appearance of erudition. After the first trial, 
Volpone remarks on the blindness of their victims, that 
distrust of Volpone and Mosca has not occurred to them. 
Mosca replies ;
MOS. True, they will not see 'it.
Too much light blinds 'hem, I thinke. Each of 'hem 
Is so possest, and stuft with his owne hopes.
That any thing, vnto the contrary,
Neuer so true, or neuer so apparent,
Neuer so palpable, they will resist it______
VOLP. Like a temptation of the diuell.
(V.ii.22-28)
Earlier humour characters have been generally
thought by critics not truly to possess humours because
they were not profoundly enough obsessed. But Mosca here
explicitly states a psychology which he and they share:
But your fine, elegant rascall, that can rise 
And stoope (almost together) like an arrow;
Shoot through the aire, as nimbly as a starre;
Turne short, as doth a swallow; and be here.
And there, and here, and yonder, all at once;
Present to any humour, all occasion;
And change a visor, swifter, then a thought!
This is the creature, had the art borne with him;
(III.i.23-30)
Paradoxically, while they are obsessed with one thing 
which overpowers the judgment, this same obsession leads
them to assume many shapes, in violation of many standards,
shapes which naturally seem superficial since they lack 
truth; but even though they lack depth, the obsession 
which prompts them is itself deep-seated.
This variability in being is a persistent theme in 
Jonson's plays and is as essential to the humours theory as
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the obsession which compels consistent action. It appears 
in a position of prominence in the opening scene of the 
play when Volpone sings his morning hymn of worship to 
his and the "worlds soule," his gold. His hymn is a 
hierarchical catalogue of the values which gold can change 
or invert: it displaces the saints in heaven; outshines
the sun and the light of creation which banished chaos ; it 
is a son greater than the father; it replaces all human 
joys as well as all heavenly ones— children, parents, 
friends; it creates virtue, fame, and honor. It is the 
uncaused cause, the unmoved mover, of all things of worth.
Scene one witnesses the change of all those intangi­
ble values which man presumably and traditionally has 
adhered to. Scene two becomes a physical testimony to 
his spiritual transformation and forecastes the ultimate 
degradation of all who live by this new code. The creatures 
spawned in this new heaven on earth would not have pleased 
Bernard Shaw, with his hopes for the evolution of a super­
man, but Tennyson would have appreciated their implica­
tions that changing may not mean improving. Volpone*s 
dwarf, hermaphrodite, and eunuch are all perversions of 
man's physical image, just as Volpone's credo is a per­
version of his soul. Nano, Androgyno, and Castrone enter­
tain their lord and father with a skit which emphasizes 
this shifting of elements out of their proper proportion 
and balance. Nano traces in verse various transmigrations
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of the soul of Pythagoras who, according to Nano, believed 
in the shifting of the elements; these transmigrations 
presumably illustrate his theory, but there is an unfortu­
nate degeneration from the time when the soul was given by 
Apollo to Pythagoras, then passed eventually through knights 
and knaves, lords and beggars, oxes and camels, mules and 
goats, and now ends, in uneven rhyme, in the body of a 
hermaphrodite with the soul of a fool. Although this 
skit is like a playful nursery rhyme, it illustrates in 
exaggerated form the other characters’ ultimate physical 
degradation resulting from spiritual abuse. At some 
point the intangible and tangible touch with quite lit­
eral effects resulting. The humours theory with its psy­
chological and physiological interrelatedness is still at 
work, but it is given added dimension and intensity by the 
religious and animal imagery suggestive of sacrilege and 
unnatural perversions. The Elizabethan hierarchical con­
cept of natural creation persists in Jonson's time and work, 
but it has been startlingly translated into the literal, 
everyday world of trade and commerce.
All the major characters in the play, excepting 
Celia and Bonario, in some way shift their positions. 
Corbacchio shifts his will to disinherit his natural 
legatee on the basis of his unnatural hopes of outliving 
Volpone. Corvino shifts from a jealous husband outraged 
,over a trifle to one "liberal" and "tolerant" enough to
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offer his wife for the restoration of Volpone. Voltore, 
a lawyer ostensibly committed to justice, shifts in that 
role to protect his and Volpone’s interests, shifts again 
when he thinks all hope of inheritance lost, and shifts 
yet again when he learns Volpone to be still alive. This 
last change is dramatized as the most grotesque and ludi­
crous as he rolls on the ground in a fit, a man pretending 
to be possessed by the devil and in truth obsessed with a 
devilish greed. Like the soul of Pythagoras in its pro­
gress through time and change, his soul ends in a physical 
posture reflecting its debased condition. All of these 
shifts are in keeping with the obsessive greed of the 
characters, but the shifts are also essential parts of the 
action: Corbacchio and Corvino's duplicity towards son
and wife leads to the first major vexing of Volpone's will 
and results in the first court assemblage which involves 
Voltore whose first imposing performance at court contrasts 
markedly with his second.
The two principal protagonists, Volpone and Mosca, 
likewise undergo changes and shift their positions in ways 
most important to the action. Although Herford and Simpson 
say that the relationship of Volpone and Mosca is a devel­
opment from Jonson's writing of tragedy, this "league of 
two able villains, master and servant, ending in a deadly 
struggle between them," is also suggested in the humour
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7plays, particularly Every Man out of his Humour. The 
tenuous alliance between Carlo Buffone and Macilente has 
already been commented on: Carlo helps Macilente purge
the others and then Macilente precipitates the coup de 
grace administered to Carlo. There is another relation­
ship in this play which foreshadows that of Volpone and 
Mosca: Sogliardo and his pimp professor Shift. Among
their pet names for each other are those of "Countenance" 
and "Resolution." Ironically, Shift, who says "Faith, I 
am easily yeelding to any good impressions" (IV.v.73)» 
plays the part of "Resolution." In the partnership of 
Mosca and Volpone, each helps purge the other of his 
humour, or at least bring him to retribution. In addition, 
Mosca, also a pimp among his other accomplishments, stands 
behind the false visors, or countenances, assumed by Vol­
pone: the impotent man, sick and dying; the mountebank
who performs beneath Celia's window ; the commandadore who 
ventures forth to "vexe 'em all." In turn Volpone is the 
resolution behind Mosca's rapid shifts in attitude and 
sympathy and his last appearance as a Clarissimo.
Retribution is not effected by the forces of good 
combatting those of evil, a course of action which might 
have produced that lack of unified effect, or double plot, 
noted by Aristotle in the Odyseey. There are, of course.
^H. & S., I, 60.
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Celia and Bonario, but they are acquitted rather than 
rewarded or elevated. They do not belong to the world 
which is the predominant one created in the play. They 
are dragged into the action through the actions of the 
other humorous characters, but they perform little action 
themselves. In character they are rather like Mitis 
(EMOH) of whom Jonson says, he is "a person of no action, 
and therefore we haue reason to affoord him no Character." 
They remain rather abstract embodiments of innocence which 
serve to illustrate the effects of Volpone and his kind on 
those unlike themselves. The presence of Celia and 
Bonario, more than anything else, makes this play sus­
ceptible to those critical strictures about double actions 
and lack of unity. But, as pointed out above, they do not 
constitute an action, and their roles are carefully passive 
and subdued.
In Every Man out of his Humour, unity of action 
leading to unity of effect was maintained partially because 
Mbcilente shared in the humours of the other characters.
In Volpone, the two protagonists not only share an obsession 
but that obsession pursues the same goal. Their resulting 
actions are consistently obsessive although they themselves 
shift constantly in accordance with their desires or 
obsessions. They act in accordance with their humours 
rather than in accordance with a sense of integrity or 
personal identity, that being which the churchmen said
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evil lacked. Their actions can then be interwoven and 
their roles interchanged without any loss of unity.
Jonson pursues not one man, but one action. On the one 
hand, therefore, he heeds Aristotle's caution that events 
concerning one man do not necessarily constitute one action. 
On the other, he fulfills his preferred definition of uni­
fied action:
Now, that it should be one, and intire. One 
is considerable two waies: either, as it is only
separate, and by it self: or as being compos'd
of many parts, it beginnes to be one, as those 
parts grow, or are wrought together. That it 
should be one the first way alone, and by it self, 
no man that hath tasted letters ever would say, 
especially having required before a just Magni­
tude, and equall Proportion of the parts in them­
selves. Neither of which can possibly bee, if 
the Action be single and separate, not compos'd 
of parts, which laid together in themselves, with 
an equall and fitting proportion, tend to the 
same end; which thing out of Antiquitie it selfe, 
hath deceiv'd many; and more this Day it doth 
deceive.
So Homer lai'd by many things of Ulysses and 
handled no more, then he saw tended to one and 
the same end.
(Discoveries,11.2751-63 ;2780-81)
Dryden criticized this play as having a double
action resulting in two climaxes, one occurring naturally,
in the fourth act, and another one forced and unnatural in 
o
the fifth act. This might be a valid stricture if the play 
could be described in the rather broad terms of vice pitted 
against virtue; in this case, one of them, vice, would
8Essay of Dramatic Poesv, ed. W. P. Ker, The Essays 
of John Dryden (Oxford, I9OO), I, 73»
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have won. Instead, it is vice pitted against vice or 
vice defeating itself; in the last climax, of the fifth 
act, the two major "vices" confront each other and each 
is undone by the other. Virtue does not win; it simply 
fails to lose. Volpone is sent to the hospital of the 
Incurabili with his disease unremedied;
In any case, the action will not have reached the
moment of fruition until Mosca can stand before the
Advocatori as the equal of Volpone. The two climaxes,
therefore, grow naturally out of the two main characters'
motives and actions. Preparation for the climax of Act V
begins in Act I, scene i, when Mosca helps Volpone vaunt
his achievements and thereby manipulates Volpone to turn
his appreciation towards himself:
You know the vse of riches, and dare giue, now.
From that bright heape, to me, your poore obseruer.
Or to your dwarfe, or your hermaphrodite,
Your eunuch, or what other houshold-trifle 
Your pleasure allowes maint'nance.
VOLP. Hold thee, Mosca.
Take, of my hand; thou strik'st on truth, in all:
(I.i.62-67)
In the beginning, in addition to Volpone's god, Volpone's 
own greed and his love of seeing others endure his own 
feverish torment provide the immediate motivation for 
Mosca's actions. Mosca, however, desires his own resolu­
tion, and it is "the worldes soule" which is also to 
Mosca "vertue, fame,/ Honour, and all things else." From 
this catalogue Volpone would exclude learning, but not Mosca,
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If possible, Volpone is something of a perverted idealist, 
but Mosca is a practical man. Volpone says that avarice 
punishes itself; Mosca says it does so with a little help. 
Although Mosca falls short of Volpone in his perverted 
appreciation of the god, it motivates his actions of a 
servant apparently attempting to please his master in the 
first part of the play and the embryonic action which in 
the latter part comes to the forefront as Mosca parades 
in magnifico * s attire.
In Act I, scene ii, there is another subtle hint 
of Mosca*s real interests and of another legacy hunter’s 
lurking just behind Volpone's blind spot. Voltore has 
just departed, leaving behind a rich piece of plate.
VOL. I long to haue possession
0 my new present.
MOS. That, and thousands more,
1 hope, to see you lord of.
VOL. Thankes, kind MOSCA.
MOS. And that, when I am lost in blended dust.
And hundred such, as I am, in succession--
VOL. Nay, that were too much, MOSCA.
(I.ii.116-121)
Mosca is straining so far to flatter his master that even 
Volpone recognizes "that were too much," but what Volpone 
thinks flattery in others, he deems kindness in Mosca. 
Mosca seeks to include himself among the heir-hunters only 
on the basis of sharing a death prior to Volpone's and, of 
course, for the audience establishes himself as the most
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astute member of their calvacade. Mosca here feigns 
impending death just as Volpone does within his "tombed 
sepulchre."
It should be obvious to Volpone that Mosca will 
outlive him, but he, like the rest, lets his desires per­
plex his judgment, and so, like Corbaccio, his ears have 
grown stale with age. But his point of deafness is far 
removed beyond that of Corbaccio or Voltore or Corvino.
His point of deafness comes with the personal limitation 
of an ego that has confused itself with its god and believes 
itself invulnerable. He cannot conceive of that happening 
to himself which he sees happening to others. His after 
all is the true worship. ,
Mosca, however, has studied behind the scenes and 
knows how to make Volpone false to his god and to himself. 
The series of plots contrived to gratify Volpone become a 
series of temptations. In Act I Mosca describes Corvino's 
wife in a vocabulary suited to Volpone's understanding.
The wily contriver describes Celia in terms which equate 
her with Volpone*s gold and also promise an eternity of 
fleshy sensuality.
a soft lip,
Would tempt you to eternitie of kissing!
And flesh, that melteth, in the touch, to bloud!
Bright as your gold! and louely, as your gold!
(I.V.111-114)
At this point, it is still Volpone who articulates his own 
reaction when he says he must see her and that he will "go
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see her, though but at her windore.” The mountebank scene 
follows, one where Volpone, as Scoto of Mantua, at the 
height of his powers delivers a masterful performance in 
double-barrelled duplicity. But the epilogue is a beating 
for the great actor; Mosca quietly calls attention to 
this fact and with his art he hopes to improve on Volpone's 
performance.
Ultimately, Mosca not only provides Volpone's final
temptation, but he also articulates what Volpone's response
to that temptation should be. In Act V, scene ii, after
Voltore has performed so beautifully for Volpone's sake,
Mosca gives the advocate high praise;
He' 2^bltore7 has taken paines, in faith, sir,
& deseru'd,
(In my poore iudgement, I speake it, vnder fauour.
Not to contrary you, sir) very richly-- 
Nell— to be cosen'd,
(V,ii,44-4?)
This he speaks even after his advice to the contrary:
Why, now you speake, sir. We must, here, be fixt;
Here, we must rest; this is our master-piece:
(V,ii,12-13)
And Volpone follows the lure to cozen:
'Tis right,
I cannot answer him, MOSCA, as I would.
Not yet; but for thy sake, at thy intreaty,
I will beginne, eu'n now, to vexe 'hem all:
(v,ii,53-56)
He abrogates his own will, and for Mosca's sake, not for 
his "worldes soule," he will "vexe 'hem all,"
It is at this point that their roles shift in action
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as well as in dialogue and the themes of shifting values 
and shifting countenances can be traced in the action’s 
pattern. Volpone now begins, as Mosca has formerly done, 
to implement the action; he outlines the specifics of the 
proceedings by telling Nano and Castrone to advertise that 
he is dead and by telling Mosca to present himself as the 
newly-made heir. The spider’s lair is deserted and Volpone 
doffs his magnifico’s attire to descend into the streets, 
where Mosca once worked his master’s will. Volpone plays 
his god false by giving lip service to a natural rhythm 
which he had sought to pervert, that is, his death. He 
deserts his social position and his shrine to gain his 
pleasure in a ’’common way" in the streets. No longer does 
he aspire to and for his god in its addition and possession; 
instead he taunts others for his own personal satisfaction.
When the legacy-hunters hear of his death and the
death of their hopes, the spell of evil and the hope of
gain, which Volpone has helped to cast, is broken. Volpone 
does in effect become dead; his misfortune is in living 
beyond his time, into a realm which is reality for his vic­
tims but illusion for him. The illusion is his death, for
he is no longer in a position to impose his will; what is
reality for the others becomes, because he has abrogated 
hiw will and his power, likewise a reality for him.
The shift in Volpone’s role and his subsequent 
downfall are foreshadowed in several scenes; in the
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mountebank scene mentioned above and also, more emphatic­
ally, in the scene following the court battle. Volpone 
admits "In good faith, I was/ A little in a mist" but 
swears "not detected:/ Neuer, but still my selfe." 
Immediately preceding this avowal, however, it has taken 
considerable drink to restore his vitality, and his dis- 
c our se has revealed more profound misgivings:
Well, I am here; and all this brunt is past:
I ne’re was in dislike with my disguise.
Till this fled moment; here, 'twas good, in priuate.
But, in your publike, Caue, whil'st I breathe.
'Fore god, my left legge 'gan to haue the crampe;
And I apprehended, straight, some power had strooke me 
With a dead palsey: well, I must be merry,
And shake it off. A many of these feares 
Would put me into some villanous disease.
Should they come thick vpon me: I 'le preuent 'hem.
Giue me a boule of lustie wine, to fright 
This humor from my heart ;
(V.i.1-12)
In the public marketplace Volpone is out of his element 
and there he does not breathe so easily. The camouflage 
which aids preservation in his natural habitat provokes in 
public those ailments held in abeyance at his private 
haunts. This habitat in which Volpone flourishes is for 
him a natural one, but considered within the complete 
scheme of nature, it is an unnatural, perverted, and arti­
ficially created one. But it is when Volpone begins to 
lose his adhesion to this unnatural world that he feels 
himself shake with a "dead palsey" and a deadly humour 
strike his heart with fright. The frailties of the flesh 
creep back into reality only when he deserts the "wholeness"
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of his chosen world. His fall comes about then not only 
by his commitment to that world in the first place, but 
by his unfaithfulness to that world. The world of justice 
and right cannot infect his world by its presence there, 
just as all of Celia’s pleas fall on deaf ears. His world 
can infect a healthier one with disease and sickness, just 
as the fourth Avocatori can think of his personal gain in 
having Mosca as a son-in-law.
As for the flaw which brings about Mosca's fall,
it consists, like that of Volpone, in a personal point of
deafness, which for Mosca results in over-confidence, and
in the perversion of a higher devotion for personal ends.
By the commencement of Act III Mosca has begun to grow in
love with himself:
I Feare, I shall begin to grow in loue
With my deare selfe, and my most prosperous parts.
They doe so spring, and burgeon; I can feele 
A whimsey i’ my bloud: (I know not how)
Successe hath made me wanton. I could skip 
Out of my skin, now, like a subtill snake,
I am so limber. 0! Your Parasite
Is a most precious thing, dropt from aboue,
Not bred ’mong’st clods, and clot-poules, here on earth. 
I muse, the mysterie was not made a science.
It is so liberally profest! almost
All the wise world is little else, in nature.
But Parasites, or Sub-parasites.
(III.i.1-13)
He too falls short of the worship and turns toward becoming 
his own god, a "precious thing, dropt from aboue." When he 
and Volpone exchange their roles, know division one from 
the other in personal diversion from thoir common purpose, 
and fall away from their higher goal, both fall together.
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Their respective roles.slip back into the original posi­
tions of the relationship; Volpone is punished in accord­
ance with his position and not in strict accordance with 
his crime; Mosca is punished not only for being "chiefest 
minister" of the treachery but also for, although being a 
fellow of no birth and no blood, having abused the "habit 
of a gentleman." But he has had his moment of glory, his 
rise as well as his fall, and the acknowledgment within 
the play's structure of his importance.
There is another important consideration with 
regard to the play's so-called double climax. The play 
consistently presents the power of Volpone and Mosca and 
what they represent, but it presents their naturally 
diminishing power as they overreach themselves. The first 
court scene does more than restore the status quo; it 
illustrates Volpone's power not only to deceive but to win 
more converts, for here Lady Would-bee is added as an 
active member of the legacy hunters when she bears false 
witness against Celia. She has visited Volpone before 
this, but it has been primarily in the interest of making 
politic contacts. This brings up another criticism of the 
play's unity, the underplot or double plot involving three 
characters regarded as unnecessary--Sir Politique Would-bee,
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his wife, and Peregrine. For one thing they illustrate 
the way in which any small fish which happen along may be 
caught in a net cast for larger ones. They stand at the 
periphery, but they too are drawn into the main vortex. 
Mosca's lie to Lady ¥ould-bee in order to rescue Volpone 
from her chatter (that he has seen her husband with a 
courtesan) involves Peregrine, whom she mistakes for a 
woman disguised as a man. Her gauche solicitude upon dis­
covering her mistake makes him mistake Sir Politique for 
a pimp. Peregrine in revenge brings about Politique's 
discomfiture; both he and his wife are put out of their 
"peculiar humour" "to obserue,/ To quote, to learn the 
language ot Italy_7, and so forth— ." Politique also 
gives up his idiotic schemes for acquiring wealth and 
power, schemes pale and pathetic beside those of Volpone. 
His hiding in a tortoise shell also of course sustains the 
animal imagery of vulture, raven, and crow associated with 
Voltore, Corbaccio, and Corvino. At the same time that 
they illustrate Volpone*s power to infect and corrupt, 
they are instances of his diminishing power, for they are 
very poor specimens.
But the power he represents is still alive in the 
fifth act when Voltore does another volte-face and when one
^See H. & S., II, 64-65; Robert Gale Noyes, Ben 
Jonson on the English Stage 1660-1776 (Cambridge, Mass., 
1936), pp. 92-93; C. M. Gayley, "A Comparative View of the 
Fellows and Followers of Shakespeare," Representative 
English Comedies (New York, 1932), II, xlv-xlvi.
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of the Advocatori seriously considers the newly-rich heir, 
Mosca, as a prospective son-in-law and for thinking of 
that cannot consider the evidence before him. But because 
Volpone and Mosca cannot agree between themselves and both 
vie for mastery, all is lost for both; and not because a 
miracle has occurred, as Celia thinks; and not because the 
Advocatori have clear judgment or the laws of Venice have 
efficacy.
The concept of the humours is also a concept of 
action, a force with a pattern of movement latent in mat­
ter, destructive, antithetical to reason, judgment, art, 
and likely to impel man to destruction before he can dis­
cover these virtues. But even if man does not discover 
them, nature apparently knows the standard which it cher­
ishes despite certain aberrations in time-locked pools 
of stagnant humanity where creatures still grow, but in 
unnatural ways which carry them backwards to a primeval 
beastliness. Volpone can survive as long as he clings to 
his hothouse existence, but outside this artificial 
environment he finds the hammer blows of time move against 
himself as well as others.
CHAPTER XII
THE ALCHEMIST;
UNITY IN MULTIPLICTY PERFECTED
The Alchemist has been almost universally acclaimed
among critics and regarded as a masterpiece, particularly
in its plotting and in its adherence to the unities. Freda
L. Townsend points out that the general tendency of numerous
critics is to regard it as an achievement of Jonson the
classicist, but at the same time to comment on it as a
"vast, complex, but powerfully integrated d r a m a . T h i s
description she contends disqualifies it as classical, and
throughout her discussion of Jonson's plays she opposes
"variety of interest" to a "lordly and all-mastering unity
of action" as the criteria for judging Jonson either a
2
Renaissance author or a classicist. If one sees Jonson 
accomplishing a "variety of interest" growing out of a 
unified action, there really is no need to set up these 
mutually exclusive categories. Just as Aristotle places
^H. & S., 11, 98 in Townsend, Apologie, p. 66.
^Townsend, Apologie, p. 66. Madeleine Doran makes • 
a similar distinction in her discussion of Jonson in 
Endeavors of Art, p. 278.
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action before character, so too Jonson's general tendency 
is to subordinate character to action, but this technique 
is a means of creating variety of interest, for no one 
character, generally speaking, towers above all the others; 
instead the interest is spread out among many who have 
numerous exits and entrances. Aristotle allowed for other 
things in the drama, including character, thought, diction, 
music, and spectacle. So does Jonson, but action remains 
his chief means of unifying. That his particular technique 
of unifying fails to reproduce "the plots of Roman comedy, 
which are 'narrow and the persons few'" does not disqualify
3 •
him as a classicist. But if Jonson does subordinate char­
acter to action, he does not create an action which sweeps 
over or around the characters, an action in which they have 
no part, as Miss Townsend indicates when she notes in her 
discussion of Every Man out of his Humour that each charac­
ter is an action. Instead Jonson uses action to express 
character in a unique way and all characters are integrated 
into a whole by means of the action. No one part can be 
extracted without upsetting the balance of the whole, and 
that all parts should thus cohere was Jonson's understanding 
of "one action, whole and entire."
The Alchemist is not the first play in which Jonson 
achieves his basic idea of unity, but it is the most
^Dryden, Essay, I, 4? in Townsend, Apologie, p. 70.
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perfectly balanced expression of his art. It is the play 
in which his control of action is so superb that many char­
acters can stand out with an eminence and emphasis not 
evident in earlier plays. In the earlier plays discussed, 
Jonson could be observed disposing the action without an 
emphatic center of interest. Although there was not such 
a center and the action could not be described definitely 
either as centripetal or centrifugal, there were certain 
characters, or areas of interest, given greater weight than
others: Count Ferneze and Jaques in The Case is Altered,
1
Lorenzo Senior and Thorello in Every Man in his Humour, and 
Macilente-Asper and Carlo Buffone in Every Man out of his 
Humour.
Jonson employs a variety of means to balance his 
characters one against the other. The major characters 
are surrounded by a large number of lesser ones which may 
seem to blur their importance. What one character gains in 
duration of speech and presence on stage in a single appear­
ance, he may lose by a fewer number of appearances. What 
another may gain in frequency of appearance, he may lose 
in the, less passionate intensity of character, tone, and 
gesture. While one may dominate either a certain stratum 
within the play or the play itself in the first half, another 
will supplant him in the last half. In the last half of 
Every Man in his Humour, Justice Clement, for example, 
assumes the role and position of the voice of authority
l6l
which Lorenzo Senior has had in the first half. After his 
preliminary excursions in the first few scenes of Every Man 
out of his Humour, Macilente gives up the reins to Buffone 
and then resumes control again in the last acts.
At the same time that Jonson sustains this equality 
of accent, he employs a subtle subordination of accent as 
well. Of the two major characters in The Case is Altered, 
Count Ferneze occupies a higher social position than Jaques. 
While Angelo makes a definite commitment to villainy in 
speech, Paulo, in words, remains a shadowy figure; but in 
action Paulo reveals his supremacy in the matter of keeping 
faith. In Every Man in his Humour, Lorenzo Senior is in 
the top echelons of authority with regard to age whereas 
Thorello occupies the middle ranks; but Thorello has more 
involvement in the action. In Every Man out of his Humour 
Macilente is closer than Buffone in spirit and perception 
to Asper and thereby in turn closer to the informed critics 
of the play, the Grex, and when he appears, his sting is 
sharper than a gadfly's; but Buffone, slight an<J shallow 
though he is, seems more omnipresent and he bridges the gap 
between the detached world of criticism and the confused 
land of fops and courtly gallants--the two polarities 
between which Macilente moves.
In all three plays there is a discernible movement 
towards gathering dramatic force at the center. Although 
the action in The Case is Altered moves between the houses
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of Count Ferneze and Jaques DePrie, most of the characters 
are involved with the Count's household, and the final 
resolution, which includes Jaques, takes place at the 
Count’s home. Although Lorenzo Senior and Thorello are 
the most humourous characters in Every Man in his Humour, 
Lorenzo Senior leaves his own dwelling at the beginning of 
the play to spy on his son at Thorello's. Although Macilente 
and Buffone in Every Man out of his Humour will eventually 
be at odds with each other, they approach having a partner­
ship in satiric commentary on the other characters. By the 
advent of Volpone the partnership of two able villains has 
evolved and most of the action transpires in one location. 
Movements away from this location are interrelated with 
theme: the beginning of Volpone's downfall is when he ven­
tures away from his sick bed and the successful disguise it 
affords him. Both his and Mosca's downfall are assured 
when they move away from their partnership. In this play 
there is a more obvious subordination of accent as Volpone 
and Mosca dominate the lesser villains and almost run away 
with the action, and would if not for their mutual betrayal. 
But here again one character, Volpone, dominates in the 
first part of the play, and another, Mosca, as he assumes 
Volpone's role and position, dominates in the second. Still 
Volpone is the master and at the end he is punished in 
accordance with his station, while Mosca is punished as 
befits a slave.
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In comparison with previous plays, Volpone may seem 
to subordinate action to character, and the two main char­
acters may appear to throw the action into an imbalance.
In The.Alchemist, however, all the successful ingredients 
of Jonson's earlier plays are blended with something very 
like perfection. Strongly controlled action is concen­
trated in one location and now instead of a dual partner­
ship, as in Volpone, there is a "venter tripartite" to 
dominate a plenteous number of characters. And here the 
"venter tripartite," although its members change, does run 
away with action, thus affirming in the action what Jonson 
knew all along, that very few can be put out of their 
humours. A careful balance is achieved between multi­
plicity of accent and unity or subordination of accent.
A stream of people arrive at Love-Wit's house to 
be gulled. They come from the country and from the city, 
they range from a lowly law clerk to a knight of the realm, 
they represent the commercial and the religious, they 
include practical realists and woolly cloud-gatherers.
Yet each one emerges with his own distinctiveness, as some­
thing more than a mere pawn; at the same time there is a 
carefully sculpted niche in the whole structure into which 
one fits.
Sir Epicure Mammon is the best and best-known 
example, fittingly so, since he is of higher social station 
than the other dupes. He occupies a prominent place both
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in the action and in the language and dialogue. After the 
initial scene establishing Face, Subtle, and Dol as the 
three principals, the rest of Act I is concerned with 
establishing their modus operendi and with introducing two 
of the lesser dupes, Dapper and Drugger. Epicure appears 
at the opening of Act II and his grandiose plans for 
changing the face of nature are in marked contrast to the 
humbler hopes of Dapper and Drugger. Their hopes have 
been humble, at least in the beginning stages, but Subtle 
and Face have carefully worked them up to something of 
greater import. Unlike Dapper and Drugger, at this point, 
Epicure has visited the alchemist's lair before and when 
he appears, his presence affords a climax to the careful 
first steps of the manipulations in the preceding act. His 
exalted and blasphemous poetry of nonsense makes him per­
haps the finest example of the alchemist's art, the true 
philosopher's stone, a jumbled brain that can outrage 
every subject it touches. The fact that he appears at the 
opening of Act II signifies his importance; it is a posi­
tioning in action used before by Jonson for characters of 
importance, although secondary. Musco so appears in Every 
Man in his Humour and Buffone in Every Man out of his Humour. 
With his lengthy and eloquently rhapsodic speeches, he 
dominates the first half of Act II and Act IV, where his 
discomfiting follows upon that of Dapper in the last part
of Act III--another example of symmetry in the pattern of 
action.
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Also included among the greater fools and villains, 
in addition to Mammon, are the religious zealots, Ananias 
and Tribulation Wholesome. Like nobility, which Mammon 
represents, religion, which they represent, is one of the 
principal mainstays and stabilizers of society. That their 
violation of their roles and positions is more egregious 
than others' is emphasized by their desire for the philoso­
pher's stone. Dapper, in the beginning, has only wanted 
a familiar for luck at gambling and Drugger to know how to 
build his shop for the best trade. So the two "religious" 
brothers are near the top of the hierarchy. With the 
philosopher's stone they hope to control a whole nation 
for their own ends. Their eminence is emphasized not only 
by the sphere of society which they represent and their 
desire for the philosopher's stone, but also by the timing 
and length of their appearances. Ananias appears in 
Act II, as Mammon does, and occupies much of the second 
portion of the action. Subtle adjusts his language appro­
priately, but Ananias is suspicious and not easily pleased. 
The narrowness of his religion and his mind are revealed 
as he doggedly chops trifles into shreds of literality.
In contrast to the overblown and swaggering Mammon, he cuts 
a smaller, more precise figure; but his part is further 
underlined when he and his pastor. Tribulation Wholesome, 
appear again in the first two scenes of Act III, a duet of 
"Saints." Whereas the largeness of Mammon's daydreaming
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is counterpointed and contrasted by the practicality of 
the downright Surly, the smallness of Ananias is doubled 
and emphasized by his brother Tribulation. The latter 
reveals himself the more versatile logician of the two as 
he argues that "we must bend vnto all meanes," and "The 
children of perdition are, oft-times,/ Made instruments 
euen of the greatest workes" (III.i.ll;15-l6). Like the 
others, they reveal their fraudulence with their own words:
TRI. What makes the Deuill so deuillish, I would aske 
you,
Sathan, our common enemie, but his being 
Perpetually about the fire, and boyling 
Brimstone, and arsnike? We must giue, I say,
Vnto the motiues, and the stirrers vp 
Of humours in the bloud. It may be so,
When as the worke is done, the stone is made,
This heate of his may turne into a zeale,
And stand vp for the beauteous discipline,
Against the menstruous cloth, and ragg of Rome.
(III.i.24-33)
Tribulation hopes for a triple transubstantiation from the 
heat of hell to the humour in the blood to the zeal of the 
"beauteous discipline." Such a way of thinking makes it 
all the easier for him to believe in the philosopher's 
stone reputed to accomplish similar miracles. The satiri­
cal effect, of course, is to label their zeal a humour dis­
guised and to link both, zeal and humour, to the fire of 
hell as well as to the alchemical process presided over by 
Subtle. Ananias and Tribulation do not appear again until 
the scenes involving many characters in a general uproar-- 
Ananias in Act IV, scene vii, and both brothers in the 
confused mob of the last act.
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The lesser dupes are not linked to the central 
image of the alchemist through the philosopher's stone. 
Because their zeal is less or their imaginations smaller, 
their aspirations are not so great and as students of the 
master alchemist they cannot be raised and refined to a 
place of eminence in the hierarchy. However, they have 
their place too, and they can contribute something like in 
kind to the motivation of the others--their greed. Dapper 
is the least apt of those willing to learn. He must be 
prompted continually to those actions which will please 
the Queen of Fairy; he must be coaxed and badgered until 
contributions increase satisfactorily; and he undergoes 
the most obvious degradations without too much complaint.
In all he appears only five times, but his appearances are 
spread evenly throughout the play, in the middle of Acts I, 
III, and V. His discomfiting is accomplished in the most 
obvious way, with the most broadly comic and visual effects 
which even the dull or thé most unwilling cannot fail to 
see or appreciate; first he is made to hum and buzz like 
some insect; then he is blindfolded with "Fortune's petti- 
coate;" finally he is thoroughly pinched to make him dis­
card his purse and pther valuables (Ill.iv.-v.). When 
Mammon suddenly appears on the scene. Dapper is thrust into 
a foul-smelling privy with a piece of gingerbread stuffed 
in his mouth. There he waits until the last act when he 
is brought even lower, a moment appropriate to Dapper's
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role, but also appropriate as the last performance of 
Subtie's diminishing power and resulting in the exposure 
to Love-Wit of Face's activities. Subtle bids him crawl 
on his knees and wriggle and then to "kisse her ^ o l  as 
the Queen of Fair^Z departing part." Both are still 
fooled: Subtle thinks his power and his position still
intact, and Dapper thinks the familiar Dol gives him will 
bring him luck, even though it must suck on his blood once 
a week.
Drugger, the tobacco merchant, who wants to know 
how to build his shop and who confuses art with necromancy, 
also only has five appearances. He does not contribute so 
much as Dapper to a visual implementing of the play's theme 
and he hasn't much to say, but he is present in every act 
and his role is more crucial to the action. It is Drugger 
who knows of a rich widow and her brother up from the coun­
try, she. Dame Pliant, desirous of learning the latest 
fashions and he, Kastril, of learning to quarrel and live 
by his wits, and of his sister's marrying a count. This 
complicating factor will be the heaviest stone in the 
troubled waters of the "venter tripartite.” It will give 
Surly a lever and it will help increase the intensity and 
frequency of the cozening trio's quarrels. It will cul­
minate in a major scene (IV.vii.) of general uproar near 
the end of the play as the action quickens and threatens to 
explode. In this scene Drugger will be used primarily to
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daunt Surly and help bring his efforts to naught. Although 
Subtle attempts to interest Drugger in the philosopher's 
stone, Drugger adheres to the more prosaic interest of 
marrying a rich widow, and in the end he is treated with 
more peremptory contempt than Mammon and the "Brethren," 
but not more than Dapper; he loses the widow because he 
stayed at washing his face too long. Face says, and Love- 
Wit's blows, intended for Ananias and Tribulation, land on 
his back instead.
Kastril and Dame Pliant's roles are the most limited, 
although their appearances are rather frequent, Kastril 
appearing six times and she five. But they form the kernel 
of an action which will grow to fruition in the last act. 
Their roles and actions are interlaced with the others by 
Drugger's introducing them to Subtle and Face, by Surly's 
attempting to use Dame Pliant to expose Subtle and Face, by 
Subtle and Face's quarrelling over the widow, by Kastril's 
being used, appropriately, to make the loudest quarrelling 
noise in silencing Surly, and by Face's using Dame Pliant 
to appease Love-Wit at the end.
Because Surly first appears with Mammon, who usually 
dominates the scene when he does appear, this practical 
realist of few but pointed words does not at first glance 
seem to stand out as much as some others. But he has nine 
appearances in all, a frequency greater than that of either 
Mammon or Ananias. In addition he launches into long
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speeches in Act II, scene ill, where he turns Subtie's 
tactics and terms back on the user and reduces all to a 
concoction
Of pisse, and egge-shells, womens termes, mans bloud, 
Haire o' the head, burnt clouts, chalke, merds, and 
clay,
Poulder of bones, scalings of iron, glasse.
And worlds of other strange ingredients,
Would burst a man to name?
(11.194-198)
In Act IV he appears four times and serves as the catalyst 
producing the near-rupture of the plot in the seventh scene. 
His beating of Subtle in the sixth scene is paralleled by 
his own dumfounding defeat in the next scene. In addition 
to having a humour not to be gulled, he also, like the 
others, has a humour to profit, but his realization at the 
end is more bitter than any of the others': "Must I needs
cheat my selfe,/ With that same foolish vice of honestie!"
Each character is distinctive and each is in some 
way subtly subordinated to another. All of those thus far 
discussed are in turn subordinate to the "venter tripartite," 
the authors, stage-managers, and directors of the whole 
show. Dol is the leading lady and the peace maker of the 
group; her role is less important than that of either Subtle 
or Face and somewhat resembles that of Dame Pliant. From 
their point of view she is an object to be fought over, and 
from her own point of view they are a means of acquiring 
booty, to be obeyed, bullied, or placated in accordance 
with who is winning. Subtle is the master artist of words
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and poses who remains closeted within the magical house of 
wonders, protected in a controlled way from the infectious 
plagues without. Face is the master workman of many faces 
who reconnoiters, solicits, and brings home raw material 
from the infected populace.
At first Subtle seems the more powerful and prominent 
member of the partnership, but, like Volpone, he will be 
betrayed by his captain and assistant Face, who has an ace 
in the hole, his position as Jeremy in Love-Wit's house­
hold. Just as Mosca displaced Volpone, so Face will dis­
place Subtle as the master of the revels, but Face will in 
turn be displaced by Love-Wit. So, in addition to there 
being a triple pattern in the unholy trinity of villains, 
there is also the same pattern in the triple shift of the 
action. As in Volpone, there are subtle foreshadowings of 
Subtie's fall, which brings Dol down as well. Although 
Subtle retains his mastery throughout most of the play and 
the other characters remain subordinate to him, there are 
those who measure up against him very well and sometimes 
almost overtop him. Mammon can outtalk him and can encompass 
almost as much of the universe in his nonsense as can 
Subtle. Ananias is most refractory and persistent and 
zealously convinced that he is right; it takes both Tribu­
lation and Subtle to convert him. He is right when he says 
that Subtle speaks a heathen tongue, but, unfortunately, 
he is right for the wrong reasons.
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Surly can aptly mimic Subtie's doubletalk and it is 
he who beats Subtle and makes him yell "Help, murder!" It 
is after this encounter with Surly that Face remarks upon 
Subtle's loss of countenance:
Come SVBTLE,
Thou art so downe vpon the least disaster!
How wouldst tho' ha' done, if I had not helpt thee 
out?
(IV.vii.92-94)
Immediately afterwards Love-Wit returns. The flock of 
defeathered birds cawing at the door is heard inside by 
Subtle:
FAC. Did you not heare the coyle.
About the dore?
SVB. Yes, and I dwindled with it.)
(V.iv.14-15)
In this scene Subtle, who in Act I, scene i, has been 
SSoueraignè" and ^Generali," now acknowledges Face "the 
precious king/ Of present wits" (11.13-14). The eventual 
rupture between Face and Subtle has been foreshadowed, of 
course, by their noisy quarrel in Act I, scene i, and this 
quarrel, interrupted first by Dol and then by Dapper, 
resumes at every opportunity, appearing with consistent 
regularity in each act. It is ironic that Subtle praises 
Face at the moment when Face plans his partner's expulsion: 
it is an uneasy partnership in which neither overt distrust 
or momentary trust works very well.
Love-Wit assumes the ascendancy from Face because 
he is the property-owner, because he sizes up the situation
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rather quickly, and because he has no scruples about 
taking advantage of it. Like the others he has a natural 
affinity for what will profit him and unlike Subtle he 
immediately acknowledges his "seruants wit;" "I will be 
rul’d by thee in any thing, lEREMIE" (V.v.1^3).
As a result of these statements by Love-Wit,
A, C. Dessen says that the play ends with a "venter bipar-
4
tite" established between Face and Love-Wit. Actually, 
another "venter tripartite" has taken shape with Love-Wit 
and Dame Pliant supplanting Subtle and Dol. In the begin­
ning there are three partners: Subtle, Face, and Dol, In
the middle portion of the play there is a movement which 
threatens this partnership, throws it off balance, and 
prepares for the emergence of a new triumvirate. In this 
disruptive movement Dame Pliant is both the pawn and the 
symbol of power for which Subtle and Face compete, a battle 
which threatens to displace Dol. But Surley jockeys into 
position and threatens to displace either Face of Subtle or 
both. Had he succeeded, a marriage of two instead of three 
would have resulted, a less perverted relationship than the 
one wherein Face and Subtle share Dol. But Surley does not 
succeed, and at the end there emerges what promises to be 
another nefarious partnership as Face ingenuously invites 
the audience to be his "new ghests." As for Dame Pliant,
4
Dessen, Jonson’s Moral Comedy, p. 131.
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who knows how silent the silent bride may be after mar­
riage? She may well find that like "Madame Rabbi" she has 
talking fits. Love-Wit will not always be at home, arid 
Jeremy the butler may not easily forget that as Face he 
once hoped to enjoy the rich widow's favors. In addition, 
then, to the triple partnership of the main characters in 
the beginning and the triple shift in the action, there is 
a comparable triple partnership at the end and at three 
main points in the play three possible partnerships of 
three can be seen functioning, threatening to dissolve, 
dissolving, and emerging newly formed and functioning 
again, the number three preserved as the underlying symbol 
of the world's unity, but not in the form of Father, Son, 
and Holy Ghost.
The fundamental unity behind the eternal flux which 
the Ionian philosophers sought, which Aristotle and Plato 
formulated for the reason, and which the Christian fathers 
translated into a religious principle and pattern has been 
thoroughly violated, perverted, and finally completely 
incorporated in the business articles of Face, Subtle, and 
Dol. But they will never find or create the philosopher's 
stone, and the only thing left is eternal flux. All the 
characters are immersed in this flux; they will continually 
shift from one thing to another; they will never find unity 
in themselves or with others. Face will change his counte­
nance many times. Subtle and Dol will climb over many back
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walls I and Dol may add new characters to her repertoire of 
the "Queene of Fairie" and ’’Madame Rabbi.” Surley may not 
soon don the costume of a Spanish count, but Love-Wit will 
not hesitate to do so. Ananias and Tribulation Wholesome 
have not abandoned the zeal which has caused their present 
difficulties and which will probably cause them more.
Dapper and Drugger may rest for a while, but may move again 
when they feel the pinch for money or catch the whiff of 
another rich widowJ
The theme of eternal shifting is central to the 
play, a part of the alchemical process at which Subtle 
labors. Subtle pretends to an art which can shift the 
elements and produce the "lapis philosophicus,” a stone 
which is not a stone, but "a spirit, a soule, and a body" 
(II.V.41). He tampers with Nature herself and, in a sense, 
pretends and presumes to idealize her. Just before Mammon 
appears. Subtle describes Mammon's hopes for the stone:
He /5lammon7 will make 
Nature asham'd, of her long sleeps: when art,
Who's but a step-dame, shall doe more, then shee,
In her best loue to man-kind, euer could.
If his dreame last, hee'll turne the age, to gold.
(I.iv.25-29)
Mammon has been Subtie's most apt pupil and he 
believes both in the philosopher's stone and in its wonder­
working magic. He is a poetic dreamer who has no idea of 
the relationship between dreams and reality, between quality 
and quantity. Only his greed anchors him to any kind of
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reality. With the stone he will turn all metals to gold; 
he will "confer honour, loue, respect, long life ;" he will 
give "safety, valure," and "victorie" to whom he will; he 
will restore youth and virility to old men and cure all 
diseases. His speech bears testimony to a blithe disregard 
for all divisions of time, space, form, or basic substance. 
He is the dreamy creator who appreciates no distinction of 
any kind.
I haue a peece of JASONS fleece, too, 
Which was no other, then a booke of alchemie,
Writ in large sheepe-skin, a good fat ram-vellam.
Such was PYTHAGORA'S thigh, PANDORA'S tub;
And, all that fable of MEDEAS charmes,
The manner of our worke: The Bulls, our fornace.
Still breathing fire; our argent-viue, the Dragon:
The Dragons teeth, mercury sublimate,
That keepes the whitenesse, hardnesse, and the biting; 
And they are gather'd, into JASON'S helme,
(The' alembeke) and then sow'd in MARS his field.
And, thence, sublim'd so often, till they are fix'd. 
Both this, th' Hesperian garden, CADMVS storie, 
lOVE's shower, the boone of MIDAS, ARGUS eyes,
BOCCACE his Demogorgon, thousands more.
All abstract riddles of our stone. How now?
(II.i.ü9-104)
He has just outraged ancient learning, history, fable, 
legend, myth, and literature as he will later outrage 
nature in his speech to Dol, whom he regards as a miracle 
of nature, and as he earlier outraged "a booke, where MOSES, 
and his sister,/ And SALOMON have written, of the art;/ I, 
and a treatise penn'd by ADAM!' (II.i.81-83). Mammon is a 
good example,of what Jonson said the artist must not do;
"we may improve, but not augment."
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Mammon, like the others, is a violation of nature; 
most of Jonson's characters are. It is for this reason 
perhaps that they have appeared to some critics like 
puppets. J. J. Enck refers to this opinion in his article 
on The Case is Altered:
The plot and language both have a thorough­
going stratification which includes almost all the 
principal characters and, furthermore, furnishes 
them their main motivation. These elements rarely 
infuse one another; rather they are parallel lines.
Such perpendicularity contributes something to the 
effect of puppets which it is claimed Jonson's char­
acters often convey. They respond less to each 
other than to their own natures,, which happen to 
be stimulated by other presences on the stage or 
just off it.5
Una Ellis-Fermor makes a similar observation about The 
Alchemist ;
. . . they //Œhe characters? have a relation with 
each other somewhat like that of the related 
blocks of colour in the picture /a" modernistic, 
non-representational painting?, no more co­
terminous with the lines of the intrigue than 
the colour-groups were in the line design.
It is perhaps natural that Jonsonian characters should 
appear to some as unnatural puppets. They are unnatural: 
they are the logical consequence of their violation of 
human nature. They are Jonson's statement about the inhuman 
or subhuman possibilities latent in human weakness and irra­
tionality. They are no longer organic human beings in tune
"The Case is Altered: Initial Comedy of Humours,"
SP, L (April 1953) , p. 209.
^The Jacobean Drama. An Interpretation (London, 
1953), p.~PT.
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with some universal principle of unity and integration.
In Volpone the humours are infecting society and perverting 
nature ; they are barely contained by society's safeguards. 
In The Alchemist only art succeeds in containing and 
shaping the humours. Within the play itself the "world's 
turn'd Bet'lem" (V.iii.$4), but it is a world which people 
may eventually accept as the normal one; the neighbors of 




THE MASK OF MULTIPLICITY
For such a play as richly complex as Bartholomew 
Fair, it seems a crime to attempt to catch its elusive 
magic on the steely prongs of critical distinctions. But 
Jonson's own sense of distinctions, critical and otherwise, 
is one thing which made the play possible. A sense of the 
play's complexity may well override any sense of its unity; 
there seems to be a trail of chaos as the characters hurtle 
restlessly from one incarnation to another. But the play's 
complexity is simply a mask for its unity, for it is the 
author's frustrated sense of unity that makes possible 
such a delicately interwoven but massively overwhelming 
kaleidoscope of chaos. The result is one great seething 
action of a myriad sights and sounds, confusing and sense­
less to outsiders, but tempting nevertheless and exciting.
To find the unity hidden in the chaos, one must pass through 
this tumult, and it is perhaps doubtful that any mere mortal 




Others have discovered that Jonson is laughing at
himself here as well as at the world. But the world had\
made a mess of all his ideas of reason, order, and sanity, 
so he in his own fashion made a mess of the world. It may 
be that the argument of the play is more humane than those 
of earlier plays and rather warmly good-natured, but the 
great rumbling bee hasn't lost his sting or his sense or 
his judgment. His revenge is a subtle one, comprehensive, 
comprehending, and amused, but still a judgment. There may 
be a focal point of place, but there is no particular cen­
ter of sympathy.
Jonas A. Barish sees the "dominant spirit" of the 
play as one of "warmth and animal appetite" which eventually 
converts the reformers or "kill-joys." Calvin Thayer sees 
the forces of fertility, generally the Fair and its people, 
triumphing over those of infertility, such as Busy, Dame 
Purecraft, Winwife, and Grace Wellborn,^ But the lines 
are not really as clearly or simply drawn as this. Busy, 
with his passion for making noises that are sanctified, is 
regarded as the chief representative of the kill-joy 
reformers. But even he, though he defines appetite as a 
disease, also calls it a natural disease and leads after 
the scent of pig like a hound. He has a latent affinity
^Barish, Ben Jonson and the Language of Prose 
Comedy, p. 222; Calvin Thayer, Ben Jonson. Studies in the 
Plays (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963),
pp. 128-156. See also Dessen, Jonson's Moral Comedy, p. l48.
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with the people of the Fair and what they represent, even 
if he does make knowledge of it inaccessible to his limited 
wits until an even more limited creature, the Puppet 
Dionysius, teaches him a lesson in a way which even he 
can understand. Certainly the puppet does not appeal to 
his reason, merely to his sense of noise. This latent 
affinity is also true, of course, of Win, who longs for 
pig, of her husband John, who writes plays for puppets, and 
of Dame Purecraft, who finds rich old men for young virgins 
of the faith.
The Fair does indeed exude a warmth, but Ursula, 
as well as Busy, likens it to the fires of hell, fires 
which are likely to render down her lard and recreate the 
first woman. Eve, or rather "a ribbe." Her leg, scalded 
as the result of her own hot temper (when she threatens 
Quarlous and Winwife with a pan of hot water), is doctored 
in "hogs grease" by Knockem who in the process describes 
her diseased underpinnings: "body o' me, she has the
Mallanders, the scratches, the crowne scabbe, and the 
quitter bone, i' the tother legge" (II.v.179-181). Just 
before this he has called her "a Pillar of the Fayre," who 
in these "dogdaies" should "keepe state" in "thy chayre,'| a 
chair in which Dame Overdoo will later sit and in which now 
Ursula must sit, just as the other three principals must 
sit a while in the stocks. In addition, of course, she is 
"mother o' the Bawds," "mother o' the Pigs," and "mother o'
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the Furies.” But these are rather■innocuous, bantering 
epithets in comparison to Knockem*s realistic description 
of her leg and to Quarlous* description of her as a form of 
primeval slime, a "Bogge** or "quagmire** a man could drown 
in.
Throughout the play there is this suggestion of a 
primordial chaos breeding maggots, flies, wasps, and 
vermin. Ursula calls Mooncalfe **Vermine,'* in addition to 
"Polcat" and "Weasell," with "Grasse-hoppers thighes." 
Bartholomew Cokes is described as one with a *'head full of 
Bees*’ (l.iv.81); Quarlous thinks him one "made to catch 
flies" (I.V.99); and later at the Fair Wasp tells him "they 
are such retchlesse flies as you are, that blow cutpurses 
abroad in every corner" (III.v.221-222). As Quarlous and 
Winwife make ready to follow Cokes and his party to the 
Fair, the latter remarks "These flies cannot, this hot 
season, but engender vs excellent creeping sport" (I.v.l40- 
l4l). The pestilential air of the "dogdaies" does breed 
the "Higher" forms of life t'oo--the polecat, the weasel, 
bear, horse, ferret, coney, and nightingale; but even the 
nightingale is a hunter in disguise, and his ballad "The 
Ferret and the Coney" calls attention to the hunter-and- 
the-hunted pattern of unidealized nature. The genteel, 
like Quarlous, Winwife, and Grace, may afford a temporary, 
amused detachment from this "sport," and a Justice who sits 
protected in his court may try to attribute this "swearing,"
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"swaggering," "snuffling," and "snarling" to tobacco that 
an "Alligarta" has "piss'd" on (II.vi.27); but Overdo's 
delusion, illustrating a lack of any proportion or degree, 
is only temporary protection, and the Fair folk rightly 
think him a fool or madman. The mass of humanity does not 
indulge in such whimsicalities; it has a survival to forage 
and not for sport, as Punque Alice demonstrates when she 
does not welcome an amateur like Dame Overdo to the sister­
hood.
If the Fair represents the forces of fertility, 
then these forces are rank, on the verge of slipping over 
into a rottenness that could return all to the mudsill of 
existence. Ursula, the dominant figure of the Fair, is 
diseased and constantly in danger of melting away. Can 
creations from the raw materials of such an environment be 
anything but trash? Joane Trash's gingerbread may be com­
posed of nature's goods, but they are either stale or 
rotten: "stale bread, rotten egges, musty ginger, and
dead honey" (II.ii.9-10). At one extreme is rottenness; 
at the other is artificiality and sterility. Leatherhead, 
Trash's co-worker, presides over mimic images of natural 
things: babies, dogs, cats, bears, horses, and other toys
appreciated by children like Cokes. Bartholomew Cokes is 
both the patron and the victim of the Fair, one of the 
innocents massacred by its numerous predators. He loses 
his box, his warrant or license, his fiancee, his money.
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his cloak and sword, his way home, and even his toys. At 
nineteen he is a child and in such an unprincipled world 
likely to remain so, a kind of hapless eunuch whose only 
progeny will be dolls, parrots, monkeys;, and gingerbread 
images. He is among the "retchlesse flies" that blow life 
into dead matter and bring forth the living cutpurse. Such 
"innocence" as his makes such a world possible. But he 
too, with a little help, could be a thief, as the incident 
with the Pear-Man illustrates: Cokes greedily snatches for
the fallen pears, as well he might, starved of real suste­
nance as he is; as the Pear-Man cries for the return of his 
pears, to no avail. Cokes cries after his lost cloak and 
sword. Perhaps he will turn thief when and if he ever 
tires of the game of puppets which he plans to continue 
beyond the Fair's time and place.
This puppet show, another of Leatherhead's produc­
tions, has, oddly enough, been taken by critics as further 
confirmation of Jonson's sympathies being with the Fair 
folk. But Leatherhead-Lanterne, though called, ironically, 
by Quarlous an "Orpheus among the beasts" (II.v.8), is no 
magical singer who can strike motion from a stone or charm 
wild animals. His sexless, brainless, repetitive puppets 
are as artificial and sterile as his array of toys in spite 
of their fetishistic preoccupation with bawdry, sex, and 
quarrelling, which are their master's charms for drawing 
money out of appreciative spectators like Cokes. These
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talky substitutes for man thinking, talking, and acting 
can, with their infertile brains and bodies, live in an 
"ancient moderne" bastardization of love and friendship 
and not be disturbed by the incongruities of their little 
world. They are, however, the fitting vehicle for con­
founding Busy. Their representative in. this debate is 
Dionysius, a tyrant, and an unthinking one, like all 
tyrants, including the public and the playwrights who 
pander to its taste. A tyrant does not need to think; he 
need only shout and this noise is a language Busy under­
stands. Ironically, the coup de grace is a tricky techni­
cality which points to the puppet’s sterility as he lifts 
his skirts to prove that real sex is no part of the drama. 
This too Busy can understand. The puppet as King Dionysius 
is also, of course, the god Dionysus who takes a sly peep 
from beneath the skirts as well--a reminder that Busy's 
senses are as keen as a hound's when there is pig, or turkey 
pie, or money about.
The "new disease" (the humours) of Every Man in his 
Humour here emerges as a very old one. Knowell's lament in 
the second version of this earlier play left some possi­
bility that the "disease” was something learned "in the 
infancie" even though it stained "vnto the liuer,/And heart, 
in some" (II.v.30-31). In Bartholomew Fair it does not 
stain in some, but in all, and the learning process, if it 
is that, begins now, not in infancy, but in the womb. The
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unborn child in Win Littlewit's womb will also partake in 
the benefits of Bartholomew pig. Several conflicting ideas 
discernible in Jonson's canon come together here. One 
could argue that corruption is a learned thing even here, 
but the argument would seem to rest on a technicality. 
Innocence in Bartholomew Fair appears as stupidity and 
ignorance, Cokes' childish flittings and Busy's "Originall 
ignorance." Contrary to what Busy preaches, staying away 
from "evil," in the form of the Fair, does not in the least 
ensure salvation, for man, as Busy himself demonstrates, 
has a natural affinity for the scent of pig. Busy's 
"Originall ignorance" becomes original sin, an idea empha­
sized not only by Busy's participation in the Fair but also 
by Justice Overdo's lesson that he is "but Adam, flesh and 
bloud" and by Ursula's identification with Eve. This idea 
of man's fall from some kind of original perfection has 
been suggested elsewhere. In The Alchemist, for instance. 
Subtle, the false artist, utters the ridiculous, in this 
context, idea that Nature first brought forth imperfect 
forms and works from these towards perfect ones--a justifi­
cation for his alchemical meddling with Nature's ways. 
Epicure Mammon, too, would interfere with Nature and bring 
her to "perfection." In addition to this idea of a fall 
into corruption, there is the additional one of progressive 
deterioration, demonstrated in Volpone by the progress of 
the soul from Apollo through Pythagoras down to the body of
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a hermaphrodite with the mind of a fool. References to 
Pythagoras in Jonson are numerous, and although one could 
construe him as an example of early man's learning and 
accomplishments, it is also possible to regard him as an 
example of the relativism which makes qualities of good or 
bad matters of opinion only. Running counter to these 
ideas of a fall from original perfection and progressive 
deterioration is the suggestion that man evolved from some 
kind of primeval bog, is still closely allied to maggots, 
flies, oysters, polecats, and weasels, and is forever on 
the verge of returning whence he came. Also, Busy's origi­
nal sin is original ignorance, a neglect of "all Antiquity," 
a substitution of "Inspiration" for learning, certainly an 
idea in conflict with that of all man's troubles being 
caused by a theft from the Tree of Knowledge. Last of all, 
there is Jonson's belief that man could and would reform if 
only he could arrive at a clear understanding of his condi­
tion; if he could attach his will to a developed and 
informed reason, he might prove that he only has the poten­
tial for either good or evil and that by consciously acting 
well he might realize one potential rather than the other.
Ifhat warrant does he have for this belief? Perhaps
he no longer knows. Perhaps only a madman like Troubleall
ever asks the question. And certainly the gods are silent.
In Bartholomew Fair Jonson does something he has not done 
before, although The Alchemist makes a subtle approach to
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the matter with its terrible trinity of thieves and rogues. 
In Bartholomew Fair all the major gods, all the idols, of 
man are brought back to earth, and their images suffer 
through eternal, restless shiftings or transformations, 
metamorphoses, inverted transfigurations.
Ursula Major is a bright constellation in the far­
away heavens, but she is also a great waddling bear that 
snarls and swears at her workers and clients. She is the 
ancient Great Earth Mother, Demeter or Ceres, and the first 
Christian mother. Eve, but she is also the mothgr of bawds, 
thieves, and pigs. And her name shortened sounds suspi­
ciously like something else, especially if Captain Whit, 
who blurs all distinctions in pronunciation, happens to 
roll it over his tongue.
A second major deity of the Fair is Justice Adam 
Overdo. Like Ursula, his identities shift, both literally 
and figuratively, as Jonson picks up fragments from almost
every tradition man has ever honored or deified. Be sets
I
himself up as a "Mirror of Magistrates, a Hercules, a 
Columbus, a Magellan, a Drake, and is revealed to himself 
by Quarlous as "but Adam, Flesh and blood" (V.vi.97)» At 
the fair he disguises as a madman, Arthur of Bradley, and a 
porter, never dreaming that his role as a Justice for the 
law of the land is also a disguise. But he comes trailing 
clouds of classical glory.'' Quoting Horace with a muddled 
sense of application, he regards all poetry, except the
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overtly moralistic, as a taint on the land. Like Jove he 
visits man’s abode in a succession of forms and at the end 
plans ’’to reueale my selfe, wherein cloud-like, I will 
breake out in raine, and haile, lightning, and thunder, 
vpon the head of enormity” (V.ii.4-6)--a statement carefully 
ambiguous enough to ally him with both pagan and Christian 
traditions.
A possible third in this realm of deities is Zeal- 
of-the-Land Busy, a representative of the new religion and 
an old failing. In his person he illustrates some of the 
major weaknesses of Christianity. In contrast to his very 
literal mind, he eschews any kind of learning for a reli­
ance on zeal, passion, and "Inspiration.” This belief is 
reminiscent of the doctrine of the Holy Ghost, the heavenly 
inspiration that, for instance, descended on the disciples 
at Pentecost, causing some of the onlookers to be amazed 
and others to believe the men drunk. But Peter says they 
cannot be drunk since it is "but the third hour of the 
day.” He continues:
And it shall come to pass in the last days, 
saith God, I will pour out of my Spirit upon all 
flesh: and your sons and your daughters shall
prophesy, and your young men shall see visions, 
and your old men shall dream dreams:
(Acts 2:17)
Busy has a liking for "a glasse of Malmesey” and he "has 
giuen ouer his Trade” as a baker since ”hee do's dreame 
now, and see visions" (I.iii.119-120). His wrath waxes hot
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against the idols of ,the Fair, just as God's did against 
the Israelites for creating a "molten calf" to worship.
Busy would destroy the Fair's idols, but God would have 
destroyed the Israelites themselves, if Moses had not sug­
gested to Him that this was not a very nice thing to do 
(Exodus 32:8-l4). Unlike God, however, Busy would just as 
soon suffer for his calling, in public of course. As far 
as Busy is concerned, any disruptions of the forces of law 
and order are justified if they are done in the name of 
God. He regards his deliverance from the stocks through 
Troubleall as a miracle effected by a madness "of the 
spirit." Abraham's command from God to murder and sacri­
fice his own son Isaac might be regarded in a similar 
light, that is, if one reads it literally. Like Ursula 
and the Fair folk. Busy is allied with the forces of pri­
mordial shapelessness when he tells Puppet Dionysius "I 
haue gaped as the oyster for the tide, after thy destruc-
I
tion" (V.v.23-24). A primitive barbarism, wrathful, petty, 
lawless, and jealous, masquerades as religion and pays 
deference to a madman, who, Dame Purecraft says, is "mad in 
truth" (IV.Vi.170).
The figure of Troubleall with his frenetic search 
for a warrant is a complicated one. When Justice Overdo 
sees him at the Fair, he thinks him "a sober and discreet 
person" (IV.i.27). One wonders then how the Justice came 
to dismiss him as a clerk from his court. At any rate, he
191
has gone mad as the result of this dismissal, apparently 
done because Justice is an incompetent fool and no judge.
In addition to being literally a madman, he shares signifi­
cantly in the epistemological questions which the play 
raises. This is made rather explicit by his reiterated 
question but also by one scene in particular which he 
shares with Grace Wellborn and her two suitors.
The character of Grace Wellborn has been trouble­
some to critics. Calvin Thayer places her among the hostile, 
priggish forces of infertility:
She is part of the half-foolish, half-mad world 
eternally at odds with everything.the Fair repre­
sents, and as such she is joined in marriage with 
someone who has been castigated for nosing after 
old women and wasting the brand of life raking for 
a fortune in their embers.^
Jonas Barish calls her the "one false note" of the play and
also describes her as "poised, judicious, and slightly
t
inhuman":
Mistress Grace, Cokes's destined bride, and 
nominal heroine of the play as Winwife is its 
nominal hero, suffers from Jonson's inability to 
make "straight" characters interesting. Doubt­
less, when Jonson created her, he thought he was 
paying a handsome compliment to her sex. She 
possesses good sense, judgment, and sobriety, 
qualities he rarely admitted in women. The trouble 
is that these are no longer the qualities that the 
play itself is primarily recommending, and they 
clash rather disastrously with the dominant spirit 
of warmth and animal appetite.
2
Thayer, Ben Jonson, p. l4$.
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Grace says that she has no fancy to visit the Fair because
"none goes thither of any quality or fashion: (l.v.132).
Barish comments, "That Jonson permitted the last of these
remarks, with its prate of 'quality' and 'fashion,' to
creep into the dialogue of a character otherwise labeled
'admirable,' is perhaps sufficient indication of how little,
3at this moment, he really cared for reason and sobriety."
The questions are where or how is she actually labelled 
"admirable" and is she "half-foolish, half-mad" only because 
she opposes the forces of the Fair? Every other character 
in the play proves false to his label or labels. And ulti­
mately she is "half-mad" because she "thinks" in the same 
way that Busy and Troubleall do.
In Act IV, scene iii, Grace stops a fight between 
Winwife and Quarlous over her favors. Barish contrasts her 
reasonable deportment here with that of Ursula who berates 
Mooncalfe for stopping a fight in her "bower." Grace 
restores order by some pertinent comments:
How can I iudge of you, so farre as to a choyse, 
without knowing you more? you are both equall, 
and alike to mee, yet: and so indifferently
affected by mee, as each of you might be the man, 
if the other were away. For you are reasonable 
creatures, you haue vnderstanding, and discourse.
(11.31-36)
Moreover, at this point, she is the only person who really 
knows of Justice Overdo's own enormities and who knows that
3Barish, Ben Jonson, p. 222.
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he "playes the foole, with the greatest diligence than 
can be" (III.v.266-267). But, in her lesson to Winwife 
and Quarlous, the stinger starts to rise and swing around 
on the speaker when she adds, "And if fate send me an 
vnderstanding husband, I haue no feare at all, but mine 
owne manners shall make him a good one" (II.I36-I38). The 
"reasonableness" with which Winwife credits her is sud­
denly transformed into something between magic and divina­
tion.
You shall write either of you, heere, a word, or a 
name, what you like best; but of two, or three 
syllables at most: and the next person that comes
this way (because Destiny has a high hand in busi- 
nesse of this nature) I 'le demand, which of the 
two words, he, or she doth approue; and according 
to that sentence, fixe my resolution, and affec­
tion, without change.
(11.48-55)
Contrary to her original, reasonable intent of knowing the 
young gentlemen better, she too, like Troubleall, seeks a 
warrant or, like Busy, some direct communication. At which 
point, enter Troubleall to play the part of Destiny. Sur­
prisingly enough, he does make a choice, and he gives her 
to the one who will fail to help her keep her wardship.
Troubleall's reiterated question, then, may well 
mean, among other things, does this mad scene have any 
warrant in the scheme of Destiny, or Fate, that force more 
powerful than Jove or Demeter or any of the gods? Further­
more, is there any such scheme or master plan of order? Is 
Destiny a madman or does one simply go mad if he asks such
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a question? If man goes searching for a warrant, he may 
get a contradictory answer that tells him to multiply and 
replenish the earth and then demands of him a warrant for 
what he does. Then, he may run mad, as Troubleall does, 
with his twin refrain of "Haue you a warrant?" and "Quit 
yee, and multiply yee" (IV.i.107; 112-113). If man runs 
after a direct statement of the absolute from God or the 
universe, he may well get it directly from the horse's 
mouth instead, as Troubleall finally does from Knockem the 
horse-courser. The warrant is a fraud, but it does allow 
thé troubled soul to take a drink in peace. In the end 
when a real warrant from Justice Overdo is forthcoming, it 
is delivered to, again another shift, a fraudulent madman, 
a "ragged robe" hiding the scheming self-interest of 
Quarlous. Man is back where he started from, stranded on 
a little island of the self pounded by waves of doubt. And 
since Overdo simply signs his name on a blank piece of 
paper, Justice in effect gives madness or self-interest 
carte blanche to both quit itself and multiply itself.
There is, then, no particular center of sympathy: 
to divide the play between the forces of fertility and 
infertility would be inconsistent with the Jonsonian prac­
tice of creating a totally humorous action embracing all 
the characters. The deities of the place include not only 
Ursula, of the Fair, but Justice Overdo and Busy as well.
In addition to all these "gods," there is Destiny, a madman.
195
who by questioning the warrant of the "gods,"’’.and everyone, 
thereby questions the warrant, or plan, of the world in 
general. The action still moves by characters "yeelding 
to any.good impressions," but this shifting now includes 
transformations that range from the physical to the meta­
physical. . -
Jonson achieves an incredibly rich suggestiveness 
by thus swiftly shifting his characters through a series 
of transformations which are both literal and figurative, 
physical and metaphysical. They make reflections not 
easily caught full in a pig's eye, though the pig may suf­
fer for them just the same. On a physical and appetitive 
level, these transformations are begun by a shifting of 
scents, and the action moves by the same means. The humours 
are still at work, but they too have many guises: "long­
ing," "vapours," "appetite," "motions," "zeal," "calling," 
"Inspiration." In addition to the obvious multiplicity of 
accent, subordination, in a rather special sense, is still 
at work. The range includes, in addition to the deities 
discussed above (representatives of the cosmos, religion, 
law, and earth and hearth), members of the genteel and 
gentlemanly (Winwife, Quarlous, Grace Wellborn), the bour­
geois (John and Win Littlewit, Dame Purecraft), and the 
lower social orders, which in turn have their own semblance 
of a hierarchy (from Ursula, Knockem and Captain Whit, to 
Mooncalfe and Punque Alice). The ground swell of appetite
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cuts across all these distinctions, however, making each 
one false to his supposed distinctiveness and uniting all 
of them in a common pursuit, a pursuit which in turn pits 
one interest against another. Although Jonson maintains 
unity of place and unity of time on a literal level, :/ 
thematically he works simultaneously upward and downward 
in space and backward and forward in time— a situation, 
perhaps responsible for the keepers of the watch (Haggise 
and Bristle) not knowing what time it is and resolving to 
argue then that time is dependent on them rather than they 
on it. But, then, they are easily confounded by a madman.
Even if the presiding spirit is that of a madman 
and even if there is no villainous mastermind or artist 
directing the action in this play, thé threads of action 
are just as skillfully interwoven as in The Alchemist. The 
Fair, of course, is the philosopher's stone which draws all 
the characters to partake of its pleasures and thus bear 
witness to their true gods, no matter what stratum of 
society they occupy. The play begins on a middle plane in 
the bosom of homey, middle class respectability with John 
Littlewit and his wife. Win. But there are "enormities" 
lurking within their home, to be revealed in the last scene 
of this act, including not only Dame Purecraft, Win's hypo­
critically pious mother, but also Busy who has his "teeth, 
i' the cold Turkey-pye, i' the cupbord" (I.vi.34-35). John 
and Win discuss Quarlous and Winwife, who subsequently
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appear. Wasp arrives to collect the license John has 
expounded upon in the first scene and is followed by his 
ward Bartholomew Cokes and party (Grace Wellborn, his 
fiancee, and Dame Overdo, his sister). Cokes has a longing 
to visit his Fair, "because of Bartholmew; you know my 
name is Bartholmew, and Bartholmew Fayre" (I.v.66-67).
Like Littlewit, he has a habit of redundantly making a 
point. Later, when Littlewit the proctor becomes Littlewit 
the author of puppet shows, he will find a perfect spec­
tator in Cokes. Cokes and party go off to the Fair, where­
upon Win also develops a longing for Fair pig, and Quarlous 
and Winwife follow after to watch the "sport," a sport 
which, as it turns out, Quarlous knows better than any other 
how to play in earnest. Purecraft and Busy emerge at the 
end of the act to supply with their combined efforts a 
metaphysical justification for visiting the Fair. Every­
thing has been easily and smoothly set in motion as the 
three groups set out for the Fair. Wasp reluctantly follows 
Cokes and serves as a kind of protective teacher substitute 
for the Justice who has abrogated his position and his 
responsibility in this, and in all ways, the result being 
that Wasp ends in the stocks with Overdo, and poor Bar­
tholomew is crucified.
The introduction of Justice Overdo is reserved for 
the first scene of the second act, which introduces the 
Fair. Because of his longing to spy out "enormities" and
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thereby fulfill his "high wisdome" as "a capitall member 
of this City," he shifts his identity from, that Of Justice 
to that of madman Arthur of Bradley. The scenes gradually 
build to the Fair's center, Ursula and her booth, where all 
the world eventually passes by. There is no need for Ursula 
to shift restlessly after the elusive scents of life. In 
her tumescent form, which evokes Paleolithic man and his 
steopogytic Great Earth Mother, Jonson has created the per­
fect embodiment of the humours. She is the epitome of self­
gratification, which may range from the simple satisfying 
of the physical senses to the more intellectual pleasures 
of outwitting others for one's own benefit. Symbolically, 
she becomes the source of all the Fair's "enormities."
When people arrive at her tent, things begin to happen.
The first group of outsiders, Quarlous and Winwife, arrive 
at Ursula's charmed center and immediately the first hassle 
starts. The second group, Cokes and friends, arrive in 
time to hear Arthur of Bradley orate on the evils of 
tobacco, assisted in this perhaps by his nipping at ale 
and beer in Urs's tent. The result of his harangue, 
grounded in no real sense of enormity but only in an 
irrelevant "factual" detail, is his first good deed--pro- 
viding the distraction which enables Edgworth to steal 
Cokes's purse. Wasp, both rightly and wrongly, beats 
Justice Overdo for the theft.
With the dominant image of the Fair firmly
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established, the play moves into the third act. The Watch­
men arrive too late, proving themselves unable to seize 
either the moment or the supposed thief, and no one wants 
the trouble of giving them an answer anyway. The third 
group of visitors. Busy and his flock, arrive and easily 
find their way to Ursula's pigs. A long speech by the 
Justice again precedes the theft of a purse, as Cokes is 
deprived a second time. Young Bartholomew and his misfor­
tunes are the focal point of this act as he buys out 
Leatherhead and Trash, drools over every word of Nightin­
gale's singing, and longs for another cutpurse to show him­
self. His every longing is satisfied, as apparently it has 
always been, and having been again deprived of his purse, 
he finds himself also deprived by Wasp of his license. He 
has not yet found or understood the warrant that will admit 
him to the human race. What that warrant is, however, is 
a secret hidden in a black box. Wasp, however, is no better 
protector of this warrant than Cokes, and it will eventually 
end in the hands of Quarlous via Edgworth the cutpurse, a 
young man who knows the score and who has infatuated the 
Justice, as his own young brother-in-law never has. It is 
possible to speculate here that a person may indeed have 
some kind of warrant for life, but one which he doesn't 
understand and which is useless to him as long as it remains 
secreted apart from himself in a box. But anything can be 
stolen from man, including his manhood, particularly if it
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depends only on a piece of paper giving him the right to 
be a man; and, of course, the same warrant that would thus 
benefit Cokes would at the same time doom Grace to an 
unhappy marriage based on her value as a piece of property.
In this act the original groupings begin to break 
up. Cokes loses more than his purse and his license as 
Quarlous and Winwife lure Grace away into their company. 
Busy's group disintegrates as he is led to the stocks after 
he overthrows the gingerbread images. Dame Purecraft fol­
lows him in distress leaving John and Win. They first 
express this new freedom as they go off to Ursula's tent 
for Win to use the jordan. With Busy gone, they do not 
have to appeal for a metaphysical warrant. Two of the 
principal characters are drawn off to reappear in the stocks 
in Act IV. Overdo's own enormities, with regard to Grace, 
are revealed at the same time that his wife calls him "a 
lewd, and pernicious Enormity: (as Master Ouerdoo calls
him.)" (III.V.206-207). The Watchmen lead him off along 
with Busy. The heads of the major authorities have been, 
in a sense, cut off, fittingly so since they don't use them 
anyway, and only a reckless, irrational deputy, the too- 
familiar "Numpes," is left to replace them.
Consequently, in Act IV, madness rules the scene, 
as Troubleall dashes in and out demanding a warrant of 
everyone. The act begins with Troubleall propelling the 
Watchmen off to go through the legal formalities of Justice.
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It ends with Troubleall distracting them sufficiently for 
the prisoners to escape, and the keepers of the peace find 
themselves fighting with the madman. In between, Overdo, 
in the stocks, has several revelations: he learns the
identity and condition of Troubleall and he learns that 
his subordinates think his judgments rest on personal whim. 
Cokes finds himself stripped down to his doublet and unable 
to find his way home again, if he ever really had one. 
Quarlous and Winwife fight over Grace, or grace, not really 
something that can be gained by combat, and not something 
that Destiny knows how to dispense either. In the end 
Grace, both as an actual character in the play and as the 
divine gift of grace, may prove valueless gnyway, belonging 
only to him who owns her. The women are being converted 
in this act, as Win is tutored by Knockem and Whit in the 
principles of being a "true bred" lady. In the absence of 
any effectively real ladies, she accepts that she may "Hide, 
and be hidden; ride, and be ridden" (IV.v.102). After all, 
ladies do ride enclosed in coaches, and this cuckolding is 
probably what they do in the secret box anyway. The play's 
first climax occurs here in the game of nonsense called the 
vapours, and the last representative of any kind of authority 
is carried off to the stocks. Wasp, the tutor-protector of 
Cokes, now in possession of the license, reveals that his 
temper is all fustian and no force. He illustrates what 
Dostoevsky was to insist on in Notes from Underground--that
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man will not be reasonable if reason conflicts with his
own will, that man will even go mad in order to have his
own way. Perhaps Wasp's temper is all fustian because he
indulges it without reason.
I haue no reason, nor I will heare of no reason, 
nor I will looke for no reason, and he is an 
Asse, that either knowes any, or lookes for't 
from me.
(IV.iv.42-44)
And he insists, "I am not i' the right, nor neuer was i' 
the right, nor neuer will be i' the right, while I am in my 
right minde" (11.72-74). He turns indiscriminately on 
everyone, including the Watchmen and Dame Overdo who inef­
fectually tries to take the Justice's place and restore 
order. Wasp is led off to the stocks. Mistress Overdo 
confesses that she does like "Sonnes of the sword" and is 
led off by Captain Whit to join Win at the jordan.
A principal unifying thread throughout this act, of 
course, is Troubleall who directs his inquiries to everyone 
who comes along. He sums up everything that has gone before 
in the preceding acts and his spirit presides over the 
bedlam of the vapours. Not only are religion and justice 
in the stocks, but man's reason, which may have attempted 
these concepts in the first place, disappears in fumes and 
smoke. Perhaps all these things were merely another variety 
of scent anyway, perhaps not even that. Perhaps barbaric 
man can only create a barbaric god and a barbaric justice. 
For God and Justice to exude this kind of savage or petty
203
aura is inexcusable, but for man to do the same can be 
thoroughly, if savagely, comic. With his restless mind, he 
can throw up a ladder into the heavens and then spend the 
rest of his life arguing about whether to climb it. He 
makes many noises, but they are still mixed with the sounds 
of the deep jungle housing a party of apes and he himself 
is not sure that the sounds make any sense. To the uni­
verse at large he may look like a brace of quarrelsome 
puppets manipulated by an equally wooden master who talks 
as much but knows no more.
The progress of man's soul through a complicated, 
spiritually confusing, and intensely physical world, in 
which he without question has his roots, may end at a 
prating puppet. In the last act's puppet show, Jonson 
gives an audience the tiniest possible portion of life 
caught in an unlifelike drama. From this he has Busy learn 
something. About this Wasp allows himself to be tutored 
by Cokes. The Justice, after his own lesson from Quarlous, 
allows the play and all concerned to adjourn to his home, 
thus proving Nightingale correct, that cutpurses thrive in 
the courts as well as at the Fair. Everything is all the 
same difference anyway.
But at the end of the play, Ursula is still gross; 
Busy is still an ignorant zealot; Overdo is still an incompe­
tent justice; Wasp can be tutored by a fool. Jonson did 
believe that man could reform himself, and he apparently
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believed it rather fervently. But justice can not reward 
the wicked and punish the innocent, nor fail to maintain 
some proportion and degree in its judgments. Reason can 
not give up and rely on revelation and Destiny. Religion 
can not be convulsed by literalistic trivialities thrown 
up by uneducated, undeveloped minds; it can not be depen­
dent on a shifting zeal out of touch with the rational 
mind, but not out of touch with the appetitive mind and 
the unharnessed will. At least, Jonson thought, man ought 
to try; that he included himself in that general category 
"man" does not mean that he believed it any the less. 
Bartholomew Fair was his London and its people his people. 
He was one of them. If he could at least see, why not 
others. Bartholomew Fair is a beautiful play as well as a 
very funny one; it is beautiful not only because it dis­
plays the skill and power of a giant, but also because it 
is deeply touching. It reveals how doggedly that very 
large mind explored every possible avenue of man's salva­
tion and how, no matter what man did, this particular poet 
still wanted to "save" him anyway.
CHAPTER XIV
CONCLUSION
This work has been concerned with clarifying Ben 
Jonson's position as a critic, thinker, and playwright. 
Jonson emerges as an independent thinker, one perhaps who 
knew too much, or tried to assimilate too much, but one 
who succeeded in preserving the integrity of his own mind 
without having to close it to the thoughts of others. His 
independence of mind is revealed by an examination of other 
critics, both English and Italian, who defended and dis­
cussed the drama and who analyzed concepts inherited from 
classical thinkers.
On the crucial question of "unity of action," those 
critics who dealt with it at all, primarily the Italians, 
justified, like Cinthio, the double plot, insisted, like 
Minturno, on "one sole and single action," or allowed, like 
Castelvetro, one or two actions dependent on one or two 
prrsons. These analyses represent attempts to comprehend 
Aristotelian thought and to acclimatize it to the contem­
porary scene. It has been necessary, therefore, to examine 
the Poetics and also the tradition of thought preceding and
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leading up to Aristotle. Aristotle was like his predeces­
sors, both the pre-Socratics and Plato, in thinking to 
discern a principle of unity in the nature of things. This 
principle has been regarded subsequently as a primary char­
acteristic of classical thinking and has been used to dis­
tinguish classical influence from Renaissance practice in 
the Elizabethan and Jacobean drama, wherein diversity and 
multiplicity have been regarded as the principal character­
istics. But Aristotle, though he thought there was such 
a principle of unity, did not conceive of it in the same 
way as some of his predecessors, particularly Plato; he 
conceived of it as a dynamic, evolving process. In man, 
it was the reason which helped to ally him with this 
dynamic, unifying process. Hence Aristotle stressed the 
reason and he stressed action; hence he appreciated litera­
ture, its relationship both to life and to ultimate ends 
or ideals; hence in the drama he allowed one action to be 
the interrelationship of many parts tending towards one end.
The contention of this work has been that Jonson is 
closer than others of the Renaissance to Aristotle in criti­
cal thought and in actual practice and that he reveals the 
influence of Aristotle quite early in his career. A close 
examination of the Discoveries and a number of the plays 
reveals that Jonson was aware of there having been prac- 
titicing playwrights before there were "laws,” but he was 
also aware that the observations of Aristotle were coherent
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and had validity and could therefore be regarded as guiding 
principles. Like Aristotle, he subordinates character to 
action and he does not make unified action dependent on 
the deeds of one man. In the Discoveries he defines, on 
several occasions, one whole action, not as a double plot, 
not as only one action, but as unified action composed of 
many interrelated parts. A study of his plays reveals that 
this method of unifying is his practice as well as his 
theory. He is therefore a product both of classical and 
Renaissance thought. Any similarity or dissimilarity 
between his plays and Roman plays does not make him either 
classical or non-classical. That he explored the thoughts 
of a multitude of ancient writers should not be allowed 
to account for his classicism, to make him a proponent of 
certain "laws," to obscure the fact that he understood some 
of the real principles of classical thought. That he did 
not adhere to these supposed "laws" should not in turn dis­
qualify him as a classicist and clear the way for claiming 
him as a true and original artist of the Renaissance. Jonson 
succeeds in combining both multiplicity and unified action 
tending toward a unified end and a unified effect. He 
stresses method, "election, and a meane," and it is method 
guided by principles and the reason; it is, therefore, 
shaping or creating as a forming process, not an imposition 
of theory.
208
Throughout the discussion of the plays there has 
been an attempt to demonstrate the way in which all parts 
of the action are interrelated into one large unified 
action'. In order to do this it has also been necessary to 
explore Jonson's theory of the humours. Like unity of 
action, the humours theory is another key to Jonson*s work. 
The humours is one principal means by which Jonson controls 
the motivation of his characters and thereby controls his 
action. In Jonson’s work, however, the humours is not by 
any means equivalent to the Renaissance "scientific" 
physiology-psychology, nor is it simply another name for 
social mannerisms or affectations. It is instead indicative 
of that world view which critics have thought to be elusive 
or nonexistent. The humour is similar to the Greek 
hamartia, to the tragic flaw of the tragic hero; it is an 
indelible mark on man's nature that social or religious 
institutions do not succeed in restricting, restraining, 
eradicating, educating, or even touching. It may shift 
eternally in a Protean manner, but it is always there.
This eternal shifting of appetitive desires antithetical 
to reason is also the essence of the action in Jonson's 
plays. In the early plays these humours are somewhat con­
tained in characters still guided by some respect for reason 
and for institutions in general. But just as the humours 
growing to an excess form the action within individual plays, 
so too there is a progressive development in the humours
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carrying over from one play to another. So it is, at the 
peak of Jonson's powers as a playwright, that there are 
characters such as Volpone who threaten the macrocosm as 
well as the microcosm; Subtle and Face who pervert nature 
and can help corrupt every stratum of the social structure; 
Ursula, Justice Overdo, and Zeal-of-the-Land Busy who per­
vert all of man's safeguards against chaos--a principled 
nature, a just social law, and a rational religion.
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